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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § § 7 8 A-3 -102.(3)(j) 
and 78A-4-103(2)G) (2009). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
I. Did the trial court err in dismissing the fraud based claims in Plaintiffs' 
361-page Second Amended Complaint for failure to plead ihe ek ar and concise 
particularity required by Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b)? 
Standard of Review: This Court reviews a trial court's decision to grant a motion 
to dismiss for correctness. Coroles v. Sabey, 2003 IIT App 339, \ 15,1\- -s :-a y / t . 
II. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in determining, based on the facts 
affirmatively pleaded by Plaintiffs, that Plaintiffs' fraud based claims relating to the 
Hawaii Development, the Mapleton Development, and the Springville Property i ouUi not 
proceed in equity and good conscience in the absence of Kxn Dolezsar's estate under 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 19? 
Standard of Review: This Court reviews a trial court's determination nuclei Rule 
19 for abuse of discretion. Seftel v. Capital City Bank, 7*7 P ..M l)4 i, 944 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989). 
III. 1 )id the trial court abuse its discretion in dismissing Plaintiffs' fraud based 
claims without leave to amend? 
Standard of Review: This Court review s the trial court's denial of leave to amend 
for abuse of discretion. Kelly v. Hard Money Funding, Inc., 2004 UT App 44, ^  14, 87 
P.3d734. 
1 
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IV. Did the trial court err in dismissing Plaintiffs' civil claims for aiding and 
abetting? 
Standard of Review: This Court reviews a trial court's decision to grant a motion 
to dismiss for correctness. Coroles v. Sabey, 2003 UT App 339, If 15, 79 P.3d 974. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS 
I. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) provides: 
Fraud, mistake, condition of the mind. In all averments of fraud or mistake, 
the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with 
particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other condition of mind of a 
person may be averred generally. 
II. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) provides: 
A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course at any time 
before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is one to which no 
responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been placed upon 
the trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time within 20 days after it is 
served. Otherwise a party may amend its pleading only by leave of court or 
by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given 
when justice so requires. A party shall plead in response to an amended 
pleading within the time remaining for response to the original pleading or 
within 10 days after service of the amended pleading, whichever period 
may be the longer, unless the court otherwise orders. 
III. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 19(a)-(b) provides : 
(a) Persons to be joined if feasible. A person who is subject to service of 
process and whose joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the 
subject matter of action shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in his 
absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or 
(2) he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so 
situated that the disposition of the action in his absence may (i) as a 
practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest or 
(ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of 
incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason 
of plaintiff. If the joined party objects to venue and his joinder would 
2 
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render the venue of the action improper, he shall be dismissed from the 
action. 
(b) Determination by court whenever joinder not Feasible. If a person as 
described in Subdivision (a)(l)-(2) hereof cannot be made a party, the court 
shall determine whether in equity and good conscience the action should 
proceed among the parties before it, or should be dismissed, the absent 
person being thus regarded as indispensable. The facts to be considered by 
the court include: first, to what extent a judgment rendered in the person's 
absence might be prejudicial to him or those already parties; second, the 
extent to which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of 
relief, or other measure, the prejudice can be lessened or avoided; third, 
whether a judgment rendered in the person's absence will be adequate; 
fourth, whether the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the action is 
dismissed for nonjoinder. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings 
The claims in this case alleged by Appellants Leslie D. Mower, LD SQ, LLC, LD 
III, LLC, LD Purpose, LLC, andNavona, LC (collectively, "Plaintiffs") primarily arise 
from two real property developments: a condominium development on the island of 
Kauai in Hawaii (the "Hawaii Development") and an up-scale residential subdivision in 
Mapleton, 11 ta! 1 c a 11 e< 1"111 c Preserve at Mapleton (the "Mapleton Development"). I n 11 I ei r 
361-page Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs asserted 4X unisex of action, including, 
among others, claims for breach of contract, quasi contract, unjust enrichment, breach of 
fiduciary duty, aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, fraudulent 
nondisclosure, aiding and abetting fraudulent nondisclosure, negligent misrepresentation, 
conspiracy, violation of the Utah Pattern of \ hikm fit! Activity Act, and conversion. 
Plaintiffs originally filed this lawsuit on October 20, 2009. (R. 461.) After 
motions to dismiss were filed by multiple defendants, Plaintiffs filed a I irst \mended 
3 
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Complaint on November 27, 2009, which contained 216 pages and 713 numbered 
paragraphs. (R. 1873; R. 1893; R. 2161; R. 2143.) The First Amended Complaint 
prompted several more motions to dismiss from the defendants. (R. 2229; R. 2256; R. 
2271; R. 2373.) 
On January 22, 2010, the trial court "dismissefdj the fraud allegations arising 
throughout the Amended Complaint since they [did] not contain the required level of 
particularity" under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). (R. 2608-2607, attached as Ex. 1 
in the Addendum hereto.) However, the Court granted Plaintiffs a "chance to plead fraud 
within 20 days [of the January 22, 2010 Order] and do it concisely and with 
particularity." (Id.) 
Plaintiffs filed their Second Amended Complaint on March 5, 2010, followed by 
an 11-page Notice of Errata Regarding Second Amended Complaint on March 12, 2010. 
(R. 3194, attached as Ex. B in Addendum to Appellants' Opening Brief on Appeal; R. 
5048.) The Simpson Defendants (as defined in the List of All Parties to Proceedings in 
District Court above) then filed a Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint, asking 
the trial court (1) to dismiss Plaintiffs' fraud based claims for failure to plead with 
particularity as required under Utah R. Civ. P. 9(b), (2) to dismiss the fraud based claims 
related to the Hawaii Development, the Mapleton Development, and the Springville 
Property (defined below) under Utah R. Civ. P. 19, (3) to dismiss Plaintiffs' fraudulent 
nondisclosure claim related to the Double T Ranch water purchase for failure to state a 
claim under Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), and (4) to dismiss Plaintiffs' aiding and abetting 
claims for failure to state a claim under Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). (R. 5267-5264.) 
4 
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Defendant Michael Aviano, Defendant Chad D. Carlson, and Defendant David Nemelka 
also filed motions to dismiss on the basis that the allegations of fraud in the Second 
Amended Complaint did not meet the particularity requirements under Rule 9(b). {See R. 
5110; R. 5055; R. 5300.) 
After hearing oral argument concerning the several motions to dismiss, the trial 
court ruled from the bench on May 13, 2010, indicating it would dismiss the fraud based 
claims for failure to plead with particularity and would dismiss the fraudulent 
nondisclosure claim concerning the Double T Ranch water purchase, as well as Plaintiffs' 
aiding and abetting claims, for failure to state a claim. (R o 1 \u 1K ? 1S 187:8, attached 
as Ex. 6 in the Addendum hereto.) The court took the Rule 19 issues under advisement. 
(R. 6136, 183:24-184:3.) 
The trial court then issued two written rulings concerning the motions to dismiss. 
The trial court's June 22, 2010 Ruling and Order on Defendants' Motions to Dismiss the 
Second Amended Complaint reflected its ruling from the bench, dismissing Plaintiffs' 
fraud based claims for failure to plead with particularity and dismissing the 1 )< >ubk' 1 
Ranch water purchase, and the aiding and abetting claims, for failure to state a claim. 
(R. 5606-5602, attached as Ex. 7 in the Addendum hereto.) In its June 16, 2010 Ruling 
and Order on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Fraud Claims in Second Amended 
Complaint Under Rule 19, the trial court concluded that the estate of Ken Dolezsar was a 
necessary and indispensable party, necessitating dismissal of Plaintiffs' fraud based 
claims related to Dolezsar. (R. 5595-5592, attached as Ex. 8 in the Addendum hereto.) 
Plaintiffs then filed two separate petitions for discretionary appeal — one for each 
5 
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of the trial court's written orders. This Court granted Plaintiffs' petitions and 
consolidated them into a single appeal in the above-captioned matter. (R. 5959.) 
Statement of Facts 
1. Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint alleged 48 causes of action against 
38 defendants. (R. 3194.) 
2. In Claim Nos. 1-10, Plaintiffs alleged claims related to the Hawaii 
Development for fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary 
duty, fraudulent nondisclosure, aiding and abetting fraudulent nondisclosure, conversion, 
unjust enrichment, conspiracy, and violation of the Utah Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act 
against the following defendants: David Simpson; Nathan Simpson; Michael Thompson; 
Todd Dorny; Brandon Dente; Wood Springs, LLC; ALS Properties, LLC; Mai Ke Kula; 
Hanalei Kai Holdings, LLC; Ka Mahina, LLC; Dente, LLC; He Kaikolu, LLC; and 
Koamalu Plantation (the "Hawaii Development Defendants"). (R. 3017-2978.) 
3. In the fraud-based claims related to the Hawaii Development, Plaintiffs 
alleged that Ken Dolezsar (Plaintiff Mower's late ex-husband) communicated a number 
of misrepresentations to Mower. Plaintiffs alleged that Dolezsar communicated these 
misrepresentations to Mower, either "in ignorance of the falsity of the representations or 
as part of a conspiracy with Michael Thompson, David Simpson, Nathan Simpson, Todd 
Dorny, Brandon Dente and their entities," after allegedly hearing such misrepresentations 
from David Simpson and Nathan Simpson. (R. 3016, f 543.) 
4. Nowhere in the fraud allegations associated with the Hawaii Development 
did Plaintiffs allege that David Simpson, Nathan Simpson, or any other of the Hawaii 
6 
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Development Defendants made any representations directly to Mower. (R. 3017-3012, 
Y! 538-559.) 
5. Dolezsar could not be joined to the case because he was killed on 
November 15,2007. (R. 3056, «i 400.) 
6. Dolezsar's estate could not be joined because Plaintiffs waited to file this 
case until October 2009, long after the expiration of the one year statute of limitations for 
claims against Dolezsar's estate found in Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-803(a) (1992). 
(R.5593.) 
7. In Claim Nos. 11-20, Plaintiffs alleged claims related to the Mapleton 
Development for fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary 
duty, fraudulent nondisclosure, aiding and abetting fraudulent nondisclosure, conversion, 
unjust enrichment, conspiracy, and violation of the Utah Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act 
against the following defendants: David Simpson; Nathan Simpson; Wood Springs, LLC; 
Landmark Real Estate, Inc.; Oak Leaf, LLC; Sunny Ridge, LLC; KNDJ Development, 
LLC; DN Simpson Holdings, LLC; SOS Mapleton Development, LLC; DN Simpson 
Mapleton Holdings, LLC; The Preserve at Mapleton Development Company, LLC; 
Pheasant Meadows, LLC; Carnesecca Orchard Estates, LLC; Spanish Vista Plat I, LLC; 
Landmark Homes of Utah, LLC; David Nemelka; Chad Carlson; 2 Brothers 
Communications; Allen Hakes; Lonestar Gutters, LLC; Dallas Hakes; Lonestar Builders, 
LLC; Michael Marx; and Michael Aviano (the "Mapleton Development Defendants"). 
(R. 2978-2909.) 
7 
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8. Similar to the fraud claims concerning the Hawaii Development, Plaintiffs 
alleged Dolezsar made a number of misrepresentations to Mower concerning the 
Mapleton Development. Again, Plaintiffs alleged that Dolezsar communicated all of the 
alleged misrepresentations directly to Mower, after allegedly hearing them from David 
Simpson and Nathan Simpson, and that he did so "as part of a conspiracy with the 
Simpsons." (R. 2975,1731; R. 2977, ^ 721; R. 2974,1734; R. 2973, f 739; R. 2970, | 
757-758; R. 3048,1434; R. 2925,1977.) 
9. Plaintiffs do not allege that the Mapleton Development Defendants made 
any misrepresentations directly to Mower. (R. 2978-2962, ffl[ 717-814.) 
10. As part of the claims related to the Mapleton Development, Plaintiffs 
asserted claims on behalf of Magnet Bank, which claims Plaintiffs alleged were acquired 
by Plaintiff Navona, LC in February 2008. (R. 2965,1793.) 
11. In the Magnet Bank fraud-based claims (Claim Nos. 11, 14, 15, 16, and 
20.), Plaintiffs alleged that the Mapleton Development Defendants made 
misrepresentations and material omissions to Magnet Bank in connection with a loan 
extended by Magnet Bank for the Mapleton Development. (R. 2969-2963, ffi[ 766 - 811.) 
12. In Claim Nos. 21-25, Plaintiffs alleged claims for fraud, negligent 
misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, fraudulent nondisclosure, and conspiracy 
arising from Mower's purchase of approximately 30 acres of real property in Springville, 
Utah (the "Springville Property"). Plaintiffs asserted these claims against David 
Simpson, Nathan Simpson, Wood Springs, and Pheasant Meadows (the "Springville 
Property Defendants"). (R. 2909-2896.) 
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13. As in the claims related to the Hawaii Development and the Mapleton 
Development, Plaintiffs alleged that Dolezsar, "whether duped by or complicitous with 
the Simpsons," communicated a number of alleged misrepresentations to Mower with 
respect to the Springville Property. (R. 3048, ^  434; R. 2908, H 1014.) 
14. Plaintiffs did not allege that any of the Springville Property Defendants 
made any misrepresentations directly to Mower. (R. 3048, ^  435; R. 2909-2905, ^ 
1007-1035.) 
15. In Claim Nos. 26-30, Plaintiffs alleged claims for fraud, negligent 
misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, fraudulent nondisclosure, and conspiracy 
against David Simpson and Nathan Simpson, claiming the Simpsons made 
misrepresentations to Mower through her "representatives" concerning the Mapleton 
Development's share of costs for the construction of a water tank by Maple Mountain 
Water Tank Development Company in connection with the Mapleton Development. 
(R. 2896-2885.) 
16. In Claim Nos .31-32, Plaintiffs alleged claims for breach of fiduciary duty 
and fraudulent nondisclosure against David Simpson, claiming Simpson failed to disclose 
to Mower that he used funds from Plaintiff LD III to purchase water shares from a 
company named Double T Ranch (the "Double T Water Purchase"). (R. 2885-2881.) 
17. Plaintiffs affirmatively alleged, and not in the alternative, that Ken 
Dolezsar, David Simpson, Nathan Simpson, and others conspired and agreed to convert 
Plaintiffs' property, make misrepresentations and material omissions to Plaintiffs, and 
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breach their alleged fiduciary duties to Plaintiffs. (R. 2926-2924, fflf 975-980; R. 2897-
2896,^1090.) 
18. Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint spanned 361 pages and contained 
48 causes of action and 1362 numbered paragraphs. (R. 3194.) 
19. Unfortunately, much of the length of the Second Amended Complaint 
resulted from unnecessary detail, such as the 20 pages filled by Plaintiffs with minutia 
from credit card statements to claim that David Simpson and Nathan Simpson allegedly 
breached fiduciary duties to LD SQ by authorizing LD SQ to pay for personal expenses. 
(R. 3149-3129, fflf 179-198; see, e.g., R. 3172-3169, fflf 93-105; R. 3162-3154, fflf 131-
162; R. 3122-3121, ffif 223-226; R. 3051-3050, fflf 420-426.) 
20. Despite having included a host of unnecessary details, Plaintiffs' Fraud 
Based Claims (as defined below) routinely omit essential details concerning the "who, 
what, when, where and how" of the alleged fraud. (See, e.g., R. 2974, ^737 (who, when, 
where); R. 2970, fflf 757-758 (who, when, where); R. 3005-3004 (who, how); R. 3003-
3002 (who, how); R. 2952-2948 (who, how); R. 2947-2945 (who, how); R. 2899-2898 
(who, how); R. 2889-2888 (who, how); R. 2883-2881 (how); R. 3017, % 542 (who); 
R. 2986,1679 (who), R. 2977, \ 720 (who); R. 2976, \ 726 (who); R. 2972, \ 143 (who); 
R. 2908, If 1014 (who); R. 2895,f1094 (who); R. 2895, f 1096 (who); and R. 2895, 
1f 1099 (who).) 
21. Throughout the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs consistently lumped 
David Simpson and Nathan Simpson, and often others, together in levying Plaintiffs' 
allegations of fraud. (See, e.g., R. 3017,1542; R. 2986,1679, R. 2977,1f 720; R. 2976,1f 
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726; R. 2974, K 737; R. 2972, ^  743; R. 2970 ^  757-758; R. 2908, ^ 1014; R. 2895, ^ 
1094; R. 2895, ^ 1096; and R. 2895, ^ 1099; R. 3005, ffl[ 580-581; R. 2951-2949, ^  833-
846; R. 2899-2898, K 1075; R. 2889, ^  1134.) 
22. Although such allegations are made on "information and belief," Plaintiffs 
consistently failed to plead any facts to explain the basis for their belief that David 
Simpson, Nathan Simpson, or others made any of the alleged misrepresentations, or their 
belief as to what David Simpson or Nathan Simpson said or did not say to Dolezsar. (See, 
e.g., R. 3113-3112, ffl[ 256-257; R. 3092-3086, Yl 314-317; R. 3048-3046, ffl| 434-435; R. 
3177-3174, ffl| 83-84.) 
23. Plaintiffs also made other information and belief allegations without the 
necessary factual basis. For example, Plaintiffs alleged, "on information and belief," that 
the 15 offers used in an appraisal of the Mapleton Development submitted to Magnet 
Bank were somehow "contrived sham transactions." (R. 2966, ^  787; R. 3098-3096, 
•jffi 300-304.) However, Plaintiffs did not plead any facts demonstrating a basis for their 
"information and belief that the offers were somehow "sham transactions." They simply 
asserted the conclusion. (R. 2967-2966, ffl[ 784,787; R. 3079, ^  340.) 
24. The Simpson Defendants addressed the several deficiencies in the Second 
Amended Complaint in a motion to dismiss in which they asked the trial court (1) to 
dismiss Plaintiffs' fraud based claims for failure to plead with the concise particularity 
required under Utah R. Civ. P. 9(b), (2) to dismiss the fraud based claims related to the 
Hawaii Development, the Mapleton Development, and the Springville Property under 
Utah R. Civ. P. 19 for failure to join Dolezsar's estate, (3) to dismiss Plaintiffs' 
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fraudulent nondisclosure claim related to the Double T Ranch Water Purchase for failure 
to state a claim under Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), and (4) to dismiss Plaintiffs' aiding and 
abetting claims for failure to state a claim under Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). (R. 5267-5264, 
attached as Ex. 3 in the Addendum hereto; R. 5288-5263, attached as Ex. 4 in the 
Addendum hereto; R. 5430-5407, attached as Ex. 5 in the Addendum hereto.) 
25. The trial court granted the Simpson Defendants' motion to dismiss, ruling 
from the bench and in two subsequent written rulings. (R. 6136, 182:15-187:14; R. 5606-
5602; R. 5595-5592.) 
26. The court dismissed Plaintiffs' fraud based claims — Claim Nos. 1, 4, 5, 
11, 14, 15, 21, 24, 26, 29, and 32 in their entirety, and Claim Nos. 9, 10, 19, 20, 25, and 
30 to the extent they were based on allegations of fraud (collectively, the "Fraud Based 
Claims") — for failure to plead with particularity under Rule 9(b). (R. 5603.) 
27. The court's Rule 9(b) decision adopted the reasoning in the Simpson 
Defendants' memoranda. (R. 5605; R. 6136, 182:21-25; R. 5288-5265.) Additionally, 
the court stated that Plaintiff Mower "was directly privy to what was said to her," yet 
failed to include "where that should have occurred, when it would have occurred, what 
words were used, who else was present, all those types of things that the Court indicated 
in its prior rulings." The court also specifically noted that "there [were] circumstances 
where there were not references to earlier facts that were pleaded, and [the Court] dofes] 
not believe that counsel and the Court should have to guess where those facts are coming 
from or go back and research where those facts are coming from." (R. 6136, 183:1-19.) 
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28. In its written ruling, the trial court determined that the "much too long and 
involved" Second Amended Complaint "still [did] not provide the particularity mandated 
by Rule 9(b)" and improperly "dump[ed] upon the [court]. . . the burden of sifting 
through the hundreds of paragraphs of alleged facts to ascertain whether Plaintiffs [had] 
allege[d]... the facts necessary to make all their elements of fraud." (R. 5605 (internal 
quotations omitted).) 
29. As Plaintiffs had failed on successive attempts to properly plead their fraud 
claims, the trial court granted dismissal under Rule 9(b) without leave to amend. (R. 
5605, 5603; R. 6136,184:12-17,186:20-23.) 
30. The trial court also granted the Simpson Defendants' motion to dismiss 
under Rule 19, dismissing Plaintiffs' fraud-based claims related to the Hawaii 
Development (Claim Nos. 1,4-6, 9, and 10), the Mapleton Development (Claim Nos. 11, 
14-16,19, and 20), and the Springville Property (Claim Nos. 21, 22, 24, and 25). 
(R. 5595-5592; R. 5265.) 
31. Relying on the case of Turville v. J & J Properties, Inc., 2006 UT App 305, 
145 P.3d 1146, and its remarkably similar fact pattern, the court determined that 
Dolezsar's estate was both a necessary and indispensable party under Rule 19. 
Specifically, based on the facts affirmatively pleaded by Plaintiffs, the trial court 
concluded that Dolezsar "occupied a pivotal representative role in the alleged fraud" 
because all of the alleged misrepresentations related to the Hawaii Development, the 
Mapleton Development, and the Springville Property were made to Mower directly by 
Dolezsar. The court therefore determined that "Dolezsar acted as more than a simple go-
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between" as argued by Plaintiffs, and that "complete relief would not be available for 
those who [were] already parties" in his absence. The trial court further determined that 
"an adequate resolution to [Plaintiffs'] claims for fraud [could not] be reached in the 
absence of Mr. Dolezsar's estate, and the only way to mitigate the resulting prejudice to 
Simpsons is to dismiss the claims for fraud." (R. 5595-5592.) 
32. The trial court also dismissed the Double T Ranch Water Purchase 
fraudulent nondisclosure claim (Claim No. 32) for failure to state a claim under Rule 
12(b)(6) because Plaintiffs failed to allege that any of the allegedly non-disclosed facts 
induced any action or influenced any decision by Plaintiffs. (R. 5605 n.l; R. 5603.) 
33. Finally, the court dismissed Plaintiffs aiding and abetting claims (Claim 
Nos. 3, 5, 13, 15) for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) because the Supreme 
Court has not yet recognized civil causes of action for aiding and abetting. (R. 5604.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Dismissal Under Rule 9fb) 
The trial court correctly dismissed Plaintiffs' Fraud Based Claims for failure to 
meet the "basic and fundamental.. . requirement of clarity and conciseness" imposed 
under Rule 9(b). Coroles v. Sabey, 2003 UT App 339, f 23, 79 P.3d 974. Plaintiffs' 
Second Amended Complaint was 361 pages in length, contained 48 causes of action, and 
had 1362 numbered paragraphs. Unfortunately, its length resulted from "unnecessary 
detail, if not minutia," rather than the concise particularity required by Rule 9(b). By 
intermingling unnecessary minutia and leaving out essential detail, Plaintiffs' 361-page 
Complaint "[was] actually too replete with alleged facts, to such a degree that it [was] 
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functionally incomprehensible," justifying dismissal under Rule 9(b). Coroles, 2003 UT 
App 339,^127 n.12. 
Additionally, throughout the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs consistently 
lumped David Simpson and Nathan Simpson, and often others, together in levying 
allegations of fraud. This did not satisfy Rule 9(b)'s standard, which requires a plaintiff 
to set forth with specificity the time, place, content, and manner of each defendant's 
alleged misrepresentations. Plaintiffs' practice of lumping defendants together in their 
fraud allegations was compounded by the fact that they consistently did so based solely 
on "information and belief." This is not surprising as Plaintiffs did not allege that David 
Simpson or Nathan Simpson ever made any representations directly to Mower. Yet, 
Plaintiffs failed to plead any facts to explain the basis for their belief that David Simpson 
or Nathan Simpson made any of the alleged misrepresentations to Dolezsar (who 
allegedly made the misrepresentations to Mower), or their belief as to what David 
Simpson or Nathan Simpson said or did not say to Dolezsar. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' 
information and belief allegations had no value under Rule 9(b). 
The trial court therefore found that Plaintiffs' failure to specifically plead what 
Mower knew and how she knew it justified dismissal of Plaintiffs' Fraud Based Claims 
for failure to plead with particularity. In so doing, the trial court did not "ignore[] 
established agency principles," as argued by Plaintiffs. Rather, the court required Mower 
to allege what she knew and how she knew it to support her "information and belief 
allegations that David Simpson, Nathan Simpson, and others made any 
misrepresentations or omissions at all. 
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For these and the other reasons outlined below, the trial court correctly dismissed 
Plaintiffs' Fraud Based Claims for failure to meet the pleading standard of Rule 9(b). 
Dismissal Under Rule 19 
As demonstrated by the case of Turville v. J&JProps., L. C, 2006 UT App 305, 
1fl[ 36-37, 145 P.3d 1146, the trial court acted within its discretion in concluding under 
Rule 19 that the estate of Ken Dolezsar was a necessary and indispensable party to this 
case. Based on the facts affirmatively pleaded by Plaintiffs, the trial court determined that 
Dolezsar, like the absent party in Turville, "occupied a pivotal representative role" in the 
alleged fraud because all of the alleged misrepresentations were made to Mower directly 
by Dolezsar. Plaintiffs cannot dispute that all of the misrepresentations were made to 
Mower by Dolezsar because that is what they affirmatively alleged in their Complaint. 
That Plaintiffs alleged Dolezsar was Mower's agent does not make him any less 
indispensable. Dolezsar was indispensable not because he was an agent, a joint tortfeasor, 
or even a co-conspirator, but because he "occupied a pivotal representative role" in the 
alleged fraud similar to the absent party in Turville. As has been recognized by this 
Court, situations like those in Turville and in this case are not governed by the general 
rule that joint tortfeasors are not necessary parties. If anything, Dolezsar 5s having made 
the misrepresentations to Mower while acting as her agent only strengthens the 
conclusion that Dolezsar occupied a pivotal representative role in the alleged fraud. The 
trial court therefore acted within its discretion when it concluded that Dolezsar was 
necessary to the just adjudication of this case because "complete relief would not be 
available for those who [were] already parties" in his absence. 
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The trial court also acted within its discretion in concluding that Dolezsar was an 
indispensable party, necessitating dismissal of Plaintiffs' fraud claims related to the 
Hawaii Development, the Mapleton Development, and the Springville Property.1 
Applying the factors outlined in Rule 19(b), the trial court determined that "an adequate 
resolution to [Plaintiffs'] claims for fraud [could not] be reached in the absence of 
Mr. Dolezsar's estate, and the only way to mitigate the resulting prejudice to Simpsons is 
to dismiss the claims for fraud." This unavoidable prejudice included, among other 
things, the fact that the Simpson Defendants might be subjected to joint and several 
liability for misrepresentations allegedly communicated by Dolezsar without the ability to 
hold Dolezsar accountable through cross-claim, cross-examination, or otherwise as a 
result of Plaintiffs' failure to file their fraud claims within the applicable limitations 
period. Further, because Dolezsar's estate can still bring claims against the Simpson 
Defendants, allowing the fraud claims to go forward in this case would potentially subject 
the Simpson Defendants to multiple or inconsistent obligations. The trial court's Rule 
19(b) determination was thus fully supported and within its discretion. 
Dismissal Without Leave to Amend 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing without leave to amend 
after Plaintiffs had failed to properly plead their fraud despite at least three prior attempts 
and express direction from the court. Furthermore, Plaintiffs failed to file a properly 
1
 The trial court did not dismiss all of the fraud based claims under Rule 19 as asserted by 
Plaintiffs. It simply granted the Simpson Defendants' motion to dismiss, which sought 
dismissal under Rule 19 of all fraud based claims related to the Hawaii Development, 
the Mapleton Development (other than those associated with Magnet Bank), and the 
Springville Property. (R. 5592, 5265; R. 5768-5763.) 
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supported written motion for leave to amend to the trial court, which of itself justifies the 
court's refusal to grant leave to amend. 
Dismissal of Aiding and Abetting Claims 
The Court should decline to create a new cause of action for aiding and abetting in 
this case, where Plaintiffs have alleged claims for conspiracy and violation of the Utah 
Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act. To the extent Plaintiffs wish to extend liability to 
persons with whom they had no dealings, they should be required to prove their claims 
for conspiracy and violation of the Utah Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED PLAINTIFFS' FRAUD-
BASED CLAIMS FOR FAILURE TO PLEAD WITH PARTICULARITY. 
"Rule 9(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires that fraud claims be pled 
with particularity." DeBry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 443 (Utah 1995). Under Rule 9(b), a 
plaintiff must "allege with particularity facts necessary to make all their elements of 
fraud." Id.; see also Otsuka Elecs. (USA, Inc.) v. Imaging Specialists, Inc., 937 P.2d 
1274, 1278 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) ("[AJppellants must state with particularity the 
circumstances supporting each element of fraud."). "At a minimum, Rule 9(b) requires 
that a plaintiff set forth the who, what, when, where and how of the alleged fraud, and 
must set forth the time, place, and contents of the false representation, the identity of the 
party making the false statements and the consequences thereof." United States ex rel 
Sikkenga v. Regence BlueCross BlueShield of Utah, All F.3d 702, 726-27 (10th Cir. 
2006) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
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Rule 9(b)'s particularity requirements apply not only to "allegations of common-
law fraud," but extend to "all circumstances where the pleader alleges the kind of 
misrepresentations, omissions, or other deceptions covered by the term 'fraud' in its 
broadest dimension." Williams v. State Farm Ins. Co., 656 P.2d 966, 972 (Utah 1982). 
Thus, Rule 9(b)'s pleading requirements apply to all of Plaintiffs' Fraud-Based Claims. 
Ignoring the fact pleading requirement of Rule 9(b), Plaintiffs incorrectly ask the 
Court to apply the standard governing motions under Rule 12(b) to determine whether the 
trial court properly dismissed Plaintiffs' Fraud-Based Claims for failure to plead with 
particularity. (Appellants' Opening Br. 25.) "[Rule 12(b)(6)], however, does not apply 
to actions for fraud." DeBry, 889 P.2d at 443. Accordingly, the Court need not "draw all 
reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiff," as proposed by 
Plaintiffs. (Appellants'Opening Br. 25.) 
In this case, Plaintiffs' 361-page Complaint failed to clearly and concisely provide 
the particularity required by Rule 9(b). Accordingly, as outlined below, the trial court 
properly dismissed Plaintiffs' Fraud Based Claims. 
A. The Second Amended Complaint Did Not Comply With Rule 9(b)'s 
Fundamental Requirement of Clarity and Conciseness. 
Under the notice pleading requirements espoused by the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, plaintiffs are required to set forth their claims for relief in "a short and plain 
statement... showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Utah R. Civ. P. 8(a). Where 
fraud is at issue, "the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with 
particularity." Utah R. Civ. P. 9(b). Together, the purpose of these pleading Rules is "to 
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require that the essential facts upon which redress is sought be set forth with simplicity, 
brevity, clarity and certainty so that it can be determined whether there exists a legal basis 
for the relief claimed." Heathman v. Hatch, 372 R2d 990, 992 (Utah 1962). 
A trial court may properly dismiss a complaint that does not satisfy the "basic and 
fundamental... requirement of clarity and conciseness" imposed under Rule 9(b). 
Coroles v. Sabey, 2003 UT App 339, If 23, 79 P.3d 974. For example, in the case of 
Coroles v. Sabey, the plaintiffs filed a complaint containing 13 different causes of action, 
consisting of'125 paragraphs spanning 136 pages, the first 646 paragraphs and 125 
pages of which [werej alleged facts." Id. at ^ 6. However, the length of the complaint 
was the result of "unnecessary detail, if not minutia," instead of the concise 
"particularity" required by Rule 9(b). Id. at 123 n.l 1. Indeed, the complaint "[was] 
actually too replete with alleged facts, to such a degree that it [was] functionally 
incomprehensible," leaving the Court "unable to ascertain what facts are claimed to 
constituted [the fraud] charges." Id. at f^ 27 n.l2 (internal quotations omitted). This 
problem was compounded by the fact that the plaintiffs merely incorporated the facts 
stated in the 660 paragraphs preceding their fraud claim, rather than setting forth the 
specific facts constituting the alleged fraud within the actual cause of action. Id. f 25. 
In so doing, the Coroles plaintiffs "essentially dumpfed] upon the trial court . . . 
2
 See also Arena Land & Inv. Co. v. Petty, No. 94-4196, 69 F.3d 547, 1995 WL 645678, 
at *2 (10th Cir. Nov. 3, 1995) ("As this case exemplifies, mere wordiness is not what it 
takes to state a cause of action under Rule 9. It is a matter of precision, not length that 
is required."). The Arena Land & Investment case was favorably cited by this Court in 
Coroles. Coroles, 2003 UT App 339, at f27. 
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the burden of sifting through the hundreds of paragraphs of alleged facts to ascertain 
whether Plaintiffs ha[d] allege[d]... facts necessary to make all their elements of fraud." 
Id. at ^  27 (internal quotations omitted). The Court held that the plaintiffs' "much too 
long and involved complaint" thus failed to set forth "with simplicity, brevity, clarity and 
certainty" the relevant surrounding facts "in such a manner that it [was] evident what 
facts [were] claimed to constitute [the fraud] charges." Id. at *| 27 (emphasis added) 
(internal quotations omitted).3 Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal 
of the plaintiffs' fraud claims for failure to plead with particularity under Rule 9(b). Id. at 
^ 30; see also Glenn v. First Natl Bank in Grand Junction, 868 F.2d 368, 371-72 (10th 
Cir. 1989) (affirming dismissal of complaint after concluding "the trial court did not err 
in refusing to attempt to create order out of chaos"); Arena Land & Inv. Co. v. Petty, No. 
94-4196, 69 F.3d 547,1995 WL 645678, at *1 (10th Cir. Nov. 3,1995) (affirming 
dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8, 9(b) after concluding "[i]t is neither the court's nor the 
appellees' role to sift through a lengthy, conclusory and poorly written complaint to piece 
together the cause of action.") 
As with the complaint in Coroles, the Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint 
failed to satisfy Rule 9(b)'s fundamental requirement of clarity and conciseness. The 
Second Amended Complaint spans 361 pages in length, containing 1362 numbered 
paragraphs. Unfortunately, much of the length of the Complaint results from 
3
 The Coroles Court also noted that the plaintiffs' had failed "to identify exactly who 
made the alleged misrepresentations" by asserting allegations in the passive voice. 
Coroles, 2003 UT App 339, at ^  28. As set forth in Part LB below, Plaintiffs likewise 
failed to identify exactly who made the alleged misrepresentations by improperly 
grouping defendants throughout their Second Amended Complaint. 
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"unnecessary detail, if not minutia," rather than the concise particularity required by Rule 
9(b). See Coroles, 2003 UT App 339, If 23 n. 11. For example, Plaintiffs filled 20 pages 
of the Complaint with unnecessary detail from credit card statements to claim that David 
Simpson and Nathan Simpson allegedly breached fiduciary duties to LD SQ by 
authorizing LD SQ to pay for personal expenses. (R. 3149-3129, fflf 179-198; see also R. 
3172-3169, fl 93-105; R. 3162-3154, fflf 131-162; R. 3122-3121, ^  223-226; R. 3051-
3050, ffljf 420-426.) As a result of including unhelpful minutia, the Complaint "rambles 
on for [177] pages before reaching the first claim for relief." Arena Land & Inv. Co., 
1995 WL 645678, *1. 
Similar to the complaint in Coroles, the Second Amended Complaint incorporates 
by reference all of the 536 paragraphs from the general factual statement into each of the 
fraud-based claims. (R. 3017,173; 3005,1579; R. 3003,1588; R. 2994, f 631; R. 
2987, | 670; R. 2978,1717; R. 2952,f831; R. 2947,1855; R. 2926,1971; R. 2923,1 
984; R. 2909,11007; R. 2899,11074; R. 2898,11081; R. 2896, ^  1093; R. 2889,1 
1133; R. 2888,11139; R. 2882, f 1175.) As Plaintiffs point out, the Fraud Based Claims 
contain a number of references to specific allegations within the 536-paragraph general 
factual statement. However, many of the allegations within those claims do not contain 
the "who, what, when, where and how" of the alleged fraud and do not reference any 
other allegations in the general section that might supply the missing information. For 
example, as part of the fraud claims related to the Mapleton Development, Plaintiffs 
made the following allegation: 
737. David Simpson, Nathan Simpson, and Ken Dolezsar also 
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represented to [Mower] that the $6,800,000.00 would be specifically used 
to fund development work at The Preserve at Mapleton development 
project, that she would receive a first position deed of trust securing a 
promissory note and that they would record the deed of trust in the office of 
the Utah County Recorder. 
(R. 2974, \ 737.) Plaintiffs did not specify who in particular made the alleged 
representations or when or where they were made. When Defendants pointed out this 
deficiency to the trial court, Plaintiffs claimed that paragraph 737 somehow "refer[ed] to 
the allegations contained in paragraph 736." (R. 5375.) However, neither paragraph 736 
nor paragraph 315 (to which paragraph 736 refers) provided the missing information. 
Similarly, each of Plaintiffs' fraudulent non-disclosure claims failed to include 
allegations explaining how the alleged omissions resulted in damages to Plaintiffs (i.e., 
why they were material or how Plaintiffs relied on them).4 For example, in the fraudulent 
nondisclosure claim related to the Double T Ranch Water Purchase, Plaintiffs alleged that 
David Simpson fraudulently failed to disclose to Mower that he had used money from LD 
III to purchase water shares in the name of Wood Springs, as well as other alleged 
happenings after the alleged purchase. (R. 2882, ^  1176-1179.) However, Plaintiffs did 
4
 "A party is liable for fraudulent nondisclosure if he comi[ts].. . a material fact when 
there is a duty to disclose, for the purpose of inducing action on the part of the other 
party, with actual, justifiable reliance resulting in damage to that party" Barber Bros. 
Ford, Inc. v. Foianini, 2008 UT App 463, *| 2 (emphasis added) (unpublished decision). 
"Under Rule 9(b), a complaint must identify the time, place, and content of each 
allegedly fraudulent representation or omission, identify the person responsible for it, 
and identify the consequences thereof" Caprin v. Simon Transp. Servs., Inc., 99 Fed. 
Appx. 150,158 (10th Cir. Feb. 23, 2004) (emphasis added) (unpublished decision). See 
also Odyssey Re (London) Ltd. v. Sterling Cook Brown Holdings Ltd., 85 F. Supp. 2d 
282,293 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) ("[W]here the alleged fraud consists of an omission . . . the 
complaint must still allege . . . the context of the omissions and the manner in which 
they mislead the plaintiff."). 
23 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
not allege that these nondisclosures induced any action or influenced any decision by 
Mower. Instead, they simply alleged that David Simpson's failure to disclose somehow 
damaged Mower and LD III in the amount of $300,125.00. (R. 2882, f 1182.) In their 
brief to this Court, Plaintiffs argue that the necessary detail concerning their reliance on 
the alleged omissions in their five claims for fraudulent nondisclosure was found in 
paragraphs 85, 258, 318, 359, 436, and 487. Yet, none of these allegations was 
referenced within any of the nondisclosure causes of action. (R. 3005-3004; R. 3003-
3002; R. 2952-2948; R. 2947-2945; R. 2899-2898; R. 2889-2888; R. 2883-2881.) They 
were simply buried in the 536 paragraphs of general facts. Moreover, Plaintiffs did not 
direct the trial court's attention to any of these paragraphs in opposing the Simpson 
Plaintiffs'motion to dismiss. 
As demonstrated by these and other examples,5 Plaintiffs improperly placed the 
burden of sifting through the hundreds of paragraphs of alleged facts on the trial court to 
determine whether Plaintiffs had supplied the missing information. Plaintiffs make clear 
that this is precisely what they intended by urging this Court to reverse the trial court for 
not "considering] the Second Amended Complaint as a whole." (Appellants' Opening 
Br. 30.) Plaintiffs also complain that the Simpson Defendants used examples in its 
memoranda to the trial court rather than pointing out every single deficiency in Plaintiffs 
5
 (See R. 2970, Iflf 757-58 (failing to set forth who among David Simpson, Nathan 
Simpson, and Dolezsar made the alleged representations or when or where they were 
made).) 
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Fraud Based Claims.6 However, "[i]t is [Plaintiffs'] responsibility, not the courts', to set 
forth the relevant surrounding facts in such a manner that it is evident what facts are 
claimed to constitute [the fraud] charges." Coroles, 2003 UT App 339, \ 27 (internal 
quotations omitted). In their memorandum to the trial court, Plaintiffs merely addressed 
the examples of pleading deficiencies highlighted by the Simpson Defendants, making no 
attempt to point the trial court to other allegations that Plaintiffs apparently believed were 
pleaded with particularity. That the trial court refused "to do Appellants' work for them" 
in this regard is not grounds for reversal. Glenn, 868 F .2d at 371. 
In short, by intermingling unnecessary minutia and leaving out essential detail, 
Plaintiffs' 361-page Second Amended Complaint "is actually too replete with alleged 
facts, to such a degree that it is functionally incomprehensible." Coroles, 2003 UT App 
339, ^ | 27 n.12. As a result, the Complaint failed to provide "a clearly defined foundation 
upon which further proceedings by way of responsive pleadings and/or trial [could] go 
forward in an orderly manner." Id. at ^  23. The trial court was therefore justified in 
dismissing Plaintiffs' fraud-based claims for failure to plead with the concise particularity 
required by Rule 9(b). 
B. Plaintiffs Improperly Lumped David Simpson, Nathan Simpson, and 
Others Together in Levying Unsupported "Information and Belief 
Fraud Allegations Throughout the Second Amended Complaint. 
The particularity requirements of Rule 9(b) "[are] especially important in cases 
involving multiple defendants." Cook v. Zions First NaVl Bank, 645 F. Supp. 423, 424 
6
 The Simpson Defendants' opening and reply memoranda to the trial court were 24 
pages and 22 pages, respectively, and surely would have been longer had they attempted 
to point out every deficiency in the Second Amended Complaint. 
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(D. Utah 1986). "[EJach defendant is entitled to know precisely what it is the plaintiff 
claims he did wrong.59 Id. Lumping multiple defendants together into allegations of 
fraud does not meet this requirement and constitutes grounds for dismissal. See id. at 
424-25 (dismissing with prejudice fraud claims where plaintiffs failed on third attempt to 
"allege specifically the factual basis upon which they charge each defendantwith fraud." 
(emphasis added)); Coroles, 2003 UT App 339,128 n. 15 (citing Cook for the proposition 
plaintiffs must "set forth in specific terms the time, place, content, and manner of each 
defendant's alleged misrepresentations or otherwise fraudulent conduct.") (emphasis 
added); Brooks v. Bank of Boulder, 891 F. Supp 1469, 1477 (D. Col. 1995) ("When 
plaintiff is dealing with more than one defendant, he or she is under a Rule 9(b) 
obligation to specify which defendant told which lie and under what circumstances."). 
Throughout the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs consistently lumped David 
Simpson and Nathan Simpson, and often others, together in levying Plaintiffs' allegations 
of fraud. (See, e.g., R. 3017,1542; R. 2986,1679, R. 2977, f 720; R. 2976, f 726; R. 
2974,1737; R. 2972,1743; R. 2970 ^ 757-58; R. 2908,11014; R. 2895, f 1094; R. 
2895,11096; andR. 2895,11099; R. 3005, U| 580-581; R. 2951-2949, ffl 833-846; R. 
2899-2898,11075; R. 2889,11134.) Paragraph 542 of the Complaint exemplifies this 
improper practice: 
542. Michael Thompson, David Simpson and Nathan Simpson, 
knowing that Ken Dolezsar was acting as [Mower's] agent, that Dolezsar 
was managing Leslie's business affairs and that he was [Mower's] husband, 
made the representations to Dolezsar described in paragraphs [sic] 83 
herein. 
(R. 3016, ^ 542.) Here, Plaintiffs merely lumped Michael Thompson, David Simpson, 
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and Nathan Simpson together without specifying which of the three made the alleged 
misrepresentations. Plaintiffs then went on to attribute these statements to Dolezsar, 
claiming he was "part of a conspiracy" with Michael Thompson, David Simpson, Nathan 
Simpson, and others. (R. 3016, ^  543.) Plaintiff similarly lumps David Simpson, Nathan 
Simpson, and Dolezsar together throughout the Second Amended Complaint. {See, e.g., 
R. 2974, TCI 737, 758.) 
Plaintiffs' practice of lumping defendants together in their fraud allegations is 
magnified because they consistently do so solely on "information and belief." {See, e.g., 
R. 3113-3112, \\ 256-257; R. 3092-3086, \\ 314-317; R. 3048-3046, ^  434-435; R. 
3177-3174, Yf 83-84.) Fraud allegations made on information and belief are sufficient 
for Rule 9(b) purposes only if the plaintiffs "include[] the facts upon which the belief is 
based." Roth v. Pedersen, 2009 UT App 313, «fl 8 (citing Kuhre v. Goodfellow, 2003 UT 
App 86, *| 24, 69 P.3d 286) (unpublished decision); see also 2 Moore's Federal Practice 
§ 9.03[l][g] (3d ed. 2010) ("Pleadings alleging fraud usually may not be based on 
information and belief."). 
Plaintiffs did not plead any factual basis to support their information and belief 
allegations. For example, in paragraph 316 Plaintiffs alleged, "[o]n information and 
belief," that "David Simpson and Nathan Simpson . . . made . . . promises, 
representations and offers of contractual consideration to Ken Dolezsar and caused 
Dolezsar to repeat the promises, representations and offers of contractual consideration to 
[Mower] in behalf of the Simpsons." (R. 3090,^316.) As neither David Simpson nor 
Nathan Simpson is alleged to have ever made any representations directly to Mower, 
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Plaintiffs had to plead this allegation on information and belief. Yet, Plaintiffs failed to 
plead any facts to explain the basis for their belief that David Simpson or Nathan 
Simpson made any of the alleged representations, or their belief as to what David 
Simpson or Nathan Simpson said or did not say to Dolezsar. (R. 3092-3086, fflf 314-
318.) Thus, Plaintiffs' information and belief allegations are of no value under Rule 9(b). 
Plaintiffs' failure to specifically plead what Mower knew and how she knew it was 
specifically cited by the trial court as justification for its conclusion that the Fraud Based 
Claims had not been properly pleaded with particularity. (R. 6136, at 183:1-10, 186:8-
13;R.5594.7) 
Plaintiffs' consistent lumping of David Simpson, Nathan Simpson, and others in 
their unsupported "information and belief fraud allegations violated the pleading 
requirements of Rule 9(b) and therefore fully supported the trial court's dismissal of the 
Fraud Based Claims. See Cook, 645 F. Supp. at 424-25. 
C. Plaintiffs Pleaded the Magnet Bank Fraud Claims Using Labels and 
Conclusions Rather Than Properly Pleaded Facts. 
Mere pleading of labels and conclusions, such as "false statements" or "fraud," 
does not satisfy Rule 9(b)'s fact pleading requirements. Williams v. State Farm Ins. Co., 
656 P.2d 966, 971 (Utah 1982); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, U.S. , 129 S. Ct. 1937, 
1949-50 (2009) (condemning pleading of "labels and conclusions" that "do not permit the 
As stated by the trial court: "[TJhere is no factual basis in the complaint for what, if 
anything, Simpsons actually told Mr. Dolezsar and no way of determining the accuracy 
of any information Mr. Dolezsar may have passed to Ms. Mower from Simpsons. This 
is one of the problems with the fraud allegation in the Complaint. What Mr. Dolezsar 
specifically told Ms. Mower and how and where he said it is presumably known only to 
her, but none of her complaints identify it with particularity." (R. 5594.) 
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court to infer more than a mere possibility of misconduct"). 
Plaintiffs pleaded their Magnet Bank fraud claims by using labels and conclusions 
rather than properly pleaded facts. Specifically, Plaintiffs alleged that David Simpson 
and Nathan Simpson somehow duped an appraiser into using allegedly fraudulent "pre-
sales" — which the appraisal itself clarifies were offers — to arrive at the valuation of the 
Mapleton Development submitted to Magnet Bank in connection with a loan application. 
(R. 2966, H 787; R. 5373.) However, Plaintiffs failed to include any factual basis for their 
claim that the offers were "sham transactions." (R. 2967-2966, ffl[ 784,787; R. 3079, ^ 
340.) Rather, Plaintiffs merely alleged, "on information and belief," that each of the 
approximately 15 offers were somehow "contrived sham transactions." (R. 3098-3096, 
^ 300-04.) Plaintiffs did not plead any facts in their 361-page Complaint demonstrating 
a basis for their "information and belief that the offers were somehow "sham 
transactions." They simply asserted the conclusion, which has no Rule 9(b) value. 
Similarly, Plaintiffs alleged in conclusory fashion that the Simpsons submitted 
false financial statements to Magnet Bank in connection with the application. (R. 2969-
2967, Y(| 766-777.) Without making any attempt to explain how, Plaintiffs merely 
conclude that David Simpson and Nathan Simpson's financial statements overstated their 
assets and understated their liabilities. (R. 3074-3073, ffl| 352, 353, 355; R. 2968, ^  771-
773.) Rule 9(b) requires that this detail be pleaded "so that there will be a clearly defined 
foundation upon which further proceedings . . . can go forward in an orderly manner." 
Heathman, 372 P.2d at 992. In their memorandum to the trial court, Plaintiffs argued that 
the missing information was supplied in other paragraphs in the Complaint, specifically 
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referencing paragraphs 323-326. (R. 5370-5369, attached as Ex. 2 in the Addendum 
hereto.) However, these allegations are not referenced anywhere in the Magnet Bank 
fraud claim. (R. 2969-2963, ffl[ 767-810.) This is yet another example where Plaintiffs 
expected the Court to "siftf] through hundreds of paragraphs of alleged facts to ascertain 
whether Plaintiffs hafd] allegefd] . . . facts necessary to make all their elements of fraud." 
Coroles, 2003 UT App 339, | 2 7 . 8 
Based on this pleading deficiency, as well as those outlined above, the trial court 
correctly dismissed Plaintiffs' Fraud Based Claims for failure to plead with the clear and 
concise particularity required by Rule 9(b). 
n. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
DISMISSING THE FRAUD-BASED CLAIMS RELATED TO KEN 
DOLEZSAR UNDER RULE 19 FOR FAILURE TO JOIN AN 
INDISPENSABLE PARTY. 
Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires joinder of "necessary" 
parties where feasible, and dismissal of the action in the absence of "indispensable" 
parties. Utah R. Civ. P. 19(a)-(b); Turville v. J&JProps., L.C., 2006 UT App 305, fflf 36-
37, 145 P.3d 1146. Analysis under Rule 19 proceeds in two steps: First, the trial court 
must determine whether an absent party is necessary to the "just adjudication" of the 
action. Second, where an absent party is found to be necessary to the action, but cannot 
feasibly be joined, the court must determine whether such party is indispensable such that 
the action must be dismissed in his absence. Turville, 2006 UT App 305, at Yl 36-37. 
8
 The Simpson Defendants expressly incorporate the arguments of Appellee Michael 
Aviano concerning the remaining portion of the Magnet Bank fraud claim, in which 
Plaintiffs alleged that Aviano, David Simpson, and Nathan Simpson misrepresented the 
sales price for Aviano's purchase of Lot 76 in the Mapleton Development. 
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"[A] trial court's determination properly entered under Rule 19 will not be 
disturbed absent an abuse of discretion." Seftel v. Capital City Bank, 767 P.2d 941, 944 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989); see also Green v. Louder, 2001 UT 62, \ 40,29 P.3d 638 ("A trial 
court's determination of whether a party should be joined to an action will not be 
disturbed absent an abuse of discretion."); Turville, 2006 UT App 305, ^  24 ("We will 
not disturb [a] trial court's determination [that] a party should be joined to an action . . . 
absent an abuse of discretion.") (internal quotations omitted). 
In its thorough Ruling and Order on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Fraud Claims 
in Second Amended Complaint Under Rule 19, the trial court in this case determined that 
Dolezsar's estate was a necessary and indispensable party and carefully "identified] the 
specific facts and reasoning that supported] its conclusion." Turville, 2006 UT App 305, 
^ 38. The court therefore granted the Simpson Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' 
fraud based claims related to the Hawaii Development, the Mapleton Development, and 
the SpringviUe Property. As set forth below, the Court acted well within its discretion in 
so doing. 
A. The Trial Court Acted Within Its Discretion In Determining Dolezsar 
Was Necessary to the Just Adjudication of This Action, 
Under Rule 19(a), a party may be necessary in either of two ways: 
"(1) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already 
parties, or (2) he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and 
is so situated that the disposition of the action in his absence may (i) as a 
practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii) 
leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of 
incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason 
of his claimed interest." 
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Utah R. Civ. P. 19(a). Here, the trial court concluded that Dolezsar was a necessary party 
under Rule 19(a)(1) based on facts affirmatively pleaded by Plaintiffs.9 (R. 5595-5591.) 
Specifically, the court determined that Dolezsar "occupied a pivotal representative role in 
the alleged fraud" and therefore that "complete relief would not be available" in his 
absence, relying on the remarkably similar case of Turville v. J&JProperties, L.C., 2006 
UTApp 305, 145 P.3d 1146. (R. 5593.) 
As demonstrated by the Turville opinion, the trial court's determination in this 
regard was within its discretion. In Turville, this Court upheld the lower court's 
determination that complete relief was not possible for purposes of Rule 19(a) in the 
absence of a party who was the primary participant in the fraud alleged by the plaintiff. 
Turville, 2006 UT App 305,140. The plaintiff (Turville) sued Tri-J Properties LLC and 
its principals (Clark, Quitiquit, and Ritchie) in relation to two real estate transactions. Id. 
at 1Hf 2-8. Turville primarily dealt with Clark, who agreed to sell two parcels of property 
owned by Tri-J in exchange for a $1,000,000 note and assumption of the debts associated 
with the properties. Id. at ^  3-6. Unfortunately, Clark entered this agreement without 
the knowledge or consent of Quitiquit and Ritchie, who thereafter refused to allow Tri-J 
to turn over its property interest. Id. As a result, Turville asserted claims for (among 
9
 As outlined in Parts II.B.l and II.B.3 below, Dolezsar was also a necessary party under 
Rule 19(a)(2) because in his absence, the Simpson Defendants would be subject to a 
substantial risk of incurring multiple and potentially inconsistent obligations. 
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others) fraud, breach of contract, and civil conspiracy against Ritchie, Quitiquit, Clark, 
Tri-J, and other related persons and entities. Id. at ^  8. Turville initially served only 
Ritchie and then waited more than two years to serve the other defendants. Id. at ^  9. In 
the interim, Clark died of cancer and was never served. Id. at \ 10. Clark sought leave to 
amend to join Clark's estate as a party to the case, but leave was denied as untimely and 
unjustified. Id. at <| 32. 
Ritchie and Quitiquit then moved the court to dismiss Turville's complaint for 
failure to join Clark's estate as a necessary and indispensable party. Id. at ^  10,17. 
Recognizing Clark's "pivotal representative role . . . in the transactions at issue," and that 
the other parties faced a "substantial risk of incurring multiple obligations without 
recourse to [Clark's] estate," the trial court found that Clark's estate was a necessary 
party to the case. Id. at ^  9. This Court affirmed, holding "the record supported] the trial 
court's conclusion that 'in [the Estate of Mr. Clark's] absence[,] complete relief cannot 
be accorded among those already parties.'" Id. at ^ | 40 (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 19(a)). 
Plaintiffs incorrectly argue that the Turville Court concluded Clark was a necessary 
party solely because he was named as a defendant in the case. Careful reading of the 
Turville opinion shows that Clark's having been named as a defendant was simply strong 
evidence that he was "primarily" responsible for the conduct that allegedly damaged the 
plaintiff—which was the justification for finding he was a necessary party. Turville, 
2006 UT App 305, \ 40. Whether a person is a necessary party under Rule 19(a) cannot 
turn merely on whether the plaintiff names such person as a defendant. Otherwise, 
plaintiffs could control the outcome of Rule 19 analysis merely by declining to name an 
otherwise necessary party as a defendant. Moreover, as they allege that Dolezsar made 
all of the representations of which they complain as part of a conspiracy to defraud them, 
Plaintiffs surely would have named Dolezsar as a defendant had they filed this case 
before he died or during the limitations period for joining his estate under Utah Code 
Ann. § 75-3-803(a). That Clark happened to die after the Turville complaint was filed 
does not make him any more necessary under Rule 19(a) than Dolezsar. 
33 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Specifically, because Clark's actions "primarily, if not solely,... led to Plaintiffs 
alleged damages," the Court held that "the interest of fairness to the parties in [the] 
litigation" justified the trial court's determination that Clark's estate was a necessary 
party to Turville's case. Id. 
As did the lower court in Turville, the trial court in this case acted within its 
discretion when it concluded that Dolezsar was a necessary party to Plaintiffs' fraud-
based claims. Based on the facts alleged by Plaintiffs, the trial court concluded that 
Dolezsar, like Clark, "occupied a pivotal representative role in the alleged fraud. (R. 
5593.) Comparing Dolezsar to Clark, the Court noted Plaintiffs affirmatively pleaded 
that all of the alleged misrepresentations related to the Hawaii Development, the 
Mapleton Development, and the Springville Property were made to Mower directly by 
Dolezsar. (R. 5594.) "[Plaintiffs] [did] not cite an instance where [the] Simpsons 
directly made a misrepresentation to her." (R. 5594.) The Court therefore concluded that 
"Dolezsar acted as more than a simple go-between" as argued by Plaintiffs, and that 
"complete relief would not be available for those who [were] already parties because of 
the inability to hold him accountable" due to Plaintiffs' failure to join Dolezsar's estate 
before the statute of limitations expired. (R. 5593.) In other words, "the interest of 
fairness to the parties in [the] litigation" necessitated the joinder of Dolezsar's estate in 
order for there to be a "just adjudication" of this matter. See Turville, 2006 UT App 305, 
140. Additionally, like the defendants in Clark, the Simpson Defendants would face a 
substantial risk of incurring multiple obligations without recourse to Dolezsar's estate, as 
outlined in Parts ILB. 1 and II.B.3 below. 
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The facts affirmatively alleged, and thereby admitted, by Plaintiffs in the Second 
Amended Complaint fully supported the trial courts' determination that Dolezsar was a 
necessary party.11 Plaintiffs alleged that David Simpson, Nathan Simpson, Dolezsar, and 
others conspired and agreed to make misrepresentations to Plaintiffs. (R. 2925, % 977.) 
Importantly, however, Plaintiffs consistently alleged that Dolezsar was the one who 
actually made the alleged misrepresentations to Mower. (R. 3016, <fl 543; R. 2977, \ 721; 
R. 2975, H 731; R. 2974, ^  734; R. 2973, ^ 739; R. 2970, K 757-58; R. 3048-3046, ^  434-
435; R. 2908, ^  1014.) Nowhere in the fraud allegations associated with the Hawaii 
Development, the Mapleton Development, or the Springville Property did Plaintiffs 
allege that any of the Simpson Defendants made any representations directly to Mower. 
(R. 3017-3012, ffl| 537-559; R. 2978-2962, Iffl 717-814; R. 3048-3046,1fl[ 434-35; R. 
2909-2905, ffl| 1007-1035.) The Second Amended Complaint itself thus shows that 
Dolezsar is alleged to be the nexus for the fraud alleged by Plaintiffs. 
Plaintiffs attempt to distinguish Dolezsar from Clark in the Turville case because 
they alleged David Simpson and Nathan Simpson participated in the fraud by authorizing 
Plaintiffs assert that the trial court made a factual determination in concluding that 
Dolezsar occupied a pivotal representative role. This is incorrect. The trial court merely 
relied on the facts affirmatively pleaded by Plaintiffs, thereby satisfying the requirement 
that it "identify the specific facts and reasoning that supported] its conclusion that a 
party is . . . necessary under Rule 19(a). Werner-Jacobsen v. Bednarik, 946 P.2d 744, 
747 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). As outlined herein, Plaintiffs affirmatively alleged, and 
cannot dispute, that Dolezsar communicated all of the alleged misrepresentations to 
Plaintiffs. By contrast, in the Hancock case cited by Plaintiffs, the trial court's denial of 
leave to amend was unsupported by the allegations in the complaint. Hancock v. The 
True and Living Church of Jesus Christ of the Last Days, 2005 UT App 314, ^  19,118 
P.3d297. 
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and instructing Dolezsar to make the misrepresentations to Plaintiffs. (See, e.g., 
R. 3016,1543.) However, as the trial court recognized, Plaintiffs cannot, and did not, 
dispute that all of the alleged misrepresentations were made to Mower by Dolezsar, 
because that is what Plaintiffs alleged. (R. 5594.) Accordingly, the district court did not 
abuse its discretion in concluding that, like Clark in the Turville case, Dolezsar "occupied 
a pivotal representative role in the alleged fraud." (R. 5593.) 
That Plaintiffs alleged Dolezsar was Mower's agent does not change this result. It 
is true that agents are typically not necessary parties to lawsuits against their principals 
simply by virtue of their agency. See, e.g., Nottingham v. Gen. Am. Commc'ns Corp., 
811 F.2d 873 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding agent was not necessary party to claims against his 
principal). However, the trial court did not conclude that Dolezsar was indispensable 
because he was allegedly Mower's agent. Dolezsar was indispensable because he was 
the one who allegedly communicated all of the alleged misrepresentations to Mower. If 
anything, Dolezsar's having made the misrepresentations to Mower while acting as her 
agent only strengthens the conclusion that Dolezsar occupied a pivotal representative role 
in the alleged fraud. As the nexus for Plaintiffs' alleged fraud, Dolezsar's presence is 
necessary to the "just adjudication" of Plaintiffs' fraud claims regardless of whether he 
was acting as Mower's agent. 
12
 Notably, Plaintiffs did not allege any factual basis for what David Simpson, Nathan 
Simpson, or others may or may not have said to Dolezsar. Presumably, they rely on 
hearsay statements from Dolezsar, which were not alleged. 
36 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
B. The Trial Court Acted Within Its Discretion In Determining the Action 
Could Not Proceed In Equity And Good Conscience in Dolezsar's 
Absence. 
Where a necessary party cannot be feasibly joined, and the action cannot proceed 
"in equity and good conscience" in his absence, the party is deemed "indispensable," and 
the action "should be dismissed." Utah R. Civ. P. 19(b). Rule 19(b) instructs the trial 
court to consider the following factors in deciding whether "equity and good conscience" 
require dismissal: 
[F]irst, to what extent a judgment rendered in the person's absence might 
be prejudicial to him or those already parties; second the extent to which, 
by protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other 
measure, the prejudice can be lessened or avoided; third, whether a 
judgment rendered in the person's absence will be adequate; fourth, 
whether the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the action is 
dismissed for nonjoinder. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 19(b) (emphasis added). As the Rule itself "does not state what weight is 
to be given each factor," the trial court "must determine the importance of each factor on 
the facts of each particular case and in light of equitable considerations." Glenny v. Am. 
Metal Climax, Inc., 494 F.2d 651, 653 (10th Cir. 1974). 
Applying these factors, the trial court determined that "an adequate resolution to 
[Plaintiffs'] claims for fraud [could not] be reached in the absence of Mr. Dolezsar's 
estate, and the only way to mitigate the resulting prejudice to Simpsons is to dismiss the 
claims for fraud." (R. 5593-5592.) The court therefore concluded that Dolezsar's estate 
was an indispensable party, necessitating dismissal of Plaintiffs' fraud claims related to 
the Hawaii Development, the Mapleton Development, and the Springville Property. (Id.) 
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1. The Trial Court Properly Concluded That Rendering Judgment 
In Dolezsar's Absence Would Result in Unfair Prejudice to 
Defendants. 
The Turville case again demonstrates that the trial court's indispensable party 
determination was within its discretion. In Turville, the Court relied heavily on two facts 
in upholding the lower court's determination that Clark was an indispensable party. 
Turville, 2006 UT App 305, IHf 41-42. First, Clark was "the major, if not the sole, actor 
responsible for Plaintiffs5 alleged damages." Id. at ^ 42. Second, the plaintiffs were 
responsible for Clark's absence because they failed to join the estate within the 
limitations period after Clark's death. Id. Under these circumstances, the court found 
that it was unfair and prejudicial to require the other defendants to defend the case in 
Clark's absence. Id. The Court therefore concluded that "the nonjoinder of the Estate of 
Mr. Clark would violate principles of 'equity and good conscience.'" Id. at f 42. 
The two factors on which the Turville Court relied are also present in this case. 
First, the trial court concluded that, like Clark, "Mr. Dolezsar is more than a mere joint 
tortfeasor and is one of the major actors in this case—potentially one who self-dealt and 
defrauded others; all the allegedly fraudulent statements were made to Ms. Mower by 
Mr. Dolezsar." (R. 5593.) As outlined in Part LA. above, the facts alleged by Plaintiffs 
in the Second Amended Complaint fully support this conclusion. Second, as did Turville, 
Plaintiffs failed to bring this action against Dolezsar's estate within the limitations period 
found in Utah Code Ann. § 75~3-803(a) (1992) after Dolezsar's death. Under these 
circumstances, which are indistinguishable from those at issue in Turville, the trial court 
determined within its discretion that it would be unfair and prejudicial to require 
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Defendants to defend against Plaintiffs' fraud claims in Dolezsar's absence. See Turville, 
2006UTApp305,^(40. 
Moreover, were Plaintiffs' fraud claims allowed to proceed without Dolezsar's 
estate, the Simpson Defendants would be at risk of incurring, double, multiple, or 
otherwise inconsistent obligations. Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. 
Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, at 110 (1968) ("[T]he defendant may properly wish to avoid 
multiple litigation, or inconsistent relief, or sole responsibility for a liability he shares 
with another.") The one year statute of limitations set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-
803(a) (1992) applies to claims against the estate, but not to claims brought by the estate 
on behalf of Dolezsar. In fact, under Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-108 (1975), the applicable 
statutes of limitation on any claims held by Dolezsar at his death were automatically 
tolled for a period of 12 months. Accordingly, Dolezsar's estate is not precluded by Utah 
Code Ann. § 75-3-803(a) from bringing claims against the Simpson Defendants related to 
Plaintiffs' fraud claims. Consequently, Defendants are not only at risk of incurring 
multiple or inconsistent obligations in subsequent litigation, but they would be precluded 
from asserting their claims against the estate in any such proceeding. The trial court 
acted within its discretion to prevent this unfair prejudice. 
Finally, due to Dolezsar's untimely death, the parties in this case cannot question 
him concerning the misrepresentations he allegedly communicated to Mower. Plaintiffs 
attempted to impute Dolezsar's alleged misrepresentations to the Simpsons by alleging 
David Simpson and Nathan Simpson participated in the fraud by authorizing and 
instructing Dolezsar to make the misrepresentations to Plaintiffs. (See, e.g., R. 3016, \ 
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543.) Plaintiffs did not allege any factual basis for what David Simpson, Nathan 
Simpson, or others may or may not have said to Dolezsar. Presumably, Plaintiffs would 
claim that they rely on hearsay statements from Dolezsar. However, as a practical matter, 
any statements by Dolezsar to Mower constitute inadmissible hearsay and cannot be 
considered as evidence in this case. More important, Defendants will be denied the 
opportunity to question Dolezsar concerning Plaintiffs' allegations in his absence. See 
Gardiner v. Virgin Islands Water & Power Autk, 145 F.3d 635, 641 (3d Cir. 1998) 
(recognizing possibility for prejudice resulting from inability to obtain evidence from 
absent party). 
2. Plaintiffs Did Not Dispute That Prejudice to Defendants Could 
Not Be Avoided By Any Protective Measures. 
The trial court properly concluded that the prejudice which would result to 
Defendants if Plaintiffs' fraud claims were allowed to proceed in Dolezsar's absence 
"[could] be avoided [only] by dismissing the claims for fraud." (R. 5593-5592.) 
Plaintiffs did not address the second factor listed in Rule 19(b) before the trial court, or in 
their Opening Brief on Appeal, thereby conceding that the prejudice to Defendants could 
not be avoided by other protective measures. 
3. The Trial Court Properly Determined That It Could Not Render 
An Adequate Judgment in Dolezsar's Absence. 
The third factor listed in Rule 19(b) — whether a judgment rendered in the 
person's absence will be adequate — "referfs] to [the] public stake in settling disputes by 
wholes, whenever possible." Provident Tradesmens, 390 U.S. at 111. "Rule 19(b)'s 
third factor is not intended to address the adequacy of the judgment from the plaintiffs 
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point of view," as argued by Plaintiffs' to the trial court. See Davis v. United States, 343 
F.3d 1282,1292-93 (10th Cir. 2003) (rejecting plaintiffs argument that a judgment 
would be adequate because it would afford the plaintiffs complete relief). "Rather, the 
factor is intended to address the adequacy of the dispute's resolution." Id. at 1293. 
Applying this standard, the trial court acted within its discretion in concluding 
"judgment rendered without Mr. Dolezsar would be inadequate because, among other 
things mentioned by Simpsons, no cross claims can not be brought against his estate." 
(R. 5593). As outlined in Part II.B.l above, Dolezsar's estate is not precluded under Utah 
Code Ann. § 75-3-803 from bringing claims related to the alleged fraud against 
Defendants in a different proceeding, thereby subjecting Defendants to risk of incurring 
multiple or inconsistent obligations in Dolezsar's absence. Moreover, because Plaintiffs 
did not timely join the estate to this proceeding, the trial court could not hear Defendants' 
claims against Dolezsar relating to the alleged fraud. The trial court therefore correctly 
concluded that any judgment rendered in Dolezsar's absence would be inadequate. 
Plaintiffs argue that Dolezsar cannot be an indispensable party by citing the 
general rule that Rule 19 typically does not require joinder of joint tortfeasors or co-
conspirators. (Appellants' Opening Br. 40.) However, Dolezsar was indispensable not 
because he was a joint tortfeasor or co-conspirator. Rather, the trial court concluded that 
Dolezsar was indispensable because he "occupied a pivotal representative role" in the 
alleged fraud. (R. 5594-5593.) As recognized by this Court in Turville, situations like 
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those of Clark and Dolezsar are not governed by the general rule. See Turville, 2006 
UT App 305,140; see also Freeman v. Nw. Acceptance Corp., 754 F.2d 553, 559 (5th 
Cir. 1985) (dismissing case where absent subsidiary company was "more than an active 
participant in the [wrong] alleged by [the plaintiffs]; it was the primary participant."); 
Hass v. Jefferson Nat'l Bank of Miami Beach, 442 F.2d 394, 398 (5th Cir. 1971) 
(dismissing case under Rule 19(b) in absence of "active participant in the alleged 
conversion of [plaintiff s] stock"); Jurimex Kommerz Transit G.M.B.H. v. Case Corp., 
201 F.R.D. 337, 340 (D. Del. 2001) (dismissing case under Fed. R. Civ. P. 19 where 
"Plaintiffs' interactions were almost entirely with the [absent subsidiary companies] and 
not with Defendant"). The trial court therefore acted within its discretion in applying the 
Turville case and dismissing Plaintiffs' fraud claims for failure to join Dolezsar's estate 
during the limitations period. 
4. The Trial Court Properly Concluded That the Unavoidable 
Prejudice to Defendants Outweighed Plaintiffs' Interest in a 
Forum For Their Fraud Claims. 
The trial court "must determine the importance of each factor on the facts of each 
particular case and in light of equitable considerations." Glenny, 494 F.2d at 653. In this 
case, the trial court properly determined based on the facts alleged in Plaintiffs' Second 
13
 Plaintiffs also claim that Dolezsar is not indispensable because Defendants "can be held 
liable for damages only in proportion to their own fault." (Appellants' Opening Br. 40.) 
This is simply incorrect. Plaintiffs alleged that the fraud perpetrated on them was 
carried out as part of a conspiracy. The Utah Supreme Court has expressly held that 
claims for conspiracy, which impose joint and several liability, are not subject to 
apportionment of fault under the Utah Liability Reform Act. Jedrziewski v. Smith, 2005 
UT 85, 128 P.3d 1146. The Jedrziewski court also held that whether other intentional 
torts are subject to apportionment of fault is an open question. Jedrziewski, 2005 UT 
85,124. 
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Amended Complaint that the unavoidable prejudice to the Simpson Defendants 
outweighed the fact that Plaintiffs might not have another forum for their fraud claims. 
(R. 5593.) The court recognized that the Plaintiffs' remaining claims would not 
"perfectly protect Ms. Mower's interests."14 (R. 5592.) However, recognizing the unfair 
prejudice to the Simpson Defendants, the trial court concluded that "[i]n the absence of 
Mr. Dolezsar and with the inability to join his estate as a party at this juncture, 
[Plaintiffs'] remaining claims must suffice.") As demonstrated in Turville, the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion in assigning greater weight to the unfair and unavoidable 
prejudice that would result to the Simpson Defendants in Dolezsar's absence. Turville, 
2006 UT App 305, ^ 40-42 (upholding dismissal for failure to join indispensable party 
despite absence of alternative forum for plaintiffs claims). 
For all of these reasons, this Court should uphold the trial court's determination 
that Plaintiffs' fraud based claims related to the Hawaii Development, the Mapleton 
Development, and the Springville Property could not continue in equity and good 
conscience in the absence of Dolezsar and his estate. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS' FRAUD-BASED CLAIMS WITHOUT LEAVE 
TO AMEND. 
"This [C]ourt reviews a trial court's denial of a motion to amend for an abuse of 
discretion, reversing only when the decision exceeds the limits of reasonability." 
14
 Any possible deficiency in this regard resulted from Plaintiffs' failure to bring the 
fraud-based claims within the limitations period. Plaintiffs should not be permitted to 
wait until after the central figure in the case can no longer be joined to seek recovery 
from others who are alleged only to have acted in concert with him. 
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Turville, 2006 UT App 305,123 (internal citation and quotations omitted). Exercising 
its broad discretion, the trial court may consider any factor it deems relevant to the case 
before it in ruling on a motion to amend, including without limitation timeliness, 
motivation, and prejudice. Kelly v. Hard Money Funding, Inc., 2004 UT App 44, fflf 39-
41, 87 P.3d 734. Among other reasons, the court may deny leave to amend where there 
have been "repeated failure[s] to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed." 
Id 1f4l (quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)). 
As a preliminary matter, Plaintiffs failed to make a motion for leave to amend. 
(Appellants' Opening Brief 43 ("Plaintiffs did not make a motion to amend the complaint 
....").) For this reason alone, the Court should affirm the trial court's dismissal without 
leave to amend. Holmes Dev.y LLC v. Cook, 2002 UT 38, fflf 56-59, 79 P.3d 974 
(upholding denial of leave to amend where plaintiff failed to file a written motion for 
leave to amend supported by a memorandum of points and authorities); Coroles, 2003 
UT App 339,142-45 (same). 
Regardless, the trial court acted within its discretion when it dismissed Plaintiffs' 
fraud-based claims "without leave to amend" after Plaintiffs had failed to properly plead 
their fraud despite at least three attempts at doing so. (R. 5606-5602; R. 6136, at 186:20-
23 ("So there will not be leave to amend in this case, this would be going on our third -
well, as Mr. Carlile says we'd be down the road on this quite a ways.").) Each of the 
three complaints filed by Plaintiffs was met with motions to dismiss. (R. 1873; R. 1893; 
R. 2196; R. 2229; R. 2256; R. 2271; R. 2373; R. 5055; R. 5110; R. 5237; R. 5300.) The 
trial court dismissed Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint on January 22, 2010 for failure 
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to plead with particularity, indicating it would give Plaintiffs a "chance to plead fraud 
within 20 days [of the January 22, 2010 Order] and do it concisely and with 
particularity." (R. 2608-2607.) Plaintiffs then filed their Second Amended Complaint, 
and an 11-page Notice of Errata, which the trial court again dismissed for failure to plead 
with particularity. (R. 3194; R. 5048.) The trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying leave to amend under these circumstances. See, e.g., Cook, 645 F. Supp. at 425 
("Based on plaintiffs' continued failure to comply with Rule 9(b), the court believes that 
plaintiffs' cause of action should be dismissed with prejudice.") 
IV. THE COURT SHOULD DECLINE TO RECOGNIZE A NEW CIVIL 
CAUSE OF ACTION FOR "AIDING AND ABETTING" IN THIS CASE. 
As recognized by Plaintiffs, neither this Court nor the Utah Supreme Court has 
recognized a civil cause of action for aiding and abetting another person's commission of 
a tort. See Coroles, 2003 UT App 339, ^ 34 n.19 (declining to decide whether claims for 
aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty and fraud are cognizable under Utah law.) 
Creating a new cause of action for aiding and abetting is not necessary in this case. 
Plaintiffs have alleged that the same group of defendants that "aided and abetted" 
breaches of fiduciary duties and fraudulent nondisclosure also conspired to breach 
fiduciary duties and engage in fraudulent nondisclosure, and were part of an "enterprise" 
that allegedly did so in violation of the Utah Pattern of Unlawful Act. (Claim Nos. 3,5, 
9,10,13,15,19, 20.) To the extent Plaintiffs wish to broaden their net with respect to 
claims for breach of fiduciary duty and fraud, they should be required to prove their 
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claims for conspiracy and violation of the Utah Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act, the 
contours of which are clearly defined under Utah law. 
Moreover, even were the Court to recognize a civil cause of action for aiding and 
abetting, Plaintiffs' claims for aiding and abetting fraudulent nondisclosure are deficient 
because Plaintiffs failed to properly allege the underlying fraud with particularity as 
required by Rule 9(b). Coroles, 2003 UT App 339, f 36 ("[T]o sufficiently plead their 
secondary fraud claims, Plaintiffs were obligated to adequately plead the existence of [the 
underlying] tort.") 
For these reasons, as well as those stated in the brief of Appellee Aviano, the 
Court should uphold the trial courts dismissal of Plaintiffs' aiding and abetting claims. 
CONCLUSION 
For all of the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the rulings of the trial 
court in this matter. 
DATED this 1st day of April, 2011. 
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER P.C. 
moat 
Craig Carlile 
Caleb J. Frischknecht 
Attorneys for the Simpson Defendants 
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Ex. 6. Transcript of May 13, 2010 Oral Arguments. (R. 6136, pp. 182-187.) 
Ex. 7. Ruling and Order on Defendants' Motions to Dismiss the Second Amended 
Complaint. (R. 5606-5600.) 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LESLIE D. MOWER, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DAVID R. SIMPSON, et al., 
Defendants. 
RULING GRANTING IN PART THE 
VARIOUS DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO 
DISMISS 
Civil No. 090403844 
Judge SAMUEL D. MCVEY 
The Court has reviewed the First Amended Complaint in light of common claims of 
insufficiency made by the numerous defendants in this case. The claims which can be addressed 
without the need for oral argument are those disputing the private rights of action pled under 
different Utah criminal statutes and those claiming a failure to plead fraud with particularity. The 
Court grants the Motions to Dismiss in part by dismissing Claims I, II, III, IV, V and VI of the 
First Amended Complaint. The Court acknowledges plaintiffs now state they did not seek to set 
forth causes of action under criminal statutes, but only meant to plead predicate facts for their 
Pattern of Unlawful Activity Claim (UPUA). Since each violation of criminal statute is 
identified as a "CLAIM," the Court assumes plaintiffs mispled and do not object to dismissing 
those claims and moving the facts alleged in them to the UPUA claim.. 
The Court further dismisses the fraud allegations arising throughout the Amended 
Complaint since they do not contain the required level of particularity-who in particular said or 
represented what to whom in particular, when, where, and how such representations occurred, 
the specific terminology used, why reliance was reasonable and what particular damages were 
caused by each discrete action. Defendants are entitled to know the precise events on which 
plaintiffs rely without having to infer what happened through assembling pieces of a puzzle 
contained throughout a voluminous complaint. Plaintiffs are granted a chance to plead fraud 
within 20 days hereof and do it concisely and with particularity. 
All other facets of the motions, as well as plaintiffs' Rule 56(f) motions for additional 
time in which to conduct discovery, are reserved for resolution after oral argument. Counsel 
wishing to participate should contact the clerk to set an oral argument. Defendants should 
attempt to identify their common arguments to allow them to be addressed together. To the 
extent any defendants have unique arguments, such as Mr. Nemelkas,' they can be heard after the 
common arguments. Given the fact the file is going on 7 volumes, the Court would appreciate 
courtesy copies five days before any hearing. Each party need present only its own pleadings as 
courtesy copies. 
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WHEREFORE IT IS ORDERED: 
Claims I through VI of the First Amended Compliant are dismissed but the facts alleged 
therein and not already stated in Claim VII may be used to support the sufficiency of other 
claims. The fraud allegations throughout the First Amended Complaint are dismissed with leave 
to amend within 20 days hereof. 
Dated this 22nd day of January 2010 
• - > 
7 7 ^ Samue[ DfMcVey/ 
District iCpiirt Judge 
fe.'-^'. **'" 
N & • <&> ^ . - ' 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 090403844 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
fc<>t - J O ^ V K ^ Saussi "jyo\' H \%- T"I18 
MAIL: BART J BAILEY 584 S STATE ST OREM, UT 84 058 
MAIL: JASON D BOREN 2 01 S MAIN ST STE 800 SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
MAIL: CRAIG CARLILE 86 NORTH UNIVERSITY STE43 0 PROVO UT 
84601-4420 
MAIL: MARK D EDDY 233 S PLEASANT GROVE BLVD STE 202 PLEASANT GROVE 
UT 84062 
MAIL: CHRISTOPHER D GREENWOOD 1840 N STATE ST SUITE 200 PROVO UT 
84604-0117 
MAIL: JULIAN D JENSEN 311 S STATE ST STE 3 80 SALT LAKE CITY UT 
84111 
MAIL: R SPENCER MACDONALD 86 N UNIVERSITY AVE STE 400 PROVO UT 
84601 
MAIL: LAURA S SCOTT 201 S MAIN ST STE 1800 POB 45898 SALT LAKE 
CITY UT 84145-0898 
Date: l-n-JO CjUl- .AZZR. 
Deputy Court Clerk 
Page 1 (last) Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Tab 2 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
73 *» A 10= 21' 
Bart J. Bailey (172) 
William T. Jennings (8213) 
BAILEY & JENNINGS, LC 
584 South State Street 
Orem, Utah 84058 
Telephone: (801) 426-8600 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LESLIE D. MOWER, an individual; LD SQ, LLC, a 
Utah limited liability company; LD III, LLC, a Utah 
limited liability company; LD PURPOSE, LLC, a 
Utah limited liability company; and, NAVONA, LC, 
a Utah limited liability company; 
Plaintiffs; 
vs. 
DAVID R. SIMPSON, an individual; NATHAN R. 
SIMPSON, an individual; MICHAEL K.THOMPSON, an 
individual; TODD DORNY, an individual; BRANDON 
DENTE, an individual; DAVID N. NEMELKA, an 
individual; DALLAS M. HAKES, an individual; CHAD 
D. CARLSON, an individual; MICHAEL A. MARX, an 
individual; ALLEN R. HAKES, an individual; MICHAEL 
W. AVIANO, an individual; ALS PROPERTIES, LLC, 
a Hawaii limited liability company; MAI KE KULA, 
LLC, a Hawaii limited liability company; HANALEI 
KAI HOLDINGS, LLC, a Hawaii limited liability 
company; KA MAHINA, LLC, a Hawaii limited 
liability company; HE KIAKOLU, LLC, a Hawaii 
limited liability company; KOAMALU PLANTATION, 
LLC, a Hawaii limited liability company; LANDMARK 
REAL ESTATE, INC., a Utah corporation; WOOD 
SPRINGS, LLC, a Utah limited liability company; 
OAK LEAF, LLC, a Utah limited liability company; 
DENTE, LLC, a Utah limited liability company; 
SUNNY RIDGE, LLC, a Utah limited liability 
company; KNDJ DEVELOPMENT, LLC, a Utah 
limited liability company; DN SIMPSON HOLDINGS, 
LLC, a Utah limited liability company; 
[cont'd on Page 2] 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
TO THE SIMPSON 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO 
DISMISS PLAINTIFFS' SECOND 
AMENDED COMPLAINT 
(Oral Argument Requested) 
Case No. 090403844 
Judge: Samuel D. McVey 
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SOS MAPLETON DEVELOPMENT, LLC, a Utah 
limited liability company; DN SIMPSON MAPLETON 
HOLDINGS, LLC, a Utah limited liability company; 
THE PRESERVE AT MAPLETON DEVELOPMENT 
COMPANY, LLC, a Utah limited liability company; 
PHEASANT MEADOWS, LLC, a Utah limited liability 
company; CARNESECCA ORCHARD ESTATES, LLC, 
a Utah limited liability company; SPANISH VISTA 
PLAT I, LLC, a Utah limited liability company; 
LANDMARK HOMES OF UTAH, LLC, a Utah limited 
liability company; MAPLE MOUNTAIN WATER TANK, 
LLC, a Utah limited liability company; LONESTAR 
GUTTERS, LLC, a Utah limited liability company; 2 
B R O T H E R S C O M M U N I C A T I O N S , a sole 
proprietorship; LONESTAR BUILDERS, INC., a 
fictitious entity; and, DOES 1-100; 
Defendants; 
and 
KOAMALU PLANTATION INVESTMENT, LLC, a Utah 
limited liability company; BANKOF AMERICAN FORK, 
a Utah Corporation; and, KATHYA.TEMPLEMAN, an 
individual; 
Rule 19 Defendants. 
Plaintiffs, by and through their undersigned counsel, respectfully submit this 
Memorandum in Opposition to the Simpson Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' 
Second Amended Complaint. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On March 5, 2010, Plaintiffs filed their Second Amended Complaint. In a hearing 
held in relation to David Nemelka's Motion to Dismiss, the Court ordered that any 
Defendants who wanted to file a motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint 
were required to file and serve such motion by April 13, 2010. On April 13, 2010, 
Defendants David R. Simpson; Nathan R. Simpson; Todd Dorny; Koamalu Plantation, LLC; 
Landmark Real Estate, Inc.; Wood Springs, LLC; Oak Leaf Investments, LLC; Dente, LLC; 
Sunny Ridge, LLC; KNDJ Development, LLC; DN Simpson Holdings, LLC; SOS Mapleton 
Development, LLC; DN Simpson Mapleton Holdings, LLC; The Preserve at Mapleton 
Development Company, LLC; Pheasant Meadows, LLC; Carnesecca Orchard Estates, 
LLC; Spanish Vista Plat I, LLC; Landmark Homes of Utah, LLC; Maple Mountain Water 
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Tank, LLC and Kathy A. Templeman (collectively referred to as the "Simpson Defendants") 
filed and served their Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint^ 
DISCUSSION 
The purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is "to challenge the formal sufficiency of the 
claim for relief, not to establish the facts or resolve the merits of the case." Wipple v. 
American Fork Irrigation Co., 910 P.2d 1218, 1220 (Utah 1996)(emphasis added). "[A] 
dismissal is justified only when the allegations of the complaint clearly demonstrate that 
the plaintiff does not have a claim." Id. (emphasis added). "A dismissal is a severe 
measure and should be granted by the trial court only if it is clear that a party is not entitled 
to relief under any state of facts which could be proved in support of its claim." 
Mackey v. Cannon, 996 P.2d 1081, 1084 (Ut. Ct. App. 2000)(emphasis added). 
The Court must consider all the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the facts in 
a light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Id. "The courts are a forum for settling 
controversies and if there is any doubt about whether a claim should be dismissed for the 
lack of a factual basis, the issues should be resolved in favor of giving the party an 
opportunity to present its proof." Id (emphasis added). "A motion to dismiss is properly 
granted only in cases in which, even if the factual assertions in the complaint were correct, 
1
 Previously, Craig Carlile, represented the defendants submitting this Motion to Dismiss Second 
Amended Complaint In addition, he previously represented Michael K. Thompson; Brandon Dente; ALS 
Properties, LLC; Mai Ke Kula, LLC; Hanalei Kai Holdings, LLC; Ka Mahina, LLC and He Kiakolu, LLC. 
Plaintiffs can only assume that those parties are not part of the Motion to Dismiss Second Amended 
Complaint Further, the Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint lists Oak Leaf Investments, LLC as 
being a party to the motion. However, Oak Leaf Investments, LLC was dismissed as a party to this action and 
was previously represented by Jason Born, and has never been represented by Mr. Carlile. 
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they provided no legal basis for recovery." Id. Stated another way, "a motion to dismiss is 
appropriate only where it clearly appears that the plaintiff or plaintiffs would not be entitled 
to relief under the facts alleged or under any state of facts they could prove to support 
their claim." Sony Electronics, Inc. v. Reber, 203 P.3d 186, 188-89 (Ut. Ct. App. 
2004)(emphasis added). 
In summary, when considering a motion to dismiss, the Court must assume all the 
allegations contained in the complaint are true and it must also make all reasonable 
inferences in the plaintiffs' favor. Here, when the allegations of Plaintiffs' Second Amended 
Complaint are taken as true and when all reasonable inferences are taken in Plaintiffs' 
favor, the Simpson Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint must be 
denied. 
PLEADING FRAUD WITH PARTICULARITY 
The Simpson Defendants request that the Court dismiss Plaintiffs claims that are 
based on fraud because Plaintiffs fail to plead fraud with the particularity required by Rule 
9 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The Simpson Defendants claim that they are left 
to guess the substance of the acts constituting the alleged wrong. However, the Simpson 
Defendants fail to read and comprehend the allegations contained in Plaintiffs' Second 
Amended Complaint. 
When alleging a cause of action for fraud, a party must set forth the facts with 
"sufficient particularity to show what facts are claimed to constitute such charges." Armed 
Forces Ins. Exchange v. Harrison, 2003 UT 14 f l 6 ; 70 P.3d 35, 40 (Ut. Ct. App. 2003). In 
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addressing the adequacy of pleading fraud, the Utah Supreme Court stated, "our liberalized 
rules of pleading are designed to afford parties the privilege of presenting whatever 
legitimate contentions they have pertaining to their dispute, subject only to the requirement 
that their adversary have fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds of the claim and a 
general indication of the type of litigation involved." Hill v. Allred, 2001 UT 161J14; 28 P.3d 
1271, 1275 (Utah 2001). 
Speaking of the requirement that fraud be plead with particularity, the United States 
Circuit Court for the Third Circuit stated that "courts should be sensitive to the fact that 
application of the Rule prior to discovery may permit sophisticated defrauders to 
successfully conceal the details of their fraud." Shapiro v. UJB Financial Corp., 964 F.2d 
272, 284 (3rd Cir. 1992). The Utah Supreme Court stated that to claim fraud with 
particularity means that a party's allegations must contain the "substance of the acts 
constituting the alleged wrong." Williams v. State Farm Ins. Co., 656 P.2d 966, 972 (Utah 
1982). Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint adequately sets forth the alleged fraud with 
the required particularity and gives the defendants fair notice of the substance of the alleged 
wrongs. 
While arguing generally that Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint fails to contain 
the required specificity, the Simpson Defendants point to only one paragraph they believe 
does not meet the particularity requirement. The Simpson Defendants argue that 
paragraph 737 of the Second Amended Complaint does not specify who in particular made 
the alleged representations or when they were made. The Simpson Defendants fail to 
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carefully read the allegations. Paragraph 737 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint 
clearly states that David Simpson, Nathan Simpson and Ken Dolezsar made the 
representations. The allegations in paragraph 737 refer to the allegations contained in 
paragraph 736. Those allegations clearly state that the misrepresentations were made at 
the end of November or the beginning of December. 
Further, the Simpson Defendants complain that Plaintiffs do not specifically set forth 
who said exactly what. However, David Simpson and Nathan Simpson, father and son, 
would speak for each other. Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint alleges that David 
Simpson and Nathan Simpson made the misrepresentations and therefore it satisfies the 
pleading standard for fraud. 
The Simpson Defendants further complain that they are left to guess the substance 
of the acts constituting the alleged wrong. They point to paragraphs 721, 731,734 and 739 
of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint as examples of Plaintiffs' failure to plead the 
specifics. However, an examination of those paragraphs shows otherwise. 
Paragraph 721 alleges that Ken Dolezsar ("Dolezsar"), acting on David Simpson's 
and Nathan Simpson's direction, repeated the misrepresentations contained in paragraphs 
256 and 259 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint2 Plaintiffs' clearly describe when 
the misrepresentations were made. Paragraph 731 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended 
Complaint states that the representations contained in paragraph 314 were made to Leslie 
2The Utah Court of Appeals specifically approved the practice of referencing preceding paragraphs 
in a complaint. See Coroles v. Sabey, 2003 Ut App 339, fn13. 
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D. Mower ("Leslie"). Paragraph 314 states the misrepresentations were made at the end 
of November or the beginning of December. The allegations contained in paragraph 734 
refer to the allegations in paragraph 315. Therefore, all of the necessary particularity is 
present. 
The misrepresentations referred to in paragraph 315 are clearly alleged to have been 
made at the same time the misrepresentations referred to in paragraph 314 were made. 
The allegations contained on paragraph 739 also refer to a previous paragraph, which 
clearly indicates the misrepresentations were made at the same time as those contained 
in paragraphs 314 and 315. In an attempt to make their arguments, the Simpson 
Defendants simply construe Plaintiffs1 Second Amended Complaint in the most narrow 
manner possible. However, the standard for a motion to dismiss is that the allegations must 
be read broadly and all reasonable inferences must be taken in Plaintiffs favor. Further, the 
Simpson Defendants focus on when their misrepresentations were relayed to Plaintiffs, not 
when they made them, which is the issue in this matter. Plaintiffs clearly allege when David 
Simpson and Nathan Simpson made the misrepresentations. 
MAGNETBANK FRAUD 
The Simpson Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' have failed to explain what in 
particular about the "offers" used in the appraisal relied on by MagnetBank makes them 
fraudulent. The Simpson Defendants make a narrow reading of Plaintiffs1 Second Amended 
Complaint, failing to refer to the relevant allegations and exhibits. Paragraphs 300 through 
303 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint set forth the basic facts of the "offers" that 
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were made for 14 lots located in The Preserve Development Project. The "offers" were 
made between October 1, 2006 and October 6, 2006. In paragraph 335, Plaintiffs allege, 
as part of the plan to deceive MagnetBank and its participating bank, that David Simpson 
and Nathan Simpson caused MagnetBank to use the services of Free and Associates for 
an appraisal. Plaintiffs clearly allege that the "offers" were used by the appraiser in arriving 
at a value for The Preserve Development Project property. 
The appraisal itself, dated January 3, 2007, is attached to Plaintiffs1 Second 
Amended Complaint The parties who made offers on the 14 lots never actually purchased 
the lots. However, the appraisal contains a section titled "History of the Project." It states, 
"According to the purchase agreement provided by Mr. Nathan Simpson, the purchases are 
as follows: 
Transaction #3 - This is an offer on the subject lot numbers 40, 39, 38, and 37 
Information Source: Real Estate Purchase Agreement 
Date of Contract: October 1, 2006 
Closing Date: Current Offer, to close when lots are finished 
Buyer: Dallas Hakes 
Purchase Price: $1,685,000.00 
Price/Per Lot: Lot 40: $340,000.00 
Lot 39: $340,000.00 
Lot 38: $340,000.00 
Lot 37: $340,000.00 
Lot 33: $325,000.00 
Relevancy to Current Value: This is an offer on the subject lots and therefore, is a 
good indicator for valuing the individual lots. 
Transaction #4 - This is an offer on the subject lot numbers 51, 52, 53, 54 and 55. 
Information Source: Real Estate Purchase Agreement 
Date of Contract: October 2, 2006 
Closing Date: Current Offer, to close when lots are finished 
Buyer: Chad Carlson 
Purchase Price: $1,650,000.00 
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Price/Per Lot: Lot 51: $325,000.00 
Lot 52: $325,000.00 
Lot 53: $350,000.00 
Lot 54: $325,000.00 
Lot 55: $325,000.00 
Relevancy to Current Value: This is an offer on the subject lots and therefore, is a 
good indicator for valuing the individual lots. 
Transaction #5 - This is an offer on the subject lot numbers 49 and 50. 
Information Source: Real Estate Purchase Agreement 
Date of Contract: October 6, 2006 
Closing Date: Current offer, to close when lots are finished 
Buyer: Allen Hakes 
Purchase Price: $650,000.00 
Price/Per Lot: Lot 49: $325,000.00 
Lot 50: $325,000.00 
Relevancy to Current Value: This is an offer on the subject lots and therefore, is a 
good indicator for valuing the individual lots. 
See Exhibit "A" attached hereto. 
Further, in using the income approach for valuing the lots in The Preserve 
Development Project, the appraiser clearly relied on the "offers" for the 14 lots. In the 
Income Approach section of the appraisal, the appraiser states that the offers on the lots 
were used as comparables. On page 57 is a chart that refers to the sale of lots 51, 52, 53, 
54, 55,49,40 and 39. See Exhibit "B" attached hereto. All of these lots were subject to the 
purchase agreements Plaintiffs allege were entered into fraudulently. The chart also 
includes a Date of Sale which refers to the date the "offers" were made. Page 58 of the 
appraisal lists lots 33 through 35, lots 37, 38 and 50 as comparables, using the amount 
"offered" as the value. See Exhibit "B.". 
On page 68 of the appraisal, the appraiser notes that "the subject property has 
already sold several one acre lots between $325,000.00 and $340,000.00." See Exhibit "C" 
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attached hereto. Again, the appraiser clearly relied on the "offers" in making his appraisal 
of the property. 
The chart contained on page 69 of the appraisal also shows the value of lots 37, 38, 
39 and 40 as the value of the "offer" and lists the value as "Lot Sale Price." See Exhibit "D" 
attached hereto. The chart on page 71 of the appraisal lists the values for lots 33, 34, 35, 
49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54 and 55 as the sales price of the "offer" and states that the value is the 
"Lot Sale Price." See Exhibit "D." The lot purchase agreements themselves are included 
in the appendix to the appraisal. 
Plaintiffs have clearly plead that the "offers" were not real offers, that they were made 
with the intention of artificially raising the values of the real property, that they were supplied 
to the appraiser by David Simpson and Nathan Simpson for the purpose of raising the 
values in the appraisal, that the offers were indeed used by the appraiser and that 
MagnetBank, to its detriment, relied on the appraisal. Therefore, Plaintiffs Second 
Amended Complaint regarding the misrepresentations made to MagnetBank meets the 
particularity requirements imposed by Rule 9. 
The Simpson Defendants argue that Plaintiffs must allege exactly which assets 
David Simpson and Nathan Simpson over-valued in their financial statements submitted to 
MagnetBank, which liabilities were under-stated and the amount of each liability. However, 
the Simpson Defendants do not refer to any case law or other controlling precedent to 
support their argument. The Simpson Defendants would require that Plaintiffs have in their 
possession all the information from discovery before filing a complaint. 
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Further, Plaintiffs specifically allege that neither David Simpson's nor Nathan 
Simpson's financial statements reflected any amounts owed to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs' Second 
Amended Complaint sets forth with great detail the amounts owed to Plaintiffs by David 
Simpson and Nathan Simpson. Paragraph 323 of the Second Amended Complaint clearly 
describes the promissory note executed by The Preserve at Mapleton Development 
Company, LLC ("The Preserve") in favor of LD III, LLC ("LD III") in the amount of 
$6,800,000.00. A review of the financial statements David Simpson and Nathan Simpson 
submitted to MagnetBank, which are attached to Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint as 
Exhibits 119 through 121, clearly demonstrates that David Simpson and Nathan Simpson 
failed to include the amounts owed to LD III and Leslie. 
Paragraph 325 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint clearly describes the 
promissory note from David Simpson and Nathan Simpson personally to Leslie D. Mower 
("Leslie") in the amount of $6,800,000.00. Paragraph 326 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended 
Complaint clearly describes a promissory note from David Simpson and Nathan Simpson 
personally to Leslie in the amount of $3,300,000.00. 
The financial statements submitted by David Simpson and Nathan Simpson to 
MagnetBank, which are attached to Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, show that there 
is no mention of the amounts owed to Leslie. It is disingenuous for the Simpson 
Defendants to argue that they do not have a clearly defined foundation so the proceedings 
can go forward in an orderly manner. Even a cursory reading of Plaintiffs' Second Amended 
Complaint explains what amounts were owed to Leslie but which were not included in David 
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Simpson's and Nathan Simpson's financial statements. There is no mention in David 
Simpson's and Nathan Simpson's financial statements of any funds owing to Leslie. The 
promissory notes from David Simpson and Nathan Simpson to Leslie and LD III are clearly 
explained and attached to Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint There is no doubt 
regarding what amounts Plaintiffs allege were owed to Leslie that were not included on the 
financial statements. Further, Rule 9 does not require that Plaintiffs include the detail being 
demanded by the Simpson Defendants. It is clear what funds were owed to Plaintiffs and 
that they were not included on the financial statements. 
The Simpson Defendants argue that Plaintiffs fail to allege how MagnetBank's 
position changed as a result of the fact that David Simpson, Nathan Simpson and Michael 
Aviano ("Aviano") misrepresented the purchase price that Aviano paid for lot in The 
Preserve Development Project. There is no requirement that Plaintiffs show as part of a 
fraud claim that MagnetBank changed its position. The Simpson Defendants assert the 
requirement without supplying any support for such a requirement. Plaintiffs need only 
allege that MagnetBank relied on the misrepresentation to its detriment and that it was 
damaged. The Simpson Defendants also wrongly argue that Plaintiffs fail to allege what 
particular damages were caused by the Aviano sale. 
Plaintiffs allege the false closing documents were provided to MagnetBank and its 
participating bank and that in reliance on the false closing documents MagnetBank reduced 
the amount they required to be paid for MagnetBank to release the security interest in 
Aviano's lot. Plaintiffs further allege that if MagnetBank and its participating bank had 
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known the true sales price and that the closing documents were false, they would not have 
allowed the purchase to go forward, they would have had reason to suspect that the loan 
was in peril and they would have taken steps to protect the loan. Plaintiffs also allege that 
if MagnetBank and its participating bank had known the truth, they would have immediately 
called the loan due, and that they were induced to not call the loan due and to take other 
protective measures because of the false closing documents signed by Aviano, which he 
knew would be submitted to MagnetBank and its participating bank. 
Plaintiffs allege that MagnetBank and its participating bank would not have approved 
the sale of a lot to Aviano and that they would not have agreed to accept the $900,000.00 
payment had they known the truth. Plaintiffs allege that had MagnetBank and its 
participating bank known the truth, they would have at the very least insisted on payment 
of the previously agreed release price of $1,020,000.00. Plaintiffs also clearly allege that 
had MagnetBank and its participating bank known the truth, they would have called the loan 
to The Preserve due and would have taken additional steps to protect their loan. However, 
because of David Simpson's, Nathan Simpson's and Aviano's, fraud and 
misrepresentations, MagnetBank and its participating bank believed the lots in The 
Preserve Development Project were actually worth what David Simpson and Nathan 
Simpson had represented they were worth, not nearly half that value. Therefore, Plaintiffs 
have sufficiently alleged the fraud and the damage from the fraud. Taking all the allegations 
as true and making all reasonable inferences in Plaintiffs' favor, Plaintiffs clearly meet the 
pleading standard regarding the Aviano transaction. 
Paae 15 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
DOUBLE T RANCH WATER PURCHASE 
The Simpson Defendants argue that Plaintiffs cause of action for fraudulent non-
disclosure in relation to the Double T Ranch water purchase must fail because Plaintiffs fail 
to allege how the non-disclosures resulted in damage. The Simpson Defendants again 
attempt to impose their own heightened pleading requirements, without any supporting 
authority. 
Plaintiffs clearly allege that Leslie's funds were wrongfully taken and used to partially 
fund the purchase price of the water shares. Plaintiffs also clearly allege that David 
Simpson purchased the water shares in the name of his own entity, that Leslie was never 
reimbursed for her funds that were wrongfully taken and used, that Leslie never received 
any profits from the sale of such water shares and that David Simpson wrongfully kept some 
of the water shares for himself. 
Further, Plaintiffs clearly allege that LD Ill's funds were wrongfully taken, that they 
were used to purchase water shares which were titled in an entity owned by David Simpson, 
that LD III was never reimbursed for its funds and that the water shares were sold and that 
LD III never received any proceeds. It is clear that LD III and Leslie were damaged in that 
their funds were taken and never repaid. If all reasonable inferences are extended to 
Plaintiffs, it is clear that the Simpson Defendants Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended 
Complaint in relation to the claims regarding the Double T Ranch water purchase must be 
denied. 
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MAPLE MOUNTAIN WATER PROJECT 
The Simpson Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' claims for fraud regarding the Maple 
Mountain Water project must be dismissed because Plaintiffs fail to plead the fraud with the 
required particularity. However, Plaintiffs have clearly alleged the fraud with the required 
particularity. 
In paragraph 479 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that 
Leslie provided The Preserve $281,693.59, with the understanding that it would be used to 
pay The Preserve's share of the water tank cost. Instead, the funds were not used for the 
water tank but were taken by Nathan Simpson and David Simpson. Paragraph 1094 of 
Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint alleges that David Simpson and Nathan Simpson 
told Leslie's son that The Preserve needed at least $281,693.59 to pay past due bills, much 
of that amount being required to pay The Preserve's share of the water tank. Paragraph 
1096 alleges that at the end of March or beginning of April, David Simpson and Nathan 
Simpson again told Leslie's son that they needed additional funds for The Preserve's share 
of the water tank cost. Paragraph 1099 alleges that between November 15,2007 and April 
23, 2008, David Simpson and Nathan Simpson repeatedly solicited Leslie and her 
representatives for funds to pay past due bills of The Preserve. Paragraph 1101 clearly 
states that David Simpson and Nathan Simpson used funds they had requested and 
received from Leslie to pay Nathan Simpson $72,814.78 and to pay David Simpson 
$65,000.00 instead of using the funds to pay The Preserve's share of the water tank costs. 
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Contrary to the Simpson Defendants arguments, there is no attempt by Plaintiffs to 
"cryptically attempt to bolster" their general allegations. Plaintiffs clearly allege that David 
Simpson and Nathan Simpson represented they needed funds to pay the debts of The 
Preserve, specifically The Preserve's share of the water tank cost, that when they received 
the funds they used them for other purposes, such as paying themselves and using the 
funds to pay The Presidio's share of the water tank cost. David Simpson and Nathan 
Simpson had previously entered into a contract to purchase real property owned by The 
Presidio and were obligated to pay part of The Presidio's share of the water tank cost as 
part of the purchase. It is clear that Leslie furnished the funds in reliance on David 
Simpson's and Nathan Simpson's misrepresentations and that she was damaged because 
here funds were deceitfully taken. Therefore, contrary to the Simpson Defendants' 
statement that "the Court and the defendants are left to guess what Mower did in response 
to these alleged misrepresentations and how it damaged her," Plaintiffs clearly allege that 
her funds were used for purposes other than those for which they were provided and that 
she no longer has the funds. Such is clear from even a cursory reading of Plaintiffs' Second 
Amended Complaint Therefore, the Simpson Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Second 
Amended Complaint should be denied. 
FAILURE TO JOIN ESTATE OF KEN DOLEZSAR 
The Simpson Defendants argue that Dolezsar is the "central figure" in this case and 
that Doleszar's estate is a necessary and indispensable party to this action. The Simpson 
Defendants fail to describe in what way Dolezsar is the "central figure" in this matter. There 
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can be little doubt that the central figures in this matter are David Simpson and Nathan 
Simpson. It is nothing more than a red herring. 
The Simpson Defendants argue that the Estate of Ken Dolezsar (the "Estate") is a 
necessary and indispensable party that cannot be joined. Therefore, they argue that 
Plaintiffs' fraud based claims related to the Hawaii development scam, The Preserve at 
Mapleton Development scam and the commercial property scam must be dismissed 
because they cannot proceed in equity and good conscience. The Simpson Defendants 
argue that they are prevented from asserting their claims against Dolezsar and from 
otherwise requiring Dolezsar to account for his alleged actions by way of deposition or trial 
testimony. 
However, the reasons put forth by the Simpson Defendants for finding that the 
Dolezsar or the Estate are necessary and an indispensable parties do not meet the 
standard set forth in Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The burden of 
presenting specific facts and reasoning is on the party attempting to persuade the Court that 
Dolezsar or the Estate are necessary or indispensable parties. See Grand County v. 
Rogers, 2002 UT 25, fl29; 44 P.3d 734, 741 (Utah 2002). "[Abstract generalizations are 
not a substitute for the analysis required under Rule 19." Seftel v. Capital City Bank, 767 
P.2d 941, 945 (Ut. Ct. App. 1989). Simply alleging that Dolezsar is the cental figure and 
that the defendants will be prevented from pursuing any cross claims against Dolezsar does 
not establish that Dolezsar or the Estate are necessary or indispensable parties. Such 
conclusory statements do not satisfy the required analysis under Rule 19. The Simpson 
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Defendants have failed to carry their burden to show that Dolezsar and/or the Estate are 
necessary and indispensable parties. Therefore, their claim should be denied. 
Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states: 
(a) Persons to be joined if feasible.. A person who is subject to service of 
process and whose joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the 
subject matter of action shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in the 
person's absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already 
parties, or (2) the person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action 
and is so situated that the disposition of the action in the person's absence 
may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede the person's ability to protect 
that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a 
substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent 
obligations by reason of the claimed interest. 
(b) Determination by court whenever joinder not feasible. If a person 
described in Subdivision (a)(1)-(2) hereof cannot be made a party, the court 
shall determine whether in equity and good conscience the action should 
proceed among the parties before it, or should be dismissed, the absent 
person being thus regarded as indispensable. The factors to be considered 
by the court include: first, to what extent a judgment rendered in the person's 
absence might be prejudicial to the person or those already parties; second, 
the extent to which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping 
of relief, or other measures, the prejudice can be lessened or avoided; third, 
whether a judgment rendered in the person's absence will be adequate; 
fourth, whether the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the action is 
dismissed for nonjoinder. 
In addressing a Rule 19 issues, a court must first determine whether a party is 
necessary under Rule 19(a) See Smith v. Osguthorpe, 58 P.3d 854, 864 (Ut. Ct. App. 
2002). In doing so it considers the factors set out in the rule. If a court concludes that a 
party is necessary, it then must "consider whether joinder of the necessary party is 
feasible." Id. 
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Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is "substantively similar to its federal 
counterpart" and federal case law may be used as guidance. Seftel v. Capital City Bank, 
767 P.2d 941,944 (Ut. Ct. App. 1989). Therefore, cases interpreting Rule 19 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure have precedential value in the courts of the State of Utah. 
The Simpson Defendants argue that Dolezsar and the Estate are necessary parties. 
The Simpson Defendants rely primarily on Turville v. J&J Properties, L C , 2006 UT App 
305; 145 P.3d 1146 (Ut. Ct. App. 2006) to support their argument that Dolezsar and/or the 
Estate are necessary parties. However, the only similar fact in Turville and this matter is 
that someone died and could not be made a party to the case. Otherwise, the facts are 
very different. 
The Simpson Defendants allege that Dolezsar was the central figure in this matter, 
and, based only on their conclusory statement, argue that Dolezsar is just like Mr. Clark in 
Turville. However, a close examination of the facts in Turville shows that it is David 
Simpson and Nathan Simpson who performed the fraudulent acts like those alleged to have 
been done by Mr. Clark, not Dolezsar. 
In Turville, James Ritchie ("Ritchie"), John Quitiquit ("Quitiquit") and Clark Properties, 
Inc. ("CPI"), whose officers were Mrs. and Mr. Clark, formed Tri-J Properties, LLC ("Tri-J") 
for the purpose of buying 142 acres of real property from Davis County. Tri-J won the bid 
on the property and it was transferred to Tri-J. Unbeknownst to the other members of Tri-J, 
Mr. Clark ("Clark") executed a quitclaim deed for the property from Tri-J to CPI. Clark then 
deeded 128 acres back to CPI and retained 14 acres in the name of CPI. See Id. at 1f2. 
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Turville, the plaintiff in the action, met with Ritchie, Quitiquit and Clark in hopes of 
purchasing the property. Tri-J's members were undecided regarding selling the real 
property. However, Clark informed Turville that CPI owned the 128 acres and that he had 
authority to sell both the 128 acres and the 14 acres to Turville. Clark subsequently agreed 
to sell the properties to Turville for $1,000,000.00. Clark caused CPI to deed the 128 acres 
to Turville and gave Turville a quitclaim deed for CPIfs interest in the 14 acres, promising 
that he could convince the other members of Tri-J to sell the 14 acre parcel to Turville. 
Turville gave Clark a note for $1,000,000.00 and began developing the properties. See Id. 
atfflI3-4. 
Tri-J and CPI sued Turville claiming he had no legal right to the properties. Clark 
then made a deal with Ritchie and Quitiquit that they would receive a portion of the 
proceeds of the $1,000,00.00 note. The lawsuit was then dismissed. See Id. at ^ 7. 
Later, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Tri-J, Ritchie, Quitiquit, J&J Properties, CPI, 
Mrs. Clark and Clark. Turville served Ritchie but took no further action. Later, Turville filed 
for a default against Ritchie. Then Clark died of cancer. See Id. at 1HJ8-9. Several of the 
defendants moved the court to dismiss the complaint because of failure to join the estate 
of Mr. Clark as an indispensable party. See Id. at 1117. Ultimately, the trial court, and later 
the Utah Court of Appeals, found that Clark's estate was a necessary and indispensable 
party. 
The Simpson Defendants argue that the present case is just like Turville because, 
like Clark, Dolezsar was the person "primarily involved" in the alleged conduct that caused 
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Plaintiffs' damages3. However, even a cursory reading of Plaintiffs' Second Amended 
Complaint show that the those primarily involved in the alleged conduct that caused 
Plaintiffs' damages were David Simpson and Nathan Simpson. 
The activity, involvement and roles of Clark and the activity, involvement and roles 
of Dolezsar are readily distinguishable. Here, Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint 
alleges that Dolezsar was acting as Leslie's agent. See Second Amended Complaint, 
ffl]542, 601, 718 and 864. It was in his capacity as Leslie's husband and agent that he 
relayed the misrepresentations made by David Simpson, Nathan Simpson and others to 
Leslie. Dolezsar only relayed David Simpson's ans Nathan Simpson's representations, he 
did not make them. 
In Turville, it is clear that the person who made the misrepresentations and 
committed the fraud was Clark. Plaintiffs do not allege that Dolezsar was the source of the 
misrepresentations or the source of the fraud. He was simply the go between used by 
David Simpson, Nathan Simpson and others. Therefore, his situation is quite different from 
Clark's. 
Further, in finding that Clark was a necessary and indispensable party, the Utah 
Court of Appeals found it important that the complaint filed by Turville actually named Clark 
as a defendant. See Id. at U40. The Utah Court of Appeals specifically cites to cases which 
hold that when a plaintiff makes no claims against an unjoined party, it is clear that 
3
 On page 17 of their Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint, 
the Simpson Defendants state, "noting his 'pivotal representative role ... in the transactions at issue/ the trial 
court found that Clark was a necessary party to the case. Id. at p . A careful reading of paragraph 9 of 
Turville shows that it contains no such language. 
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complete relief can be granted in [the party's] absence. See Id. (referring to Mallalieu-Golder 
Ins. Agency v. Executive Risklndem., 254 F.Supp.2d 521, 525 (M.D. Pa. 2003). The Court 
of Appeals goes on to say that "Plaintiff's reason for naming and including Mr. Clark is 
apparent where the record reveals that it was primarily, if not solely, the actions of Mr. 
Clark in his individual capacity that led to Plaintiffs alleged damages." Id. (emphasis 
added). Here, it is the actions of David Simpson, Nathan Simpson and others which 
primarily, if not solely, led to Plaintiffs' damages. 
The Utah Court of Appeals cited the case of Johnson v. Higley, 989 P.2d 61 for the 
proposition that a party was not a necessary party because the plaintiff's claims were 
expressly limited to the defendants acts or omissions." See Id. In other words, because 
Plaintiffs in this matter have limited their claims to the named defendants and have not 
made any claims against Dolezsar or the Estate, neither Dolezsar nor the Estate are 
necessary parties. 
While the Turville court found that Clark's estate was a necessary and indispensable 
party, the factual basis for those conclusions is very different from the facts in this matter. 
Regarding Clark's status as an indispensable party, the court found that "because Plaintiff 
named or included Mr. Clark in his claims as the major, if not the sole actor responsible for 
Plaintiffs alleged damages, a judgment rendered in the Estate of Mr. Clark's absence would 
prejudice those already parties to the action; protective provisions would not ameliorate this 
prejudice; a judgment entered in the Estate of Mr. Clark's absence would be less than 
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adequate; and, most importantly, as a result of the foregoing factors, the nonjoinder of the 
Estate of Mr. Clark would violate principle of equity and good conscience." Id. at Tf42. 
The Turville court clearly based its decision on the very important fact that the plaintiff 
had identified Clark as the major actor and as a defendant. Despite the Simpson 
Defendants' best efforts to decide for Plaintiffs' who caused their damages and despite their 
best efforts to shift responsibility for their misrepresentations made in this matter to 
Dolezsar, the facts are that they are the main actors who are primarily responsible for 
Plaintiffs' damages, not Dolezsar. Therefore, the Simpson Defendants' reliance on Turville 
is misplaced and their Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint should be denied. 
The Simpson Defendants argue they will not be able to question Dolezsar concerning 
the origin of the information he passed on to Leslie because of his untimely death. They 
fail to explain how, if Plaintiffs had filed this action before the time to make claims against 
the Estate had lapsed, it would have allowed them to question Dolezsar concerning the 
origin of the representations. It is just another attempt to shift the focus of the wrongdoing 
from themselves to Dolezsar. 
The Simpson Defendants also argue that any judgment issued in Dolezsar's absence 
will result in unavoidable prejudice to the other defendants. They argue that the defendants 
in this matter will be "unable to require Dolezsar to account for his alleged conduct at a 
deposition or a trial in this matter. It is important to note that the scope of Rule 19 deals 
with making persons parties to the litigation, not with the availability of evidence because 
of the death of a person. The Simpson Defendants cannot argue that having the 
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opportunity to join the Estate as a party would allow them to conduct depositions or examine 
Dolezsar at trial. Therefore, the Simpson Defendants' argument that the Estate is an 
indispensable party because the Simpson Defendants will be prejudiced because of their 
inability to question Dolezsar must fail. Such an argument has noting to do with joinder of 
a party. 
If the Court finds that Dolezsar or the Estate are necessary parties, it then must move 
to the second prong of the analysis and decide if Dolezsar or the Estate are indispensable 
parties. The United States Supreme Court has analyzed Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure. In the seminal case of Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. 
Patterson, 309 U.S. 102 (1968) the Court stated "Rule 19 (b) suggests four interests that 
must be examined in each case to determine whether in equity and good conscience the 
court should proceed without a party whose absence from the litigation is compelled." Id. 
at 109. The United States Supreme court went on to list the interests as: 
First, the plaintiff has an interest in having a forum. Before the trial, the 
strength of this interest obviously depends upon whether a satisfactory 
alternative forum exists. ... Second, the defendant may properly wish to 
avoid multiple litigation, or inconsistent relief, or sole responsibility for a 
liability he shares with another. ... Third, there is an interest of the outsider 
whom it would have been desirable to join. ... Fourth, there remains the 
interest of the courts and the public in complete, consistent, and efficient 
settlement of controversies. We read the Rule's third criterion, whether the 
judgment issues in the absence of the nonjoined person will be 'adequate,' to 
refer to this public stake in settling disputes by wholes, whenever possible.... 
Id. at 109-111. 
Here, Plaintiffs' have a great interest in having a forum. There is no other forum 
available where Plaintiffs could bring their claims. If the case is dismissed, Plaintiffs will be 
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prevented from pursuing any remedy for the fraud perpetrated against them. Further, there 
is no danger of multiple litigation or inconsistent relief. Lastly, it is in the interest of the 
courts and the public to be able to settle controversies and have redress for alleged wrongs. 
All of the factors listed by the United States Supreme Court support a denial of the 
Simpson's Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint based on Rule 19. 
The Simpson Defendants argue that any judgment issued in the absence of the 
Estate will be inadequate. They argue that none of the defendants in this case will be able 
to bring any related claims against the Estate, such as cross claims or claims for 
contribution. 
However, the inability to bring a cross claim against another party does not make that 
party an indispensable party. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
stated, "it is well-established that Rule 19 does not require the joinder of joint tortfeasors. 
Nor does it require the joinder of principal and agent. Finally, Rule 19 does not require the 
joinder of persons against whom [the parties] have claim for contribution." Nottingham v. 
General American Communications Corp., 811 F.2d 873, 880 (5th Cir. 1987), See also 
Milligan v. Anderson, 522 F.2d 1202, 1204-05 (10th Cir. 1975); Dennis v. Wachovia 
Securities, 429 F.Supp. 2d 281, 290 (D. Mass. 2006). 
"[A] defendant's right to contribution or indemnity from an absent non-diverse party 
does not render that absentee indispensable pursuant to Rule 19." Gardiner v. Virgin 
Islands Water & Power Authority, 145 F.3d 635, 641 (3rd Cir. 1998). The Gardiner court 
added that "the possibility that the defendant may have a claim for contribution or indemnity 
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does not render an absentee indispensable. The right of contribution and indemnity should 
not, therefore, be considered to cause inadequacy of the resulting judgment." Further, 
when considering whether a judgment will be adequate, the proper inquiry is whether the 
remedy will be adequate from a plaintiffs point of view. See Provident Tradesmens Bank 
& Trust Co. v. Patterson, 309 U.S. 102, 112 (1968). Here, Plaintiffs will have an adequate 
remedy without the joinder of Dolezsar or the Estate. 
The Simpson Defendants argument is based on the fact that they will not be able to 
pursue the Estate for contribution as a joint tortfeasor. Therefore, they have failed to carry 
their burden. The Estate is not a necessary and indispensable party. 
The last factor that a court must consider is whether the plaintiff will have an 
alternate remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder. The Simpson Defendants argue 
that Plaintiffs' other causes of action for breach of contract, quasi contract, breach of 
fiduciary duty, conversion and unjust enrichment provide a remedy for any alleged wrongs. 
However, the Simpson Defendants are again wrong. 
Plaintiffs other claims do not address the fraud that was perpetrated against them. 
If Plaintiffs causes of action for fraud are dismissed pursuant to Rule 19, Plaintiffs will have 
no remedy for those wrongs. There is no other venue or court available for Plaintiffs to bring 
their claims. See Id. 
The Simpson Defendants would have the Court believe that pursuant to Rule 19 
Plaintiffs1 fraud causes of action must be dismissed because they do not have the 
opportunity to press cross claims against the Estate. They would categorize Rule 19 as 
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being there to protect their rights against other possible defendants. However, as explained 
above, such is not the purpose of the rule. "The basic purpose of Rule 19 is to protect the 
interests of absent persons as well as those already before the court from multiple litigation 
or inconsistent judicial determinations." Ludlow v. Salt Lake County Board of Adjustment, 
839 P.2d 1101 (Ut. Ct. App. 1995). Further, "[t]he purpose of rule 19 is to protect against 
the entry of judgments which might prejudice the rights of indispensable parties in their 
absence." Call v. City of West Jordan, 788 P.2d 1049,1054-55 (Ut. Ct. App. 1990). Here, 
there is no possibility of prejudice to the Estate. Further, the Simpson Defendants are not 
in danger of being subject to multiple litigation or inconsistent judgments. Therefore, the 
Simpson Defendants' motion to dismiss the fraud claims pursuant to Rule 19 must be 
denied. 
FRAUDULENT NON-DISCLOSURE 
The Simpson Defendants argue that Plaintiffs fail to allege that Leslie relied on David 
Simpson's fraudulent non-disclosures in relation to the Double T Ranch water purchase.4 
The Simpson Defendants, relying on an unpublished opinion, claim that Plaintiffs must 
allege reliance by Leslie to pursue their cause of action for fraudulent non-disclosure. 
However, the standard proclaimed by the Simpson Defendants is wrong. 
4The Simpson Defendants rely on the case of Barber Bros. Ford, Inc. v. Foianini, 2008 UT App 463 
for the standard of pleading a cause of action for fraudulent non-disclosure. However. Barber Bros, is a 
Memorandum Decision of the Utah Court of Appeals and states it is "NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION." 
Therefore, the Simpson Defendants cannot rely on it as authority and it cannot be cited as precedent. See 
Grand County v. Rogers, 2002 UT 25 1f7; 44 P.3d 734, 736 (Utah 2002)(stating court of appeals' 
memorandum decisions designated as such are not published and cannot be relied upon as precedent). 
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The Utah Supreme Court addressed the elements of fraudulent non-disclosure in 
Yazd v. Woodside Homes Corp., 2006 UT 47. The court stated that "[i]n order to prevail on 
a claim of fraudulent concealment, a plaintiff must prove "(1) that the nondisclosed 
information is material, (2) that the nondisclosed information is known to the party failing to 
disclose, and (3) that there is a legal duty to communicate." Id. at 1J10. Here, Plaintiffs 
allege that David Simpson failed to disclose material and relevant facts, that such facts were 
material and that David Simpson had a duty to disclose the facts. Therefore, contrary to the 
Simpson Defendants1 argument, Plaintiffs have alleged all the necessary elements for their 
claim of fraudulent non-disclosure regarding the Double T Ranch water purchase. 
Therefore, the Simpson Defendants1 motion to dismiss should be denied. 
AIDING AND ABETTING CLAIMS IN UTAH 
The Simpson Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' claims for aiding and abetting breach 
of fiduciary duty and aiding and abetting fraudulent non-disclosure are not recognized by 
Utah courts and therefore must be dismissed. To support their argument, the Simpson 
Defendants cites to language from Colores v. Sabey, 2003 UT App 339, 79 P.3d 974 (Ut. 
Ct. App. 2003) in which the Colores court declined to decide whether claims for aiding and 
abetting breach of fiduciary duty are recognized in Utah. The Colores court stated, "since 
we decide the aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty claim on the basis discussed 
above, we do not need to decide the issue, reached by the trial court, of whether this 
cause of action is cognizable under Utah law in the first place." Id. at FN 19 (emphasis 
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added). Just because the Colores court declined to reach the issue, does not mean that 
such a claim is not cognizable in Utah. 
Causes of action for aiding and abetting are recognized by the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, §876. A majority of states have adopted the validity of a claim for aiding 
and abetting under the Restatement. See Dale v. ALA Acquisitions, Inc., 203 F.Supp.2d 
694,700 (S.D. Miss. 2002) (listing states that have adopted the validity of claims for aiding 
and abetting). Therefore, the court should allow Plaintiffs to proceed with their aiding and 
abetting claims. CONCLUSION 
On a motion to dismiss the Court must take all allegations contained in Plaintiffs' 
Second Amended Complaint as true and it must make all reasonable inferences in 
Plaintiffs1 favor. Further, the Court must resolve all doubts in Plaintiffs' favor. Applying that 
standard, Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint clearly and adequately asserts causes of 
action against the Simpson Defendants for fraud, fraudulent non-disclosure and aiding and 
abetting fraudulent non-disclosure. Plaintiffs have plead all of their fraud based claims with 
the particularity required by Rule 9. Further, the Simpson Defendants have failed carry their 
burden and show that Dolezsar or the Estate are either necessary or indispensable parties. 
Therefore, the Simpson Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint should 
be denied and Plaintiffs should be awarded their reasonable costs and fees incurred in 
addressing the Simpson Defendants motion. 
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REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
Plaintiffs hereby request oral argument on the Simpson Defendants' Motion to 
Dismiss Second Amended Complaint 
DATED this 26th day of April, 2010 
Bailey & Jennings, LC 
William T. Jennings 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 26th day of April, 2010,1 served a true an correct 
copy of the foregoing Memorandum in Opposition to the Simpson Defendants' Motion to 
Dismiss Second Amended Complaint on the following by mailing the same, United States 
mail, postage prepaid, addressed as follows: 
Chris D. Greenwood 
1840 North State St., Suite 200 
Provo, UT 84604 
Craig J. Carlile 
86 North University Ave., Suite 430 
Provo, UT 84601 
Mark D. Eddy 
233 South Pleasant Grove Blvd. 
Suite 202 
Pleasant Grove, UT 84062 
Laura S. Scott 
201 South Main Street 
Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Jonathan L. Jaussi 
P.O. Box 460 
Payson, UT 84651 
Julian D. Jensen 
311 South State Street, Suite 380 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Steven R. Sumsion 
86 North University Ave., Suite 400 
Provo, UT 84601 
Jennings 
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Craig Carlile (0571) 
Caleb J. Frischknecht (11648) 
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER P.C. 
86 North University Avenue, #430 
Provo,Utah 84601-4420 
Telephone: (801)342-2400 
Attorneys for Defendants David R. Simpson, Nathan R. Simpson, Todd Dorny, Koamalu 
Plantation, LLC, Landmark Real Estate, Lnc, Wood Springs, LLC, Oak Leaf Investments, LLC, 
Dente, LLC, Sunny Ridge, LLC, KNDJ Development, LLC, DN Simpson Holdings, LLC, SOS 
Mapleton Development, LLC, DN Simpson Mapleton Holdings, LLC, The Preserve at Mapleton 
Development Company, LLC, Pheasant Meadows, LLC, Carnesecca Orchard Estates, LLC, 
Spanish Vista Plat I, LLC, Landmark Homes of Utah, LLC, Maple Mountain Water Tank LLC, 
andKathy A. Templeman 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, PROVO DEPARTMENT 
LESLIE D. MOWER, an individual; et al., 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
DAVID R. SIMPSON, an individual; et al., 
Defendants 
and 
KOAMALU PLANTATION INVESTMENT, 
LLC, a Utah limited liability company, et al., 
Rule 19 Defendants. 
MOTION TO DISMISS SECOND 
AMENDED COMPLAINT 
Civil No: 090403844 
Judge: Samuel D. McVey 
Defendants David R. Simpson, Nathan R. Simpson, Todd Dorny, Koamalu Plantation, 
LLC, Landmark Real Estate, Inc., Wood Springs, LLC, Oak Leaf Investments, LLC, Dente, 
LLC, Sunny Ridge, LLC, KNDJ Development, LLC, DN Simpson Holdings, LLC, SOS 
Mapleton Development, LLC, DN Simpson Mapleton Holdings, LLC, The Preserve at Mapleton 
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Development Company, LLC, Pheasant Meadows, LLC, Carnesecca Orchard Estates, LLC, 
Spanish Vista Plat I, LLC, Landmark Homes of Utah, LLC, Maple Mountain Water Tank, LLC, 
and Kathy A. Templeman hereby move to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint of Plaintiffs 
Leslie D. Mower, LD SQ, LLC, LD III, LLC, LD Purpose, LLC, and Navona, LC (collectively, 
"Plaintiffs"), pursuant to Rules 8(a), 9(b), 12(b)(6), and 19(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
The grounds for this motion are that Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint again fails to 
meet the basic pleading requirements of Rules 8(a) and 9(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. The Court previously dismissed the allegations of fraud in Plaintiffs' 216-page First 
Amended Complaint because they did not contain the level of particularly required under Rule 
9(b). Despite now spanning 361 pages, the Second Amended Complaint still fails to provide the 
concise particularity required by the pleading standards under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
and, therefore, must be dismissed. 
Additionally, Plaintiffs' fraud-based claims related to Ken Dolezsar (Plaintiff Mower's 
ex-husband who was killed in November 2007) must be dismissed for failure to join an 
indispensible party under Rule 19(b). Ken Dolezsar is the central figure in this case. Plaintiffs 
affirmatively allege that all of the claimed misrepresentations with respect to the Hawaii 
development, the Mapleton development, and the Springville property were communicated to 
Mower by Dolezsar, who was allegedly acting in conspiracy with Defendants David Simpson 
and Nathan Simpson. However, Dolezsar cannot be joined because Plaintiffs failed to bring this 
case within the one year statute of limitations for claims against Dolezsar's estate after his death. 
The other defendants are thus prevented from asserting their claims against Dolezsar and from Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
otherwise requiring Dolezsar to account for his alleged actions by way of deposition or trial 
testimony. Under these circumstances, the fraud-based claims related to Dolezsar must be 
dismissed under Rule 19(b). 
Plaintiffs' claim for fraudulent nondisclosure with respect to the alleged purchase of 
water shares from Double T Ranch should also be dismissed for failure to state a claim because 
Plaintiffs fail to allege any justifiable reliance resulting in damages. 
Finally, Plaintiffs' claims for aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty and aiding and 
abetting fraudulent nondisclosure should be dismissed for failure to state a claim as Utah courts 
have not recognized a cognizable civil cause of action for "aiding and abetting." 
Therefore, as more fully stated in the supporting memorandum filed contemporaneously 
herewith, the Court should (1) dismiss Plaintiffs' fraud allegations for failure to plead in 
accordance with Rules 8(a) and 9(b); (2) dismiss Plaintiffs' fraud-based claims related to the 
Hawaii Development (Claim Nos. 1, 4-6, 9, and 10), the Mapleton Development (Claim Nos. 11, 
14-16,19, and 20), and the Springville Property (Claim Nos. 21, 22, 24, and 25) under Rule 
19(b) for failing to join an indispensible party; (3) dismiss Plaintiffs fraudulent nondisclosure 
claim with respect to the Double T Ranch water purchase (Claim No. 32) under Rule 12(b)(6); 
and (4) dismiss Plaintiff's claims for aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty (Claim Nos. 3, 
and 13) and aiding and abetting fraudulent nondisclosure (Claim Nos. 5, and 15) under Rule 
12(b)(6). 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
s ^ d DATED this/jT'day of April, 2010. 
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER P.C. 
Craig Carlile 
Calej/J. Frischknecht 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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Development Company, LLC, Pheasant Meadows, LLC, Carnesecca Orchard Estates, LLC, 
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IN' THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY; STATE OF UTAH, PROVO DEPARTMENT 
LESLIE D. MOWER, an individual; et al., 
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1 T 
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Defendants 
and 
KOAMALU PLANTATION INVESTMENT, 
LLC, a Utah limited liability company, et al., 
Rule 19 Defendants. 
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Development Company, LLC, Pheasant Meadows, LLC, Camesecca Orchard Estates, LLC, 
Spanish Vista Plat I, LLC, Landmark Homes of Utah, LLC, Maple Mountain Water Tank, LLC, 
and Kathy A. Templeman submit this memorandum in support of their Motion to Dismiss 
Second Amended Complaint. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint again fails to meet the basic pleading 
requirements of Rules 8 and 9 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court previously 
dismissed the allegations of fraud in Plaintiffs' 216-page First Amended Complaint because they 
did not contain the level of particularly required under Rule 9(b). At that time, Plaintiffs were 
given a "chance to plead fraud within 20 days . . . and do it concisely and with particularity." 
(Ruling Granting in Part the Various Defendants' Motions to Dismiss (emphasis added).) 
Plaintiffs have responded by adding 145 more unnecessary pages to their Second Amended 
Complaint. Despite now spanning 361 pages, the Second Amended Complaint still fails to 
provide the concise particularity required by the pleading standards under the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. As Plaintiffs have now failed on all three of their chances, their improperly-pleaded 
fraud claims should be dismissed with prejudice. 
Additionally, Plaintiffs' fraud-based claims with respect to the Hawaii development, the 
Mapleton development, and the Springville property must be dismissed for failure to join an 
indispensible party under Rule 19. As demonstrated by the allegations in the Second Amended 
Complaint, Ken Dolezsar (Plaintiff Mower's ex-husband who was killed in November 2007) is 
the central figure in this case. Plaintiffs affirmatively allege that all of the claimed 
misrepresentations with respect to these three transactions were communicated to Mower by 
Dolezsar, who was allegedly acting in conspiracy with Defendants David Simpson and Nathan 
Simpson. However, Plaintiffs failed to bring this case within the one year statute of limitations 
for claims against Dolezsar's estate after his death. See Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-803(a). Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Consequently, Dolezsar cannot be made a party to this case, The other defendants are thus 
account for his alleged actions by way of deposition or trial testimony. Under these 
circumstances, the fraud based clai ms related to the I la v\ aii d e v e l o p m e n t , t he IV laplet : n 
development, and the Springville property cannot proceed in equin and good conscience in 
Dolezsar's absence. Accordingly, these claims must be ui si, u;>^u
 t..,*;ci w^v. r ..-
Plaintiffs' claim,,, for fraudulent nondisclosure with respect to the alleged purchase of 
water shares from i double f Ranch should also be dismissed for failure to state a clai*:*. 
P : J ; ' f'r :\\\ , . . 1 I . ' ••>• ' ' ' All:'*- ' r ^ T * : CUC1.* ..) i o i l S 
concerning-the-Double T Ranch -water shares. • 
Finally, plaintiffs' clain^ i^.i ^UJ : : . .:.U aoettmg c\ . : i. •. iary etui) and aiding and 
abetting fraudulent nondisclosure should be dismissed ** >r * =. :• -U:>e a claim as 'Utah courts 
have not recognized a cogmzahe ci vit umsc o! acuon lor " UKIIILL aiid abetting." 
S I 4 TEMEN1 >• i a 
1. Plaintiffs Leslie D. Mower5 LD K>. ill'. j ,0 TIL TIT ID Purpose, I I ,C, and 
Docket.) 
2. AI k i motions to dismiss vuu: lilal in multifile defendants. Plaintiffs hied a 1MI*M 
Amended Complaint on November 27, 2009, which contained 216 pages and 713 numbered 
paragraphs. (First, Amended Complaint.) 
3. The First Amended Complaint prompted several more motions to dismiss fix m 
the defendants. (See Docket.) Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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4. On January 22, 2010, the Court "dismisse[d] the fraud allegations arising 
throughout the Amended Complaint since they [did] not contain the required level of 
particularity" under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). (Ruling Granting in Part the Various 
Defendants' Motions to Dismiss, dated January 22, 2010, attached hereto as Ex. A (hereinafter, 
"January 22, 2010 Order").) 
5. The Court granted Plaintiffs a "chance to plead fraud within 20 days [of the 
January 22, 2010 Order] and do it concisely and with particularity." {Id. (emphasis added).) 
6. On March 5, 2010, Plaintiffs filed their Second Amended Complaint (hereinafter 
"Complaint"), which now contains 361 pages, 48 causes of action and 1362 numbered 
paragraphs. 
7. Then, on March 12, 2010, Plaintiffs filed an 11-page Notice of Errata Regarding 
Second Amended Complaint. 
8. The claims alleged in the Complaint primarily arise from two real property 
developments: a condominium development on the island of Kauai in Hawaii (the "Hawaii 
Development") and an up-scale residential subdivision in Mapleton, Utah called The Preserve at 
Mapleton (the "Mapleton Development"). 
9. In Claim Nos. 1-10, Plaintiffs allege claims related to the Hawaii Development 
for fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty, fraudulent 
nondisclosure, aiding and abetting fraudulent nondisclosure, conversion, unjust enrichment, 
conspiracy, and violation of the Utah Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act against the following 
defendants: David Simpson; Nathan Simpson; Michael Thompson; Todd Dorny; Brandon Dente; 
Wood Springs, LLC; ALS Properties, LLC; Mai Ke Kula; Hanalei Kai Holdings, LLC; Ka Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Mahina, I ,LC; Dente, LLC; He Kaikolu, LLC; and Koamalu Plantation (collectively, the 
"Hawaii Development Defendants"). 
10. In the fraud-based claims related to the Hawaii Development, Plaintiffs allege that 
Ken Dolezsar (Plaintiff Mower" s late ex-hi isband) com muni : ate d i i it ID iber of 
misrepresentations to Mower. Plaintiffs allege thai Dnlc/sa- -OHMI imitated these 
misrepresentations to Mower at;e;* allegedly hearing t h a n l^-m Ua. iu Simpson ajiu . lu^-n 
Simpson, either "in ignorance i ' *he Ih'sity of the representations or as part of a c o n s r r a e / ' with 
the Simpsons. (Complaint *jj 543.) 
11. NCF '.••.•- * *; * , K L ,. ions associated \ vdth the I lawaii Develo' • • 
Plaintiffs allege thai the Simp?. v> r r ihe other Hawaii Development Defendants made any • 
representations directly to Mo v\ er. ( C o m p l a i n t ^ 538 559.) 
12. In Claim Nos. 11-20, Plaintiffs allege claims related to the Mapleton 
Development for fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, aiding and abetting breach ui 
frai icii llent nondi sclosure, aiding a nil abetting frai ldi llent nondisclosure, conversion - yust 
enrichment, conspiracy, and violation of the Utah Pattern, of Activity Act against the -Ah • wirw'i 
Oak: Leaf, LLC; Sunny Ridge, I I ,C; KNDJ Development, I i C: i^ N Simpson Holdings, LLC; 
SOS Mapletc nDe <v elopment, I I ,C; DN Simpson I\ lapletonl I •. - • I ,C; I he: Pi esei ve at 
Mapleton Development Company, I I -C; Pheasant Meadow - . M i * "arnesecca Orchard hstates, 
LLC; Spanish Vista Plat I, LLC; Landmark Homes of U a h * . v ; David Nemelka. v. ..a*.. 
Carlson: 2 Brothers Coin mi uiications; A 1 len I la kes; I ' -.--^ i: ' ' ' * ••! . : *.c ; 
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Lonestar Builders, LLC; Michael Marx; and Michael Aviano (collectively, the "Mapleton 
Development Defendants"). 
13. Similar to the fraud claims concerning the Hawaii Development, Plaintiffs allege 
Dolezsar communicated a number of misrepresentations to Plaintiff Mower concerning the 
Mapleton Development. Again, Plaintiffs allege that Dolezsar communicated all of the alleged 
misrepresentations directly to Mower, after allegedly hearing such misrepresentations from 
David Simpson and Nathan Simpson, and that he did so "as part of a conspiracy with the 
Simpsons." (Complaint ffi[ 721, 731, 734, 739, 757-758, 434, and 975.) 
14. Plaintiffs do not allege that the Mapleton Development Defendants made any 
misrepresentations directly to Mower. (Complaint ^[717-814.) 
15. As part of the claims related to the Mapleton Development, Plaintiffs assert 
claims on behalf of Magnet Bank, which claims Plaintiffs appear to allege were acquired by 
Plaintiff Navona, LC in February 2008. (Complaint f 793.) 
16. In the Magnet Bank fraud-based claims (Claim Nos. 11,14,15, 16, and 20.), -
Plaintiffs allege that the Mapleton Development Defendants made misrepresentations and 
material omissions to Magnet Bank in connection with a loan extended by Magnet Bank for the 
Mapleton Development. (See generally Complaint f^l[ 766 -811.) 
17. In Claim Nos. 21-25, Plaintiffs allege claims for fraud, negligent 
misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, fraudulent nondisclosure, and conspiracy arising 
from Mower's purchase of approximately 30 acres of real property in Springville, Utah (the 
"Springville Property"). Plaintiffs assert these claims against David Simpson, Nathan Simpson, 
Wood Springs, and Pheasant Meadows (collectively, the "Springville Property Defendants"). Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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18. As in the claims related to the I law all Development and the I\ lapleton 
Development, Plaintiffs allege that Dolezsar, "'whether duped by or compUcitous with the 
Simpsons" communicated a number of alleged misrepresentations to Mower with respect to the 
Springville Property (Complai i i t f | 4 3 1- i ind 101- I ) 
19. Plaintiffs do not allege that the Springville Property Defendants made any 
misrepresentations
 ; . 
20. In C iaim N^s. ?^- *0. Plaintiffs allege claim- \^r iraud, negligent 
misrepresentation, brea*. ii -.•; huJv.ia.rv uiu>. iiaudulent nondisclosure, and conspiracy against 
David Simp?-. :-. '- : *... " • l iming the Simpsons made misrepresentations to Mower 
through her "representatives" concerning Mapleton Development's share of costs for the 
C ' .i • : ; • , : j • • *• • ; " = *: : \ 
connection v -it" '.\e Maplelon Development (the "Maple Maintain Water Project"; JSee 
generally Complaint f f 1094 110 ; ) 
2 1 . In Claim Nos. 31-32, Plaintiffs allege claim- '«,r breach of fiduci,r\ d -::y and 
fraudulent nondisclosure against David Simp-Min. cann ing .MnipbOh iaiied u- d i ^ i . ^ co Mower 
that he used funds from Plaintiff LD III to purchase water shares from a company named Double 
T Ranch (the "Double T Water Purchase"). 
ARC • r 
I. PLAINTIFFS HAVE AGAIN FAILED TO PLEAD THEIR CLAIMS 
ACCORDING TO THE PLEADING STANDARDS OF THE UTAH RULES OF 
CIVn .PROCEDI JR E 
Under the notice pleading requirements espou^ d h- rhe Ulaii Rules of Civil Procedure, 
plaintiffs are required to set forth their claims Jor relici in ' .i viort nnd plain statement Digi ized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
r 
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Utah R. Civ. P. 8(a). Where fraud is at issue, "the 
circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity." Utah R. Civ. P. 
9(a). Together, the purpose of these pleading Rules is "to require that the essential facts upon 
which redress is sought be set forth with simplicity, brevity, clarity and certainty so that it can be 
determined whether there exists a legal basis for the relief claimed." Heathman v. Hatch, 372 
P.2d 990, 992 (Utah 1962) (emphasis added). 
As set forth in the Court's January 22, 2010 Order, Rule 9(b) requires that Plaintiffs 
allege "who in particular said or represented what to whom in particular, when, where, and how 
such representations occurred, the specific terminology used, why reliance was reasonable and 
what particular damages were caused by each discrete action." (January 22, 2010 Order ^2.) -
These requirements apply not only to "allegations of common-law fraud," but extend to "all 
circumstances where the pleader alleges the kind of misrepresentations, omissions, or other 
deceptions covered by the term 'fraud' in its broadest dimension." Williams v. State Farm Ins. 
Co., 656 P.2d 966 (Utah 1982). Thus, Rule 9(b)'s pleading requirements apply to Plaintiffs' 
common law fraud claims as well as their claims for aiding and abetting fraud, conspiracy, and 
violation of the Utah Pattern of Unlawful Practices Act, insofar as they are based on 
circumstances of fraud. 
Despite having now filed three complaints, along with a lengthy "notice of errata," 
Plaintiffs have yet again failed to plead their fraud-based claims with the particularly required by 
Rule 9(b). Rather than providing the necessary particularly, Plaintiffs have merely lengthened 
their Complaint (which now totals 361 pages and contains 1,362 paragraphs) by an additional 
145 pages. For example, Plaintiffs fill 20 pages of their Complaint with "unnecessary detail, if Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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not minutia from credit card statements to claim, that Defendants David and. Nathan Simpson 
expenses, (Complaint ffif 179-198..) 
Y et. Plaintiffs routinely fail to prov ide the necessary particularity with respect to their 
fraud claims. For example, as part of the fraud claims related to the Mapleton Development, 
Plaintiffs make the following allegation: 
737. Davu: '-\\ : M;II. -\~JA~:. :•..:.*;>A\.. aiiv. :\.^ .. . nezsar also 
represented to [Mowti j u iai the $6,800,000.00 would be specifically used to fund 
development work at The Preserve at Mapleton development project, that she 
would receive a first position deed of trust securing a promissory note and that, 
they would recc-r1 ^ e deed of trust in the office of the I Jtah County Recorder, 
(Complaint f^ 737.) Plaintiffs do not specify who in particulai* made the alleged representations-- • 
or when they were n;adv. . -^.^ alleged mis;cprescntauons are among several, omcj ,^  aaiihui 
with respect to the Mapleton Development. As outlined below, Plaintiffs allege that all of the 
other claimed misrepresentations made to Mower concerning the Mapleton, Development were 
{"orrifiiunic ateil \*\ I >. ile/sar lifter In1 ;illr|:c ill\ frreivccl infuniiation Irnm flic Simpson [Si. 
Complaint ^j 721, 731, 734, and 739.) Without the specifics as to "who in, particular said or 
with respect to the alleged misrepresentations in paragraph 7 ;'7 f.wv January 22, 2010 Order),, the 
Mapleton Development Defendants are left to guess as to "the substance oi ine acts constituting 
the alleged wrong " Williams v. State Farm Ins. Co., 656 P.2d 966, 971-72 (Utah 1982). 
This example, and. those that follow,, illustrate that Plaintiffs' Complaint is "much too 
1
 See Coroles v. Sabey, 2003 UT App 339, ]] 23 n. 11, 79 P.3d 974. 
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hundreds of paragraphs of alleged facts to ascertain whether Plaintiffs have allege[d]... the 
facts necessary to make all their elements of fraud." Coroles v. Sabey, 2003 UT App 339, ffl[ 23, 
27, 79 P.3d 974 (internal quotations omitted). As Plaintiffs have now failed to properly plead 
their claims on their third attempt, the Court should dismiss Plaintiffs' fraud claims without leave 
to amend. U.S. ex rel Ritchie v. LockheadMartin Corp., 558 F.3d 1161,1166 (10th Cir. 2009) 
(denial of leave to amend appropriate after "repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments 
previously allowed"). At a minimum, the Court should dismiss the fraud claims related to 
Magnet Bank (part of Claim Nos. 11,14,15,16, and 20), the Double T Water Purchase (Claim 
No. 32), and the Maple Mountain Water Project (Claim Nos. 26, 27, 29, and 30). 
A. Plaintiffs Fail to Plead the Fraud Claims of Magnet Bank With the 
Particularly Required Under Rule 9(b) and the Court's January 22,2010 
Order. 
For example, Plaintiffs allege that David and Nathan Simpson somehow duped an 
appraiser into using allegedly fraudulent "pre-sales" — which the appraisal itself clarifies were 
offers — to arrive at the valuation of the Mapleton Development submitted to Magnet Bank in 
connection with a loan application. (Complaint \ 787.) However, Plaintiffs do not plead any 
allegations to explain what in particular about these offers made them fraudulent. They merely 
allege, "on information and belief and without any supporting detail, that each of the 
approximately 15 offers were somehow "contrived sham transactions." (Complaint Iffi 304, 298-
303.) Merely labeling the offers as "sham transactions" does not make them so. Plaintiffs do not 
provide any explanation as to how or when the offers were "contrived." These conclusory 
allegations carry no weight under Rule 9(b). 
t;n 
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Plaintiffs also conclusorily allege that the Simpsons submitted false financial statements 
to Magnet Bank in connection with the loan application. (Complaint fflf 766-777.) Without 
making any attempt to explain how, Plaintiffs merely allege that David Simpson and Nathan 
Simpson's financial statements overstated their assets and understated their liabilities. 
(Complaint Iffl 352, 353, 355, 771-773.) Plaintiffs fail to specify which of the several assets 
listed in the statements in particular was overvalued, by how much each such asset was 
overvalued, or why each such asset was otherwise improperly included. Plaintiffs further fail to 
specify what liabilities in particular were understated or otherwise not included, and the amount 
of each such liability. Plaintiffs conclusorily allege that the financial statements did not reflect 
unspecified money allegedly owed by the Simpsons to Mower,- but provide no explanation as to 
what debt they refer, how much money was owed, or how the money was owed — such as 
money possibly owed through one of the several entities listed in the financial statements. 
(Complaint 1774.) Rule 9(b) requires that this detail be pleaded "so that there will be a clearly 
defined foundation upon which further proceedings . . . can go forward in an orderly manner." 
Heathman, 372 P.2d at 992. 
Plaintiffs further allege the Simpsons and Defendant Aviano falsely represented to 
Magnet Bank that the sales price for Aviano's purchase of Lot 76 in the Mapleton Development 
was $900,000. (Complaint fflf 794-811.) Even though they admit that Magnet Bank actually 
received $900,000 from the sale, Plaintiffs allege that the sales price was misrepresented because 
Aviano allegedly only paid $575,000 and the Simpsons allegedly paid the rest. (Complaint ff 
802-03.) However, Plaintiffs fail to explain how Magnet Bank's position changed as a result. 
As Magnet Bank had already funded the loan with respect to the Mapleton Development prior to Digitized by the Howar  W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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the Aviano sale, Plaintiffs cannot claim that Magnet Bank somehow relied on the Aviano sale to 
fund the loan. Furthermore, Plaintiffs make no attempt to allege "what particular damages were 
caused" by the Aviano sale. (See January 22, 2010 Order f^ 2.) These allegations do not meet the 
requirements in Rule 9(b) or the Court's Order. 
In short, the Magnet Bank claims have not been pleaded with particularity and must be 
dismissed. 
B, Plaintiffs Also Fail to Plead Their Fraud Claims With Respect to the Double 
T Ranch Water Purchase With Rule 9(b) Particularity. 
Plaintiffs allege that David Simpson fraudulently failed to disclose a number of alleged 
material facts to Mower concerning his alleged purchase of Double T Ranch's water shares. 
(Complaint Yl 1175-79.) However, Plaintiffs completely fail to allege how such nondisclosures 
resulted in any damage. Instead, Plaintiffs merely allege without any detail that they were 
somehow damaged in the amount of $300,125.00. (Complaint^ 1182-83.) Thisdoesnot 
comply with Rule 9(b) or the Court's January 22, 2010 Order. 
C. Plaintiffs Have Not Pleaded With Particularity Their Fraud Claims 
Concerning the Maple Mountain Water Project. 
A final example of Plaintiffs' failure to plead required details is found in the fraud claims 
related to the Maple Mountain Water Project. Plaintiffs generally allege that "[b]etween 
November 15,2007 and April 23, 2008, David Simpson and Nathan Simpson repeatedly 
solicited [Mower] and her representatives claiming [the] Simpsons needed funds to pay due and 
past due bills of the Preserve" and that Mov/er provided money in response to these solicitations, 
which money Plaintiffs claim was used for unauthorized purposes. (Complaint ^ 485,1099, 
and 1103.) This allegation is obviously lacking the detail required by Rule 9(b). Plaintiffs Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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cryptically attempt to bolster this general allegation by alleging that on two occasions the 
Simpsons falsely told Mower's son that the Mapleton Development needed funds to satisfy its 
share of the costs for the Maple Mountain Water Project, which alleged false statements were 
related to Mower. (Complaint fflf 1094-1096.) However, Plaintiffs fail to allege what specific 
actions were taken in reliance on the alleged misrepresentations, when those actions were taken, 
and "what particular damages were caused by each [of these] discrete action[s]." (January 22, 
2010 Order Tf 2.) Thus, the Court and the defendants are left to guess what Mower did in 
response to these alleged misrepresentations and how it damaged her. 
As illustrated by the foregoing, Plaintiffs' 361-page Complaint remains deficient and 
should be dismissed without leave to amend. 
II. PLAINTIFFS9 FRAUD-BASED CLAIMS RELATED TO KEN DOLEZSAR 
MUST BE DISMISSED UNDER RULE 19(b) FOR FAILURE TO JOIN 
DOLESZAR'S ESTATE. 
The allegations in the Complaint demonstrate that Dolezsar is the central figure in this 
case. Plaintiffs affirmatively plead that Mower received all of her information regarding the 
Hawaii Development, the Mapleton Development, and the Springville Property from Dolezsar, 
her late ex-husband. Indeed, each of the representations of which Plaintiffs complain with 
respect to these projects was made by Dolezsar as a member of some alleged conspiracy to 
defraud her. 
Yet, Dolezsar is not a party to this case. Plaintiffs allege that Dolezsar was murdered in 
Sandy, Utah on November 15, 2007. (Complaint f 400.) This case was filed in October 2009, 
long after the expiration of the one year statute of limitations for claims against Dolezsar's estate. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-803(a). Thus, Plaintiffs did not, and cannot, join Dolezsar's estate Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law Sch ol BYU. 
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to this case, preventing the other defendants from asserting their claims against Dolezsar and 
from otherwise requiring Dolezsar to account for his alleged actions by way of deposition or trial 
testimony. Under these circumstances, the fraud-based claims related to the Hawaii 
Development (Claim Nos. 1, 4-6, 9, and 10), the Mapleton Development (Claim Nos. 11,14-16, 
19, and 20), and the Springville Property (Ckiim Nos. 21, 22,24, and 25) cannot proceed in 
equity and good conscience in Dolezsar's absence. Such claims must therefore be dismissed 
under Rule 19. 
Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires joinder of "necessary" parties 
where feasible, and dismissal of the action in the absence of "indispensible" parties. Utah R. 
Civ. P. 19(a>(b); Turville v. J&JProps., L.C., 2006 UT App 305, ffi[ 36-37,145 P.3d 1146. 
Analysis under Rule 19 proceeds in two steps: First, the Court must determine whether an 
absent party is necessary to the "just adjudication" of the action. Second, where an absent party 
is found to be necessary to the action, but cannot feasibly be joined, the Court must determine 
whether such party is indispensable such that the action must be dismissed in his absence. 
Turville, 2006 UT App 305, at ffi[ 36-37. 
A. Dolezsar Is Necessary to This Action Because Complete Relief Cannot Be 
Accorded the Parties in His Absence. 
A party is necessary to an action if "in [the party's] absence complete relief cannot be 
accorded among those already parties." Utah R. Civ. P. 19(a). Complete relief is not possible in 
the absence of a party who was primarily involved in the alleged conduct that caused the 
plaintiffs damages. Turville, 2006 UT App 305, If 40. For example, in the case of Turville v. 
J&J Properties, L.C., the plaintiff brought contract, fraud, conspiracy, and other claims against a 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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company and its members related to a dispute concerning two real estate transactions. Id. at fflf 
2-8. One of the defendants, named Clark, died before he was served with the complaint. Id. at 
lf| at 9-10. After the plaintiff failed to join Clark's estate into the case, the other defendants 
moved the court to dismiss the complaint for failure to join Clark's estate as a necessary and 
indispensible party. Id. at fflf 10, 17. Clark was the person with whom the plaintiff had primarily 
dealt. Id. at ffif 3-6. Noting his "pivotal representative role . . . in the transactions at issue," the 
trial court found that Clark was a necessary party to the case. Id. at \ 9. The Utah Court of 
Appeals affirmed, holding that Clark was a necessary party because he was primarily involved in 
the conduct that led to the plaintiffs alleged damages and, therefore, complete relief could not be 
accorded among the parties in his absence. Id. at f 40. 
Dolezsar is a necessary party to this action as complete relief cannot be accorded to the 
parties in his absence. As did Clark in the Turville case, Dolezsar is alleged to have played a 
"pivotal representative role" in the misrepresentations alleged by Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs have 
affirmatively pleaded that all of the alleged misrepresentations related to the Hawaii 
Development, the Mapleton Development, and the Springville Property were made to Mower 
directly by Dolezsar, who Plaintiffs allege was a coconspirator with the Simpsons. (Complaint \ 
975.) For example, with respect to the Hawaii Development, Plaintiffs allege that Dolezsar 
made the misrepresentations of which Plaintiffs complain to Mower, after hearing them from the 
Simpsons, either "in ignorance of the falsity of the representations or as part of a conspiracy." 
(Complaint 1543 (emphasis added).) Nowhere in the fraud allegations associated with the 
Hawaii Development do Plaintiffs allege that the Hawaii Development Defendants made any 
representations directly to Mower. (Complaint 1fi[ 538-559.) All of the alleged Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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misrepresentations with respect to the Hawaii Development were communicated to Mower by 
Dolezsar. (Id) At most, Plaintiffs allege that the Hawaii Development Defendants instructed 
Dolezsar to make the misrepresentations to Mower. (Complaint U 542.) Accordingly, Plaintiffs' 
allegations establish that Dolezsar was the nexus for all of the conduct that Plaintiffs allege 
caused them damage. 
The same is true for the fraud claims related to the Mapleton Development and the 
Springville Property. With respect to the Mapleton Development, Plaintiffs again allege that 
Dolezsar made all of the alleged misrepresentations to Mower "as part of a conspiracy with the 
Simpsons." (Complaint fflf 721, 731, 734, 739, 757-758, and 434.)2 Plaintiffs do not allege that 
the Mapleton Development Defendants made any misrepresentations directly to Mower. 
(Complaint ff 717-814.) Likewise, Plaintiffs allege that Dolezsar, "whether duped by or 
complicitous with the Simpsons" made the alleged misrepresentations to Mower with respect to 
the Springville Property. (Complaint ffl[ 434, 435,1014.) Plaintiffs do not allege that the 
Springville Property Defendants made any misrepresentations directly to Mower. (Complaint i[fl[ 
435,435,1007-1035.) 
Scrutiny of Plaintiffs' Complaint thus shows that Dolezsar is alleged to be the primary 
perpetrator of Plaintiffs' claimed wrongs. Surely, had Dolezsar been alive when Plaintiffs filed 
this case, they would have named and served him as a defendant. However, Dolezsar's untimely 
death left Plaintiffs looking for other sources of recovery, leading to the 361-page Complaint 
before the Court, which is completely devoid of any alleged misrepresentations made to Mower 
2
 As noted in Part LA above, Magnet Bank's fraud claims related to the Mapleton Development have not been 
pleaded with particularity and must be dismissed. Digitize  by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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by anyone other than Dolezsar. Plaintiffs apparently base their allegations that the other 
defendants were somehow involved in the alleged fraud solely on Dolezsar's statements to 
Mower. However, the parties will not be able to question Dolezsar concerning the origin of his 
alleged statements due to his untimely death. Moreover, none of the other defendants in this case 
may proceed with their claims against Dolezsar's estate because Plaintiffs failed to bring this 
case until after the applicable probate statute of limitations had run. Therefore, as the party 
primarily responsible for the damages claimed by Plaintiffs, Dolezsar's absence will prevent the 
Court from according complete relief among the other parties in this case. Consequently, as was 
Clark's estate in the Turville case, the estate of Dolezsar is a necessary party to this action under 
Rule 19(a). -
B. Dolezsar Is Indispensable Because This Action Cannot Proceed In Equity 
And Good Conscience Without Him. 
Where a necessary party cannot be feasibly joined, and the action cannot proceed "in 
equity and good conscience" in his absence, the party is deemed "indispensible," and the action 
"should be dismissed." Utah R. Civ. P. 19(b). Rule 19(b) instructs the Court to consider the 
following factors in deciding whether equity and good conscience require dismissal: 
[FJirst, to what extent a judgment rendered in the person's absence might be 
prejudicial to him or those already parties; second the extent to which, by 
protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other measure, 
the prejudice can be lessoned or avoided; third, whether a judgment rendered in 
the person's absence will be adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiff will have an 
adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 19(b) (emphasis added). 
Applying these factors, the Turville court held that Clark's estate was an indispensible 
party and, therefore, the case was properly dismissed in its absence. Turville, 2006 UT App 305, Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
at ffl[ 41-42. Clark's estate could no longer be joined to the action because the probate statute of 
limitations had already run. Id. at \ 41. Because Clark was the "major" party responsible for the 
alleged damages, the court concluded that "'a judgment rendered in [the Estate of Mr. Clark's] 
absence w[ould] prejudice . . . those already parties' to the action" and "would be less than 
adequate." Id. at \ 42. Additionally, as all claims against Clark's estate, whether those of the 
plaintiff or those of the other defendants, were barred by the statute of limitations, "protective 
judgment provisions would not ameliorate [the] prejudice." Id. Accordingly, the court held that 
allowing the case to proceed despite the nonjoinder of Clark's estate "would violate the 
principles of 'equity and good conscience.'" Id. (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 19(b)). Accordingly, 
the court affirmed the dismissal of the case. M 
As in the Turville case, the principles of equity and good conscience mandate that 
Plaintiffs' fraud-based claims relating to the Hawaii Development, the Mapleton Development, 
and the Springville Property be dismissed in Dolezsar's absence. Due to his untimely death, 
Dolezsar cannot be joined to this action. Dolezsar's estate also cannot be joined because 
Plaintiffs failed to bring this lawsuit within the period of limitations set forth in the Utah 
Uniform Probate Code. See Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-803(a). 
1. Any Judgment Rendered in Dolezsar's Absence Will Result in 
Unavoidable Prejudice to the Other Defendants in This Case. 
Dolezsar is the central figure with respect to the fraud-based claims involving the Hawaii 
Development, the Mapleton Development, and the Springville Property. Plaintiffs have 
specifically alleged that all of the claimed misrepresentations made to Mower were 
communicated to her by Dolezsar. Thus, as was Clark in Turville, Dolezsar is the "major" party 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
responsible for the damages alleged in the Complaint. To the extent Plaintiffs attempt to 
somehow impute any of Dolezsar's alleged misrepresentations to the other defendants, they do 
so based solely on hearsay statements made by Dolezsar. As a result of his death, the other 
defendants will be unable to require Dolezsar to account for his alleged conduct at a deposition 
or a trial in this matter. There are no protective provisions or other measures to remedy this 
problem. Consequently, this action cannot proceed to a judgment in Dolezsar's absence without 
resulting in unfair prejudice to the other defendants. 
2. Any Judgment Rendered in Dolezsar's Absence Will Be Inadequate. 
Plaintiffs failed to bring this lawsuit before the statute of limitations expired with respect 
to claims against Dolezsar's estate. As a result, neither Plaintiffs nor any of the defendants can 
bring their related claims against Dolezsar's estate. Of course, the Hawaii Development 
Defendants, the Mapleton Development Defendants, and the Springville Property Defendants 
vigorously dispute that they made any misrepresentations to Dolezsar. To the extent liability 
could somehow be imputed to them based on Dolezsar's alleged misrepresentations, these 
defendants would seek to assert cross-claims against Dolezsar's estate. However, because 
Plaintiffs delayed in bringing this lawsuit until after the statute of limitations had run, any such 
cross-claims would likely be barred. Accordingly, any judgment on the fraud-claims related to 
the Hawaii Development, the Mapleton Development, or the Springville Property will be 
inadequate. 
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3. Plaintiffs Will Retain Adequate Remedies After Dismissal of the 
Dolezsar Fraud Claims. 
Plaintiffs have asserted 48 causes of action in this case, including claims for breach of 
contract, quasi contract, fiduciary duty, conversion, and unjust enrichment in addition to their 
fraud-based claims. These claims provide an adequate remedy for the wrongs alleged by 
Plaintiffs in their Complaint. Moreover, any possible deficiency is the result of Plaintiffs' failure 
to bring the fraud-based claims within the limitations period. Plaintiffs should not be allowed to 
wait until after the central figure in the case can no longer be joined to seek recovery from others 
who are alleged only to have acted in concert with him. 
Accordingly, applying the factors outlined in Rule 19(b), the principles of equity and 
good conscience dictate that Plaintiffs' fraud based claims related to the Hawaii Development, 
the Mapleton Development, and the Springville Property be dismissed in the absence of Dolezsar 
and his estate, both indispensable parties to this action. 
III. PLAINTIFFS' FRAUDULENT NONDISCLOSURE CLAIM CONCERNING THE 
DOUBLE T RANCH WATER PURCHASE MUST BE DISMISSED FOR 
FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM. 
"A party is liable for fraudulent nondisclosure if he 'omi[ts] . . . a material fact when 
there is a duty to disclose, for the purpose of inducing action on the part of the other party, with 
actual, justifiable reliance resulting in damage to that party" Barber Bros. Ford, Inc. v. 
Foianini, 2008 UT App 463, ^  2 (emphasis added). 
In Plaintiffs' fraudulent nondisclosure claim related to the Double T Ranch Water 
Purchase, Plaintiffs allege that David Simpson fraudulently failed to disclose to Mower that he 
had used money from Plaintiff LD III to purchase water shares in the name of Defendant Wood 
r_* n r 
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Springs, as well as other alleged happenings subsequent to the alleged purchase. (Complaint fflf 
1176-79.) However, Plaintiffs fail to allege Mower relied on these alleged fraudulent 
nondisclosures, or for that matter, how Mower could possibly have relied on these 
nondisclosures — each of which allegedly took place after the purchase of the Double T Ranch 
water shares — to her detriment. (Complaint fflf 1176-79.) Instead, Plaintiffs simply allege that 
Simpson's failure to disclose somehow damaged Mower and LD III in the amount of 
$300,125.00. (Complaint 11182.) 
Having failed to plead justifiable reliance resulting in damages, Plaintiffs' fraudulent 
disclosure claim with respect to the Double T Ranch water shares fails as a matter of law. This 
claim is nothing more than Plaintiffs' attempt to turn an alleged breach of fiduciary duty into a 
fraud claim. 
IV. PLAINTIFFS5 AIDING AND ABETTING CLAIMS HAVE NOT BEEN 
RECOGNIZED AS VALID CLAIMS UNDER UTAH LAW AND SHOULD BE 
DISMISSED ACCORDINGLY. 
In Claim Nos. 3, 5,13, and 15, Plaintiffs purport to allege claims for aiding and abetting 
breach of fiduciary duty and aiding and abetting fraudulent nondisclosure. However, claims for 
aiding and abetting have not been recognized by Utah Courts. See Coroles v. Sabey, 2003 UT 
App 339, 79 P.3d 974 (declining to decide whether claims for aiding and abetting breach of 
fiduciary duty and fraud are cognizable under Utah law). To the extent Plaintiffs wish to 
broaden their net with respect to claims for breach of fiduciary duty and fraud, they should be 
required to prove their claims for conspiracy and violation of the Utah Pattern of Unlawful 
Activity Act, which have been recognized as valid causes of action under Utah law. 
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CONCLUSION 
For all of the reasons set forth above, Plaintiffs' fraud-based claims should be dismissed 
for failure to plead with particularity as required by Rule 9(b) and failure to join an indispensible 
party under Rule 19(b). Additionally, Plaintiffs' fraud claims with respect to the alleged 
purchase of water shares from Double T Ranch, as well as their "aiding and abetting" claims, 
should be dismissed for failure to state a claim under Utah law. 
DATED t h i s Z ^ a y of April, 2010. 
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER P.C. 
Craig Carlile 
Caleb J. Frischknecht 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER P.C. 
86 North University Avenue, #430 
Provo,Utah 84601-4420 
Telephone: (801)342-2400 
Attorneys for Defendants David R. Simpson, Nathan R. Simpson, Michael K. Thompson, Todd 
Dorny, Brandon Dente, ALS Properties, LLC, Mai Ke Kula, LLC, Hanalei Kai Holdings, LLC, 
KaMahina, LLC, He Kiakolu, LLC, Koamalu Plantation, LLC, Landmark Real Estate, Inc., 
Wood Springs, LLC, Oak Leaf, LLC, Dente, LLC, Sunny Ridge, LLC, KNDJ Development, LLC, 
DN Simpson Holdings, LLC, SOS Mapleton Development, LLC, DN Simpson Mapleton 
Holdings, LLC, The Preserve at Mapleton Development Company, LLC, Pheasant Meadows, 
LLC, Carnesecca Orchard Estates, LLC, Spanish Vista Plat I, LLC, Landmark Homes of Utah, 
LLC, Maple Mountain Water Tank, LLC, andKathyA. Templeman 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, PROVO DEPARTMENT 
LESLIE D. MOWER, an individual; et al., 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
DAVID R. SIMPSON, an individual; et al., 
Defendants 
and 
KOAMALU PLANTATION INVESTMENT, 
LLC, a Utah limited liability company, et al., 
Rule 19 Defendants. 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION TO DISMISS SECOND 
AMENDED COMPLAINT 
Civil No: 090403844 
Judge: Samuel D. McVey 
Pursuant to Rule 7(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Defendants David R. 
Simpson, Nathan R. Simpson, Todd Dorny, Koamalu Plantation, LLC, Landmark Real Estate, 
Inc., Wood Springs, LLC, Oak Leaf, LLC, Dente, LLC, Sunny Ridge, LLC, KNDJ 
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Development, LLC, DN Simpson Holdings, LLC, SOS Mapleton Development, LLC, DN 
Simpson Mapleton Holdings, LLC, The Preserve at Mapleton Development Company, LLC, 
Pheasant Meadows, LLC, Carnesecca Orchard Estates, LLC, Spanish Vista Plat I, LLC, 
Landmark Homes of Utah, LLC, Maple Mountain Water Tank, LLC, and Kathy A. Templeman 
(collectively, "Defendants"1) submit the following reply memorandum in support of their Motion 
to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT SHOULD REJECT PLAINTIFFS' ATTEMPT TO MEET RULE 
9(b)'S PLEADING STANDARD WITH LABELS AND CONCLUSIONS. 
In their opposition memorandum, Plaintiffs accuse Defendants of failing to "read and 
comprehend" Plaintiffs Compliant, which contains 361 pages and 1362 individually numbered 
paragraphs, and of narrowly construing the Complaint "in the most narrow manner possible." 
{See Mem. in Opp'n 65 9.) Plaintiffs essentially argue that the pleading deficiencies in their 
fraud claims should be excused because the allegations in the Complaint "must be read broadly 
and all reasonable inferences must be taken in Plaintiffs' favor." {See Mem. in Opp'n 9.) 
However, "[the Rule 12(b) standard] does not apply to actions for fraud." DeBry v. 
Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 443 (Utah 1995). Rather, "Rule 9(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Requires that fraud claims be pled with particularity." Id. Rule 9(b) imposes a "basic and 
fundamental requirement... of clarity and conciseness," mandating that "the essential facts 
upon which redress is sought be set froth with simplicity, brevity, clarity, and certainty so that it 
can be determined whether there exists a legal basis for the relief claimed." Coroles v. Sabey, 
2003 UT App 339, 79 P.3d 974 {quotingHeathman v. Hatch, 372 P.2d 990, 992 (Utah 1962)). 
Mere pleading of labels and conclusions, such as "false statements" or "fraud," does not satisfy 
this standard. Williams v. State Farm Ins. Co., 656 P.2d 966, 971 (Utah 1982); see also Ashcroft 
v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937,1949-50 (2009) (condemning pleading of "labels and conclusions" that 
"do not permit the court to infer more than a mere possibility of misconduct"). 
As outlined below, Plaintiffs' opposition memorandum only highlights the deficiencies in 
their fraud claims. Plaintiffs have now failed on their third attempt to properly plead their fraud 
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claims. Accordingly, the Court should dismiss those claims with prejudice. U.S. ex rel Ritchie 
v. LockheadMartin Corp., 558 F.3d 1161, 1166 (10th Cir. 2009) (denial of leave to amend 
appropriate after "repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed"); see, 
e.g., Roth v. Pederson, 2009 UT App 313 (affirming dismissal with prejudice of fraudulent 
concealment claim for failure to plead with particularity). 
A. Plaintiffs Improperly Lump David Simpson, Nathan Simpson, and Others 
Together in Levying Allegations of Fraud. 
The particularity requirements of Rule 9(b) "[are] especially important in cases 
involving multiple defendants." Cook v. Zions First Nat'I Bank, 645 F. Supp. 423, 424 
(D. Utah 1986). "[E]ach defendant is entitled to know precisely what it is the plaintiff 
claims he did wrong." Id. Accordingly, in its January 22, 2010 Order, the Court required 
that Plaintiffs plead facts showing "who in particular said or represented what to whom in 
particular." (January 22, 2010 Ruling Granting in Part the Various Defendants' Motions 
to Dismiss (the "January 22, 2010 Order") f^ 2.) Lumping multiple defendants together 
into allegations of fraud does not meet this requirement and constitutes grounds for 
dismissal. See Cook, 645 F. Supp. at 424-25 (dismissing with prejudice fraud claims 
where plaintiffs failed on third attempt to "allege specifically the factual basis upon 
which they charge each defendant with fraud." (emphasis added)). 
Throughout the Complaint, Plaintiffs consistently lump David Simpson and Nathan 
Simpson (and sometimes others) together in levying Plaintiffs' allegations of fraud. (See, e.g., 
Complaint ffif 542, 720, 726, 737, 743, 757-58,1014,1094,1096, and 1099.) As cited in 
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Defendants' initial memorandum, paragraph 737 of the Complaint exemplifies this improper 
practice: 
737. David Simpson, Nathan Simpson and Ken Dolezsar also 
represented to Leslie that the $6,800,000.00 would be specifically used to fund 
development work at The Preserve at Mapleton development project, that she 
would receive a first position deed of trust securing a promissory note and that 
they would record the deed of trust in the office of the Utah County Recorder. 
(Complaint f 737.) Plaintiffs fail to plead "who in particular" made the claimed 
misrepresentations alleged in paragraph 737 and when such misrepresentations were 
made. The importance of these missing details is highlighted by the fact that all of the 
other claimed misrepresentations were allegedly made to Mower by Dolezsar "acting on 
authorization and instructions from David Simpson and Nathan Simpson, or as part of a 
conspiracy with David Simpson and Nathan Simpson." (See, e.g., Complaint ffi[ 721, 
731, 734, and 739.) 
Plaintiffs argue that the allegations in paragraph 737 are proper because "David 
Simpson and Nathan Simpson, father and son, would speak for each other." (Mem. in 
Opp'n 8.) Unsurprisingly, Plaintiff offers no authority and no explanation for this 
proposition. Plaintiffs lumping of David Simpson, Nathan Simpson, and others in the 
fraud allegations violates the pleading requirements of Rule 9(b) and constitutes grounds 
for dismissal. See Cook, 645 F. Supp. at 424-25. 
Plaintiffs also try to salvage the defective representations in Paragraph 737 by claiming 
that they somehow "refer to the allegations contained in paragraph 736." (Mem. in Opp'n 8.) In 
its entirety, paragraph 736 reads as follows: 
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736: The representations described in paragraph 315 were false as 
follows: 
a. The $6,800,000.00 loan could not be repaid in twelve 
months; and 
b. David Simpson and Nathan Simpson could not pay 
[Mower] $250,000.00 from the sale of each lot, nor did they intend to pay 
[Mower] $250,000.00 from the sale of each lot. 
(Complaint ^ 737.) Nothing in this paragraph, or in paragraph 737, suggests that the 
alleged representations in paragraph 737 refer in any way to the allegations in paragraph 
736. This after-the-fact attempt to prop up Plaintiffs' insufficient allegations should be 
rejected. 
B. Plaintiffs' Fraud Claims Related to Magnet Bank Are Based on 
Labels and Conclusions Rather Than Properly Pleaded Facts. 
Plaintiffs have not properly pleaded a factual basis for their claim that the offers 
referenced in the appraisal submitted by Free and Associates to Magnet Bank were "sham-real-
estate-transactions." (Complaint f 304.) Rather, Plaintiffs merely allege, "on information and 
belief," that each of the approximately 15 offers were somehow "contrived sham transactions." 
(Complaint ^ 304, 300-03.) However, fraud allegations made on information and believe are 
sufficient for Rule 9(b) purposes only if Plaintiffs "includef] the facts upon which the belief is 
based." Roth v. Pedersen, 2009 UT App 313, p (citing Kuhre v. Goodfellow, 2003 UT App 86, 
K 24, 69 P.3d 286); see also 2 Moore's Federal Practice § 9.03[l][g] (3d ed. 2010) ("Pleadings 
alleging fraud usually may not be based on information and belief."). 
Plaintiffs do not plead any facts demonstrating a basis for their "information and belief 
that the offers were somehow "sham transactions." They simply assert the conclusion. 
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Plaintiffs do not provide any additional basis for such "belief in their opposition memorandum, 
in which they conclusorily claim that the offers "were not real offers" and that they must have 
been made "with the intention of artificially raising the values of the real property." (Mem. in 
Opp'n 12.) Moreover, other allegations in the Complaint directly contradict Plaintiffs' "belief 
that the offers were "sham transactions." For example, Plaintiffs admit that because the debris 
collection basin remains unfinished, "The Preserve at Mapleton development cannot be 
completed," which would obviously prevent the offers from progressing to completed sales. 
(See Complaint If 381.) Indeed, the Free and Associates appraisal specified that the offers would 
not close until the lots were finished. (Mem. in Opp'n 10-11 ("Closing Date: Current Offer, to 
close when lots are finished.").) 
In short, Plaintiffs' fraud claim related to the offers referenced in the appraisal is based 
merely on unsupported labels and conclusions, which are insufficient to satisfy the requirements 
of Rule 9(b). See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937,1949-50 (2009) (condemning pleading of 
"labels and conclusions" that "do not permit the court to infer more than a mere possibility of 
misconduct") 
Plaintiffs' fraud allegations also fail with respect to the financial statements provided by 
the Simpsons in connection with the Magnet Bank loan. Plaintiffs argue that even a "cursory 
reading" of the 361-page Complaint would provide the details lacking in the allegations 
contained within this claim for fraud in paragraph 176-780. Plaintiffs then refer the Court and 
Defendants to allegations found in paragraphs 323-325 (a little more than halfway into the 
general facts section), which Plaintiffs' claim supply the missing details. However, nowhere in 
paragraphs 767-780 do Plaintiffs refer to paragraphs 323-325. Apparently, Plaintiffs expect the Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Court and Defendants to "sift[] through hundreds of paragraphs of alleged facts to ascertain 
whether Plaintiffs have allege[d] . . . facts necessary to make all their elements of fraud." 
Coroles, 2003 UT App 339, f 27. "This method for pleading fraud is unacceptable under rule 
9(b), especially in a complaint of such enormous length." Id. at ^ 26. 
Finally, Plaintiffs assert they have properly pleaded their fraud claim related to Defendant 
Aviano's purchase of Lot 76 by arguing that "[t]here is no requirement that Plaintiffs show as 
part of a fraud claim that Magnet Bank changed its position." (Mem. in Opp'n 14.) However, 
this is the very essence of fraud under Utah law, which requires that Plaintiffs prove that they did 
in fact rely on the alleged misrepresentations "and [were] thereby induced to ac t . . . to [their] 
injury and damage" Giusti v. Sterling Wentworih Corp., 2009 UT 2, f^ 53 n.38, 201 P.3d 966; 
see, e.g., Chang v. Soldier Summit Development, 1999 UT App 27, ^ f 7 (affirming summary 
judgment on fraud claim where only evidence of reliance was that plaintiffs "did not 'worry 
about the progress of the project'"). Consequently, Plaintiffs must allege "what particular 
damages were caused by each discrete action" taken in reliance on the alleged misrepresentations 
to satisfy Rule 9(b). (January 22, 2010 Order.) 
Plaintiffs do not allege any facts showing what damages were caused to Magnet Bank by 
each discrete action allegedly taken in reliance on the claimed misrepresentation concerning the 
price paid by Aviano. (See Complaint ffi[ 794-811.) Plaintiffs allege that "[i]f Magnet Bank had 
known the actual selling price, it would not have allowed the sale to go forward." (Complaint ^ 
806.) However, Plaintiffs do not allege what damages in particular were caused by Magnet 
2
 Defendants are unable to find any allegation in the Complaint that "had Magnet Bank and its participating bank 
known the truth, they would have at the very least insisted on payment of the previously agreed release price of 
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Bank's allowing the sale to go forward.3 Plaintiffs also allege that had Magnet Bank known the 
alleged "true" purchase price, it would have "taken steps to protect the collateral and the loan" 
and it "would have called the loan due." (Complaint ffi[ 806, 808.) But, Plaintiffs do not allege 
what damages resulted from Magnet Bank's not taking the unidentified steps to "protect the 
collateral" and not calling the loan due.4 Indeed, with respect to damages concerning the Aviano 
sale, Plaintiffs only generally allege as follows: 
811. As a direct and proximate result of David Simpson's, Nathan 
Simpson's and Michael Aviano's misrepresentations, as described in this cause of 
action, Leslie, LD III and Navona were damaged in the amount of at least 
$24,827,892.39. 
(Complaint f 811.) This does not satisfy the mandate of Rule 9(b) and the Court's January 22, 
2010 Order that Plaintiffs alleged "what particular damages were caused by each discrete action" 
taken in reliance on the alleged misrepresentations. 
Accordingly, the Magnet Bank fraud claims should be dismissed with prejudice. 
C. Plaintiffs Fail to Properly Plead Any Damages Resulting From the Alleged 
Fraudulent Nondisclosures Concerning the Double T Ranch Water Purchase. 
In its opening memorandum, Defendants argued that the fraud claims related to the 
Double T Ranch Water Purchase should be dismissed because Plaintiffs failed to allege how the 
claimed nondisclosures resulted in any damages. (Mem. in Supp. 14.) In response, Plaintiffs 
Belying any damage claim in this regard, Plaintiffs have affirmatively pleaded that Magnet Bank "received 
payment of $900,000.00 toward the purchase of Lot 67, but did not release its security interest." (Complaint ^f 410, 
802.) Moreover, assuming Plaintiffs' allegations that the values of the lots were artificially inflated are true, Magnet 
Bank was actually better off by receiving $900,000 instead of the "true" purchase price of $575,000. 
4
 Moreover, Plaintiffs do not explain what steps Magnet Bank would have taken to "protect the collateral," 
particularly in light of the fact that it did not release its security interest on the lot. (Complaint lfl[ 410.) Indeed, 
Plaintiff LD III has since acquired fee title to the property in a trustee's sale. (Complaint 1f 426.) Plaintiffs also do 
not explain how Magnet Bank would have been entitled to call the loan due. In reality, Magnet Bank began the 
process of calling the loan due only one month after the Aviano sale, declaring in a letter that it would not renew the 
loan. Magnet Bank eventually received payment in fiill from Navona, demonstrating that Magnet Bank did not 
suffer any damage. (Complaint ffif 414, 416.) Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
state that they "clearly allege that LD Ill's [and Mower's] funds were wrongfully taken, that they 
were used to purchase water shares which were titled in an entity owned by David Simpson, that 
LD III [and Mower] [were] never reimbursed for [their] funds and that the water shares were 
sold and that LD III [and Mover] never received any proceeds." (Mem. in Opp'n 16.) Plaintiffs 
further state that "[i]t is clear that LDIII and [Mower] were damaged in that their funds were 
taken and never repaid. (Id.) 
Tellingly, Plaintiffs make no attempt to explain how such damages resulted from the 
alleged nondisclosures. Plaintiffs thereby confirm that their claims related to the Double T 
Water Purchase have nothing to do with fraud. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' fraudulent nondisclosure 
claim with respect to the Double T Ranch Waiter Purchase should be dismissed. 
D. Plaintiffs Have Not Pleaded the Required Particularity Within Their Fraud 
Claims Concerning the Maple Mountain Water Project. 
Plaintiffs fail to plead the necessary facts within their claims for fraud related to the 
Maple Mountain Water Project. In their opposition memorandum, Plaintiffs argue that they have 
properly pleaded these claims, referring the Court to allegations contained in paragraph 479. 
However, paragraph 479 is not referenced in Plaintiffs' fraud claim, which is found in Paragraph 
1093-1107. Plaintiffs cannot expect the Court and Defendants to "sift[] through hundreds of 
paragraphs of alleged facts to ascertain whether Plaintiffs have allege[d]... facts necessary to 
make all their elements of fraud." Coroles, 2003 UT App 339, \ 27. "This method for pleading 
fraud is unacceptable under rule 9(b), especially in a complaint of such enormous length." Id. at 
ffi[ 26-30 (affirming dismissal of fraud claim for failure to meet the requirements of Rule 9(b)). 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The story told in Plaintiffs' opposition memorandum is simply not apparent when reading the 
fraud claim in the Complaint. 
In summary, Plaintiffs have again failed to plead their fraud claims with the particularity 
required under Rule 9(b) and should, therefore, be dismissed with prejudice. 
II. PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT DEMONSTRATES THAT DOLESZAR IS AN 
INDISPENSIBLE PARTY TO THIS CASE, REQUIRING DISMISSAL OF THE 
FRAUD CLAIMS IN HIS ABSENCE. 
A. The Allegations in Plaintiffs' Complaint Establish That Dolezsar Is the 
Central Figure in This Case and Is Necessary to Its Just Adjudication. 
Plaintiffs do not dispute that each of the alleged misrepresentations concerning the 
Hawaii Development, the Mapleton Development, and the Springville Property were made to 
Mower by Ken Dolezsar (Mower's late ex-husband). (See, e.g., Complaint fflf 543, 721, 731, 
734, 739, 757-58, 434, and 1014.) Yet, Plaintiffs claim that Defendants do not offer enough 
support to show that Dolezsar is the central figure in this case. Plaintiffs claim that Dolezsar was 
"[Mower's] husband and agent" and that he merely "relayed the misrepresentations made by 
David Simpson, Nathan Simpson and others to [Mower]." (Mem. in Opp'n 18-19, 23.) 
However, Plaintiffs cannot dispute their own allegations, which make clear that all of the 
alleged misrepresentations were made to Mower by Dolezsar. In paragraph 739, for example, 
Plaintiffs allege that "Ken Dolezsar, acting on authorization and instructions from David 
Simpson and Nathan Simpson, or as part of a conspiracy with David Simpson and Nathan 
Simpson, made the representations described in paragraph 316 herein to [Mower]." (Complaint 
If 739.) Likewise, in paragraph 734, Plaintiffs allege that "Ken Dolezsar, acting either on the 
authorization and instructions of David Simpson and Nathan Simpson or as part of a conspiracy 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
with the Simpsons, made the representations to [Mower] described in paragraph 315." 
(Complaint ^ 734.) Plaintiffs' own allegations thus establish that Dolezsar is the central figure in 
this case, and not merely a "go between" as argued in Plaintiffs' opposition memorandum. (See 
Mem. inOpp'n23.) 
In this regard, Dolezsar is just like Clark in the recent Utah Court of Appeals case of 
Turville v. J & J Properties, L. C., 2006 UT App 305,1445 P.3d 1146. As the person with whom 
the plaintiff had primarily dealt, Clark occupied a "pivotal representative role . . . in the 
transactions at issue." Id. at Yl 3-6, 39.5 As the alleged damages resulted primarily from Clark's 
actions, the Court concluded that Clark was a necessary party because "complete relief [could 
not] be accorded to those already parties" in his absence. Id. \ 39-40. 
Likewise, complete relief cannot be accorded to those already parties in this case without 
Dolezsar. As did Clark in the Turville case, Dolezsar played a "pivotal representative role" in 
the transactions at issue in this case. Plaintiffs allege that Dolezsar made all of the alleged 
misrepresentations of which Plaintiffs' complain. Plaintiffs have not cited a single instance in 
which David Simpson, Nathan Simpson, or any of the other Defendants made a 
misrepresentation directly to Mower. Rather, Plaintiffs claim David Simpson and Nathan 
Simpson "authorized and instructed" Dolezsar to make the alleged misrepresentations to Mower. 
(See, e.g., Complaint ffi[ 731, 734, 739.) However, Plaintiffs have not alleged any factual basis 
for what David Simpson, Nathan Simpson, or others may or may not have said to Dolezsar. 
Plaintiffs apparently rely in this regard on hearsay statements from Dolezsar. This further 
5
 Defendants inadvertently citied paragraph 9, rather than paragraph 39, when quoting referencing Clark's "pivotal 
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demonstrates that Dolezsar is the central figure in this case and that Plaintiffs5 alleged damages 
resulted primarily from his actions. See Turville, 2006 UT App 305, \ 40. Consequently, as was 
the case in Turville, the "interest of fairness to the parties in [this] litigation'5 dictates that 
Dolezsar be treated as a necessary party. Id. 
Plaintiffs attempt to distinguish the Turville case on the basis that Clark was actually 
named as a defendant in the complaint before he died. This distinction is without a difference. 
Whether a person is a necessary party under Rule 19(a) cannot turn merely on whether the 
plaintiff names such person as a defendant. Otherwise, plaintiffs could control the outcome of 
Rule 19 analysis merely by declining to name an otherwise necessary party as a defendant. 
Moreover, as they allege that Dolezsar made all of the representations of which they complain as 
part of a conspiracy to defraud Mower and her companies, Plaintiffs surely would have named 
Dolezsar as a defendant had they filed this case before he died or during the limitations period 
for joining his estate under Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-803(a). That Clark happened to die after the 
Turville complaint was filed does not make him any more necessary under Rule 19(a) than 
Dolezsar. 
For all of these reasons, Dolezsar is a necessary party to the just adjudication of this case. 
B. Application of the Factors in Rule 19(b) Demonstrates that Plaintiffs' Fraud 
Claims Cannot Proceed in Equity and Good Conscience in Dolezsar's 
Absence. 
The Court considers the following factors to determine "whether in equity and good 
conscience [Plaintiffs' fraud claims] should proceed" in Dolezsar's absence: 
[FJirst, to what extent a judgment rendered in the person's absence might be 
prejudicial to him or those already parties; second the extent to which, by 
protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other measure, Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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the prejudice can be lessoned or avoided; third, whether a judgment rendered in 
the person's absence will be adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiff will have an 
adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 19(b) (emphasis added). As the Rule itself "does not state what weight is to be 
given each factor," the Court "must determine the importance of each factor on the facts of each 
particular case and in light of equitable considerations." Glenny v. Am. Metal Climax, Inc., 494 
F.2d 651, 653 (10th Cir. 1974). 
Under the circumstances of this case, the prejudice that will result to Defendants if 
Plaintiffs' fraud claims are allowed to proceed in the absence of Dolezsar and his estate requires 
that the fraud claims be dismissed. 
1. Defendants Will Be Unfairly Prejudiced If Plaintiffs Are Allowed to 
Proceed With Their Fraud Claims in Dolezsar's Absence. 
The Turville case recently decided by the Utah Court of Appeals is directly on point with 
respect to the issue of prejudice to Defendants. In Turville, the court relied heavily on two facts 
in holding that Clark was an indispensable party. Turville, 2006 UT App 305, Yi 41-42. First, 
Clark was "the major, if not the sole, actor responsible for Plaintiffs' alleged damages." Second, 
the plaintiffs failed to join Clark while he was alive and failed to join his estate within the 
limitations period after his death. Id. Under these circumstances, the court found that it was 
unfair and prejudicial to require the other defendants to defend the case in Clark's absence. Id. 
In this case, Defendants will likewise be unfairly prejudiced by any judgment issued in 
the absence of Dolezsar, the central party responsible for the damages alleged by Plaintiffs. 
Plaintiffs have specifically alleged that all of the claimed misrepresentations were made to 
Mower by Dolezsar. Plaintiffs do not cite a single instance in which any of the Defendants made 
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a false or misleading representation directly to Mower. To the extent Plaintiffs attempt to impute 
any of Dolezsar's alleged misrepresentations to the other defendants, they apparently do so based 
solely on hearsay statements made by Dolezsar. As a practical matter, these inadmissible 
hearsay statements will not be considered as evidence in this case. Moreover, Plaintiffs will be 
unable to question Dolezsar concerning his alleged misrepresentations. Gardiner v. Virgin 
Islands Water & Power Auth, 145 F.3d 635, 641 (3d Cir. 1998) (recognizing possibility for 
prejudice resulting from inability to collect evidence from absent party). Under these 
circumstances, which are indistinguishable from those at issue in Turville, it is simply unfair and 
prejudicial to require Defendants to defend against Plaintiffs' fraud claims in Dolezsar's absence. 
See Turville, 2006 UT App 305, \ 40 (citing Kemp v. Murray, 680 P.2d 758, 760 (Utah 1984) for 
the proposition that Rule 19 "seeks to protect the interest of fairness to the parties as well as the 
interest of judicial economy"). 
Moreover, should the Court allow Plaintiffs' fraud claims to proceed without Dolezsar. 
Defendants will be at risk of incurring, double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations. 
Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, at 110 (1968) ("[T]he 
defendant may properly wish to avoid multiple litigation, or inconsistent relief, or sole 
responsibility for a liability he shares with another.") The one year statute of limitations set forth 
in Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-803(a) applies to claims against the estate, but not claims brought by 
the estate on behalf of Dolezsar. In fact, under Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-108, the applicable 
statutes of limitations on any claims held by Dolezsar at his death were automatically tolled for a 
period of 12 months. Accordingly, Dolezsar's estate is not precluded by Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-
803(a) from bringing claims against Defendants related to Plaintiffs' fraud claims However, Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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because Plaintiffs failed to bring this action against Dolezsar's estate within the limitations 
period under Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-803(a), Defendants are unable to assert their related claims 
against Dolezsar. Consequently, Defendants are not only at risk of incurring multiple or 
inconsistent obligations in subsequent litigation, but they would be precluded from asserting 
their claims against the estate in any such proceeding. This unfair prejudice must be prevented. 
Plaintiffs argue that Dolezsar is not an indispensable party, citing to the general rule that 
"Rule 19 does not require the joinder of joint tortfeasors . . . or parties against whom [the parties] 
have claim for contribution." (Mem. in Opp'n *([ 27-28, quoting Nottingham v. Gen. Am. 
Commons Corp., 811 F.2d 873, 880 (5th Cir. 1987).) However, as outlined above, Dolezsar is 
not a mere joint tortfeasor, but is the party primarily responsible for the alleged fraudulent 
conduct of which Plaintiffs' complain. The Utah Court of Appeals recognized in Turville that 
situations like those of Clark and Dolezsar are not governed by the general rule. See Turville, 
2006 UT App 305, ^ f 40; see also Freeman v. Northwest Acceptance Corp., 754 F.2d 553, 559 
(5th Cir. 1985) (dismissing case where absent subsidiary company was "more than an active 
participant in the [wrong] alleged by [the plaiintiffs]; it was the primary participant."). This case 
is indistinguishable from the Turville case and, therefore, requires the same result — dismissal 
for failure to join Dolezsar during the limitations period. 
2. Prejudice to Defendants Cannot Be Avoided By Any Protective 
Measures. 
Plaintiffs do not address the second factor listed in Rule 19(b), and therefore concede that 
the prejudice which would result to Defendants if Plaintiffs' fraud claims proceed in Dolezsar's 
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absence cannot be avoided by any protective provisions in a potential judgment or other 
measures. 
3. The Court Cannot Render An Adequate Judgment on Plaintiffs 
Fraud Claims in Dolezsar's Absence. 
The third factor listed in Rule 19(b) — whether a judgment rendered in the person's 
absence will be adequate — "refer[s] to [the] public stake in settling disputes by wholes, 
whenever possible." Provident Tradesmens, 390 U.S. at 111. Nonetheless, Plaintiffs incorrectly 
argue that whether a judgment is adequate should be determined from the Plaintiffs' point of 
view, claiming that Plaintiffs will have an adequate remedy without the joinder of Dolezsar or 
his estate. (Mem. in Opp'n 28.) The Tenth Circuit has heard and rejected this argument. See 
Davis v. United States, 343 F.3d 1282, 1292-93(10th Cir. 2003) (rejecting the plaintiffs' 
argument that a judgment would be adequate because it would afford the plaintiffs complete 
relief). 
Applying the standards set forth by the Supreme Court in Provident Tradesmens 
demonstrates that any judgment rendered in Dolezsar's absence would be inadequate. 
Dolezsar's estate is not precluded under Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-803 from bringing claims 
related to the alleged fraud against Defendants in further proceedings, thereby subjecting 
Defendants to risk of incurring multiple or inconsistent obligations. Moreover, because Plaintiffs 
did not timely join the estate to this proceeding, this Court cannot hear Defendants' claims 
against Dolezsar relating to the alleged fraud. Therefore, any judgment rendered in Dolezsar's 
absence will be inadequate. 
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4. Plaintiffs Have An Adequate Remedy In This Case. 
Upon dismissal of their fraud claims, Plaintiffs will still have some 48 causes of action in 
this case, including claims for breach of contract, fiduciary duty, conversion, and unjust 
enrichment. Plaintiffs argue that these claims do not provide a remedy for their fraud 
allegations. However, any deficiency in this regard results solely from Plaintiffs' failure to join 
Dolezsar's estate within the applicable limitations period The Court should not allow Plaintiffs 
to wait until after the central figure in this case can no longer be joined to seek recovery from 
others who are alleged only to have acted in concert with him. Accordingly, the Court should 
assign little weight to this factor, particularly when compared to the prejudice that will be 
experienced if Plaintiffs fraud claims are allowed to go forward in Dolezsar's absence. See 
Turville, 2006 UT App 305, ^  41-42 (declining to consider the plaintiffs lack of adequate 
remedy in similar circumstances). 
Therefore, considering the factors set forth in Rule 19(b), Plaintiffs' fraud claims cannot 
proceed in equity and good conscience in the absence of the Dolezsar and his estate and must be 
dismissed accordingly. 
i n . THE COMPLAINT DOES NOT STATE A CLAIM FOR FRAUDULENT 
NONDISCLOSURE WITH RESPECT TO THE DOUBLE T RANCH WATER 
PURCHASE. 
In their opposition memorandum, Plaintiffs contend that proving reliance is not required 
to recover on a claim for fraudulent nondisclosure, citing to the case of Yazd v. Woodside Homes 
Corp, 2006 UT 46. Plaintiffs are correct that Yazd does not use the word "reliance" in listing the 
elements of fraudulent nondisclosure. Id. \ 10. However, the concept of reliance is clearly 
embodied in the first element listed by the Yazd court: "a plaintiff must prove (1) that the 
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nondisclosed information is material " Id. The Yazd court defined materiality as "something 
which a buyer or seller of ordinary intelligence and prudence would think to be of.. . 
importance in determining whether to buy or sell." Id. at f 32. In other words, the fact must 
have been important enough that its nondisclosure would "induce action on the part of the other 
party, with actual justifiable reliance resulting in damage to that party." Barber Bros. Ford, Inc. 
v. FoianinU 2008 UT App 463,12.6 
In Plaintiffs' fraudulent nondisclosure claim related to the Double T Ranch Water 
Purchase, Plaintiffs allege that David Simpson fraudulently failed to disclose to Mower that he 
had used money from Plaintiff LD III to purchase water shares in the name of Defendant Wood 
Springs, as well as other alleged happenings subsequent to the alleged purchase. (Complaint ^ 
1176-79.) However, Plaintiffs do not allege that these nondisclosures induced any action or 
influenced any decision by Mower. Plaintiffs simply allege that Simpson's failure to disclose 
somehow damaged Mower and LD III in the amount of $300,125.00. (Complaint ^ 1182.) 
These allegations do not support a claim for fraud and should, therefore, be dismissed. 
IV. THE COURT SHOULD DECLINE TO CREATE NEW CAUSES OF ACTION 
FOR AIDING AND ABETTING, WHICH HAVE NOT BEEN RECOGNIZED AS 
VALID CLAIMS UNDER UTAH LAW. 
Plaintiffs admit that the Utah Supreme Court has not yet recognized civil causes of action 
for aiding and abetting. See Coroles v. Sabey, 2003 UT App 339, 79 P.3d 974 (declining to 
decide whether claims for aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty and fraud are cognizable 
under Utah law. The process of creating new law should left to the Utah Supreme Court. To the 
6
 Plaintiffs complain of Defendants' citation to the unpublished Foianini case. However, Rule 30(f) of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure expressly allows for citation of unpublished decisions "in all courts of the state." Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
extent Plaintiffs wish to broaden their net with respect to claims for breach of fiduciary duty and 
fraud, they should be required to prove their claims for conspiracy and violation of the Utah 
Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act, which have been recognized as valid causes of action under 
Utah law. 
CONCLUSION 
For all of the reasons set forth above, Plaintiffs' fraud-based claims should be dismissed 
for failure to plead with particularity as required by Rule 9(b) and failure to join an indispensible 
party under Rule 19(b). Additionally, Plaintiffs' fraud claims with respect to the alleged 
purchase of water shares from Double T Ranch, as well as their "aiding and abetting" claims, 
should be dismissed for failure to state a claim under Utah law. 
DATED this today of May, 2010. 
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER P.C. 
Craig Carlile 
Caleb J. Frischknecht 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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that will be fine. 
MR. JENNINGS: And again, I feel I should get the 
opportunity to reply to the argument that 9(b) is the 
standard, ITm not saying itfs not. But 9(b) interplays with 
12(b) which interplays with 8. 
THE COURT: Well, okay. Well, I understand your 
argument on that. I understand what you1re saying. 
MR. JENNINGS: Thank: you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: But I am inclined to agree with 
Mr. Carlile. Fraud is — fraud and a mutual mistake are 
peculiar animals, and they have to be pled with 
particularity. You get a lot more inferences under Rule 
12(b) then you do under 9(b). Okay? Thatfs my position. 
So okay. All right. 
The Court's prepared to rule in this case. I 
appreciate the memoranda that have been submitted and the 
arguments of counsel. I have read all of those. I have 
read through the Second Amended Complaint. And let me state 
— let me first go through the items addressed by 
Mr. Carlile. 
The Court is going the grant the motion to dismiss 
the fraud-based claims, and I will do that — I won't stay 
here — I don't want to go — rehash all of those reasons, 
but in addition to what Mr. Carlile said, there's another 
reason. 
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1 The plaintiff in this case, the live breathing 
2 plaintiff, Ms. Mower, was directly privy to what was said to 
3 her. She has all of that information in her knowledge. She 
4 was — she was there. I mean, she knows where that should 
5 have occurred, when it would have occurred, what words were 
6 used, who else was present, all those types of things that 
7 the Court indicated in its prior rulings. Those things were 
8 not included in the Complaint, and that would be an 
9 additional reason for finding that there was no 
10 particularity. 
11 Also, I do believe that this Complaint was a big 
12 huge improvement over the last one, but still there are 
13 circumstances where there were not references to earlier 
14 facts that were pleaded, and I do not believe that counsel 
15 and the Court should have to guess where those facts are 
16 coming from or go back and research where those facts are 
17 coming from. Those should be identified and included in the 
18 cause of action, but that!s just redundant. That's 
19 something that Mr. Carlile had already addressed. 
20 With respect to the Double T claim, I would also 
21 note that there is a failure to state a claim in that there 
22 was no alleged reliance, or action, or inaction, change of 
23 position based on what was allegedly conferred. 
24 And with respect to the Rule 19(b), Ifm going to 
25 actually reserve ruling on that. I want to look at that 
183 
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1 some more. I did read through the memoranda. I did read 
2 the Turville case and so forth, but I would like to review 
3 further and make a determination on that. 
4 Let's see, the aiding and abetting claims are 
5 dismissed. The Court is not going to create a new cause of 
6 action; that is not the Court's province. I don't know what 
7 the supreme court would do in this circumstance, maybe they 
8 would follow the 56 percent of the states that are doing 
9 that, maybe they wouldn't, it's very difficult to say. But 
10 that would not be something I would be inclined to go 
11 forward on. 
12 Let's see — 
13 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Is that with prejudice, Your 
14 Honor? 
15 THE COURT: I'm getting there, okay, I'm getting 
16 there. It's without legal amend, let me say that. So I 
17 think those cover the arguments by Mr. Carlile. Okay. 
18 Now, let's turn over to Mr. Nemelka here. Find my 
19 notes. Okay. The fraud claims against Mr. Nemelka are not 
20 pled with particularity for the reasons that have been 
21 stated; however, with respect to the conspiracy and 
22 injunction matter, again, injunction is a remedy but it's 
23 pled as a cause of action. So it's pled. I don't weigh — 
24 I don't weigh the evidence on a motion to dismiss and say, 
25 yeah, there's grounds for an injunction here or not. All I 
184 
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look at is the allegations and say are the elements pled, 
they're pled. So I'm not going to dismiss the injunction 
claim. 
Same thing with the conspiracy because it's not a 
fraud-based claim, it's relating to an alleged breach of 
fiduciary duty and a conspiracy to do that. Again, I don't 
think there's — I mean, if all of this evidence was proved, 
I think you'd have a hard time selling this to a finder of 
fact; but nonetheless, you have the opportunity to try. 
So again, I'm not weighing the evidence here, I'm 
not saying that the claim is valid. All I'm saying is it 
was pled and that's all I'm saying. So you do have — so 
you do have those claims with respect to Mr. Nemelka. 
And the same — and then also, I believe, you had 
him enjoined in the UPUA claim, right? 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Correct. 
THE COURT: So same thing on the UPUA. Again, 
they're not alleging the fraud-based claim under the UPUA, 
they're saying they're just going after the fiduciary duty 
issue. So that claim survives, that was pled. 
The same — the same reasoning would apply to 
Mr. Carlson on the conspiracy and the UPUA, and then the 
injunctive claim. The same would apply to — 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Mr. Hakes. 
THE COURT: — Mr. Hakes and his related entity. 
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1 With respect to Mr. Aviano, the fraud claim is not 
2 properly plead. It's not pled with particularity. I am —. 
3 in addition to what was stated in counsel's briefs, today we 
4 find out outside the Complaint that we do know who this 
5 deputy assessor is. We were introduced to him, but that 
6 information's not included. So it's things like that that 
7 would create the — create the issue here. 
8 I recognize plaintiffs' concern with not being able 
9 to put everything in here because they don't know yet. I 
10 mean, they don't know all that yet. The fact is the things 
11 that they do know they don't put in the Complaint, at least 
12 to the extent that they know them. So that's the concern of 
13 the Court. 
14 But again, with Mr. Aviano, I believe that the 
15 conspiracy, the UPUA and the negligent misrepresentation 
16 claims have been adequately pled and would survive in this 
17 case. Again, not passing judgment on the how strong those 
18 claims are or anything of that nature, but merely stating 
19 that they've set out a claim in the Complaint. 
20 So there will not be leave to amend in this case, 
21 this would be going on our third — well, as Mr. Carlile 
22 says we'd be down the road on this quite a ways. We need to 
23 get going on this case. 
24 So plaintiff will be allowed to try and prove their 
25 causes of action for the things such as conversion, and I 
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believe that they will have — and those other matters, I 
believe they will have the opportunity to do that; breach of 
fiduciary duty, the contract claims and so forth, they'll be 
allowed to do that. And if those can survive summary 
judgment, then they will be able to present those at trial. 
So that would be the ruling of the Court in this 
case. I wondered if, Mr. Carlile, if you would mind 
preparing an order in this case? 
MR. CARLILE: I will. 
THE COURT: And submitting that to counsel. And 
again, I appreciate — I appreciate what everyone said here 
today. I thought that I was persuaded by everybody's 
arguments, but I believe I've made the right decision. 
Mr. Jennings? 
MR. JENNINGS: Your Honor, we would ask that you 
certify the dismissal of the aiding and abetting claims as 
final orders. 
THE COURT: I'm not going to do that because you 
have to comply with Rule — well, I don't even think you can 
— it's not under Rule — well, you'd have to comply with 
Rule 54 on that, okay, if you want to do that. Okay? 
And if you want to do that, we can look at that 
because I want the other side to be able to look at that, 
all right, and make an objection. So look under Rule 54(b), 
I believe it is, for a motion for certification and I'll be 
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1 C E R T I F I C A T E 
2 I STATE OF UTAH 
) 
3 | COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
4 
5 I This is to certify that the foregoing proceedings 
6 were transcribed by me, Matthew B. Rose, RPR, a Certified 
7 I Shorthand Reporter and Official Court Transcriber in and for 
the State of Utah; 
10 I That the proceedings were reported by me in 
11 stenotype from an audio recording and thereafter caused by 
12 me to be transcribed into typewriting; and that said 
13 transcript contains all of the evidence, objections of 
14 counsel and rulings of the Court and all matters to which 
15 the same relate; and that the foregoing pages constitute a 
16 I true and accurate transcription of said proceedings. 
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4TH DISTRICT* V 
STATE OF UTAH 1/ 
uwi COUNTY 
Craig Carlile (0571) 
Caleb J. Frischknecht (11648) 
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER P.C. 
86 North University Avenue, #430 
Provo,Utah 84601-4420 
Telephone: (801) 342-2400 
Attorneys for Defendants David R. Simpson, Nathan R. Simpson, Michael K. Thompson, Todd 
Dorny, Brandon Dente, ALS Properties, LLC, Mai Ke Kula, LLC, Hanalei Kai Holdings, LLC, 
Ka Mahina, LLC, He Kiakolu, LLC, Koamalu Plantation, LLC, Landmark Real Estate, Inc., 
Wood Springs, LLC, Oak Leaf, LLC, Dente, LLC, Sunny Ridge, LLC, KNDJ Development, LLC, 
DN Simpson Holdings, LLC, SOS Mapleton Development, LLC, DN Simpson Mapleton 
Holdings, LLC, The Preserve at Mapleton Development Company, LLC, Pheasant Meadows, 
LLC, Carnesecca Orchard Estates, LLC, Spanish Vista Plat I, LLC, Landmark Homes of Utah, 
LLC, Maple Mountain Water Tank, LLC, and Kathy A. Templeman 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, PROVO DEPARTMENT 
LESLIE D. MOWER, an individual; et al., 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
DAVID R. SIMPSON, an individual; et al., 
Defendants 
and 
KOAMALU PLANTATION INVESTMENT, 
LLC, a Utah limited liability company, et al., 
Rule 19 Defendants. 
RULING AND ORDER ON 
DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS 
THE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT 
Civil No: 090403844 
Judge: Samuel D. McVey 
Before the Court are the following motions to dismiss related to the Second Amended 
Complaint: Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint (the "Simpson Motion"); Defendant 
Michael W. Aviano's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint (the "Aviano 
cent 
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Motion"); Defendant Chad D. Carlson's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Second Amended 
Complaint (the "Carlson Motion"); and Defendant David Nemelka's Motion to Dismiss (the 
"Nemelka Motion"). 
After careful review of the memoranda and authorities submitted by the parties, and 
having heard oral argument concerning the matters, the Court will dismiss Plaintiffs' fraud-based 
claims (Claim Nos. 1, 4, 5, 11, 14, 15, 21, 24, 26, 29, and 321), as well as Plaintiffs' claims for 
conspiracy (Claim Nos. 9, 19,25, and 30) and violation of the Utah Pattern of Unlawful Activity 
Act (Claim Nos. 10 and 20) to the extent they are based on allegations of fraud, for failure to 
plead with particularity as required by Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). The Court previously 
dismissed all of the fraud allegations in Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint for failure to meet 
the pleading standards under Rule 9(b), but allowed Plaintiffs one more chance to plead its fraud 
claims concisely and with particularity. Despite Plaintiffs' addition of 145 more pages, the 
Second Amended Complaint still does not provide the particularity mandated by Rule 9(b). 
Instead, Plaintiffs' "much too long and involved" Second Amended Complaint merely "dumps 
upon the [Court]... the burden of sifting through the hundreds of paragraphs of alleged facts to 
ascertain whether Plaintiffs have allege[d]... the facts necessary to make all their elements of 
fraud." Coroles v. Sabey, 2003 UT App 339,1ff[ 23, 27, 79 P.3d 974 (internal quotations 
omitted). Accordingly, for the reasons set forth in the memoranda supporting the Simpson 
Motion, the Court will dismiss Plaintiffs' fraud-based claims without leave to amend. 
1
 The Court will also dismiss Claim No. 32 for failure to state a claim under Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Claim No. 32 
is a fraudulent nondisclosure claim. Yet, Plaintiffs fail to allege that any of the facts Defendants allegedly failed to 
disclose induced any action or influenced any decision of Plaintiffs. 
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Additionally, the Court will dismiss Plaintiffs' claims for aiding and abetting (Claim Nos. 
3, 5,13, and 15) for failure to state a claim under Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The Utah Supreme 
Court has not yet recognized a claim for aiding and abetting under Utah law, and the Court 
declines to do so here. See Coroles v. Sabey, 2003 UT App 339, 79 P.3d 974 (declining to 
decide whether claims for aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty and fraud are cognizable 
under Utah law). 
The Court has taken under advisement the issues raised in the Simpson Motion under 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 19(b) and will issue a ruling after further review. 
The Court denies the Aviano Motion, the Carlson Motion, and the Nemelka Motion with 
respect to Plaintiffs' conspiracy claim related to the Mapleton development (Claim No. 19), to 
the extent such claim is based on alleged breaches of fiduciary duties, which are not subject to 
the particularity requirements of Utah R. Civ. P. 9(b). Likewise, the Nemelka Motion is denied 
with respect to Plaintiffs' claim under the Utah Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act (Claim No. 20), 
insofar as that claim is not based on allegations of fraud. Finally, the Court denies the Aviano 
Motion with respect to Plaintiffs' claim for negligent misrepresentation concerning the Mapleton 
development, which claim the Court finds is not subject to the particularity requirements of Utah 
R. Civ. P. 9(b). 
Accordingly, for all of the reasons set forth above, and those stated by the Court from the 
bench during the May 13,2010 hearing in this matter, 
2
 To the extent alleged against Defendants Carlson, 2 Brothers Communication, Allen Hakes, Lonestar Gutters, 
LLC, Dallas Hakes, Lonestar Builders, LLC, and Aviano, Plaintiffs' Claim No. 20 is based entirely on Plaintiffs' 
inadequate fraud allegations. Accordingly, Claim No. 20 shall be dismissed in its entirety with respect to these 
defendants, for the reasons set forth above. 
1 
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Claim Nos. 1,4, 5,11, 14,15, 21,24,26, 29, and 32 in 
the Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint are DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND 
for failure to meet the pleading standard found in Utah R. Civ. P. 9(b). 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Claim Nos. 9,10,19,25, and 30 in the Plaintiffs' 
Second Amended Complaint are DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND to the extent 
those claims are based on allegations of fraud for failure to meet the pleading standard found in 
Utah R. Civ. P. 9(b). 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Claim No. 20 in the Plaintiffs' Second Amended 
Complaint is DISMISSED IN ITS ENTIRETY AND WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND with 
respect to Defendants Carlson, 2 Brothers Communication, Allen Hakes, Lonestar Gutters, LLC, 1 
Dallas Hakes, Lonestar Builders, LLC, and Aviano for failure to meet the pleading standard 
found in Utah R. Civ. P. 9(b). 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Claim No. 20 in the Plaintiffs' Second Amended 
Complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND with respect to the remaining 
Defendants to the extent Claim No. 20 is based on allegations of fraud for failure to meet the A 
pleading standard found in Utah R. Civ. P. 9(b). 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Claim Nos. 3, 5,13,15, and 32 are DISMISSED 
WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND under Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b) for failure to state a claim upon * 
which relief can be granted. 
1 
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a 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LESLIE D. MOWER, an individual; et al., 
Plaintiff, 
v. 




INVESTMENT, LLC, a Utah limited liability 
company, et al., 
Rule 19 Defendants 
RULING AND ORDER ON 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS 
FRAUD CLAIMS IN SECOND 
AMENDED COMPLAINT UNDER RULE 
19 
Case No: 090403844 
Judge Samuel D. McVey 
The Court, having heard the arguments of counsel and having carefully reviewed the 
motion and memoranda submitted by counsel makes the following Ruling and Order. 
I. Procedural History 
The current case was filed in October, 2009. On March 5, 2010, Ms. Mower and the 
other plaintiffs ("Ms. Mower") filed a Second Amended Complaint. On April 13,2010, the 
Simpson defendants filed a Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss Second Amended 
Complaint including an argument that the estate of Mr. Dolezsar, Ms. Mower's deceased 
husband who died on November 15, 2007, should have been joined as a necessary and 
indispensable party. On April 26, 2010, Ms. Mower filed a Memorandum in Opposition to the 
Simpson Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint. On May 6, 
2010, the Simpson Defendants filed a Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss 
Second Amended Complaint. The Court heard oral argument and took the issue under 
advisement. 
II. Analysis 
The Simpson and related defendants (the "Simpsons"), argue plaintiffs fraud claims 
should be dismissed under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 19(b) as Ken Dolezsar is a 
necessary and indispensible party to this case and cannot now be joined because the statute of 
limitations in which to sue his estate has run. The Simpsons support this argument by citing 
Turville v. J&J Properties, L.C9145 P.3d 1146 (Utah App. 2006). Turville quotes from Seftel v. 
Capital City in setting out the required steps for a case to be dismissed under Rule 19(b). Seftel 
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v. Capital CityJBank, 767 P.2d 941, 945 (Utah App. 1989). First, a court must determine if a 
party "has sufficient interest in the action to make it a necessary party." Id. Second, if the court 
has held the party is necessary, and joinder is not feasible, the court must determine whether a 
party is indispensable. See id. To determine if a party is indispensable, the court considers the 
four factors found in Rule 19(b): 
1) To what extent a judgment rendered in the person's absence might be prejudicial to 
him or those already parties. 
2) The extent to which the prejudice can be lessened or avoided. 
3) Whether a judgment rendered in a person's absence will be adequate. 
4) Whether a plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for 
nonjoinder. 
Simpsons compare Mr. Dolezsar in the present case to Mr. Clark in Turville as one who 
occupied a pivotal representative role. Mr. Clark actively participated in a scheme to defraud 
other parties and was the figure in the scheme who withheld material information from and 
made false representations to property owners. Like Mr. Clark in Turville, Mr. Dolezsar was the 
person with whom Ms. Mower dealt. Ms. Mower does not dispute that Dolezsar passed all of the 
allegedly fraudulent information to her. Ms. Mower does not cite an instance where Simpsons 
directly made a misrepresentation to her. Additionally, there is no factual basis in the complaint 
for what, if anything, Simpsons actually told Mr. Dolezsar and no way of determining the 
accuracy of any information Mr. Dolezsar may have passed to Ms. Mower from Simpsons. This 
is one of the problems with the fraud allegation in the Complaint. What Mr. Doleszar 
specifically told Ms. Mower and how and where he said it is presumably known only to her, but 
none of her complaints identify it with particularity. 
Ms. Mower does not contest the inability to join Dolezsar's estate due to the statute of 
limitations but disagrees Turville is applicable to the present case. Ms. Mower states the only 
similarity Turville and the present matter is someone died and thus could not be joined. Ms. 
Mower attempts to distinguish Mr. Dolezsar from Mr. Clark, the Turville party, by referring to 
Mr. Dolezsar as a simple go-between while Mr. Clark was a principle perpetrator of fraud. 
However, Ms. Mower previously admitted more than this. In the Second Amended Complaint, 
Ms. Mower acknowledged all the alleged misrepresentations from Simpsons were made by Mr. 
Dolezsar to Ms. Mower, and Mr. Dolezsar may have been acting as part of the alleged 
conspiracy. Again, she does not give sufficient particulars even though she is presumably the 
only one with specific knowledge, and omitted an adequate explanation of why she did not share 
that knowledge in her serial complaints. 
Additionally, Ms. Mower claims Simpsons do not meet the standard for Rule 19 as stated 
in Grand County v. Rogers, 44 P. 3d 734 (Utah 2002). In Grand County, the court determined 
the burden was on the party attempting to persuade the court to present specific facts. Id at 741. 
Ms. Mower claims Simpsons did not present specific facts sufficient to meet the Rule 19 
standard. However, Simpsons accurately presented the facts alleged in the Second Amended 
Complaint, noting that all of the alleged fraudulent information passed to Ms. Mower came via 
Mr. Dolezsar, and Mr. Dolzesar may have been part of the alleged conspiracy. 
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In the present case, the Court finds the Second Amended Complaint alleges, at least m 
the alternative, Mr. Dolezsar acted as more than a simple go-between. He occupied a pivotal 
representative role in the alleged fraud. In his absence, complete relief would not be available 
for those who are already parties because of the inability to hold him accountable as well as the 
other reasons identified by Simpsons. There is, therefore, sufficient interest to make him a party 
to this action. The statute of limitations as found in Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-803(1) (a) - (b) 
(1993)) has already run and Mr. Dolezsar cannot be joined unless Ms. Mower presented an 
exception to tolling the limitations period, which she has not attempted to do. Thus, the Court 
will look to the Rule 19(b) factors to determine whether Mr. Dolezsar is an indispensable party. 
No Rule 19 factor is determinative and each must be given weight appropriate to the facts of this 
case. Glenny v. Am. Metal Climax, Inc., 494 F. 2d 651, 653 (10th Cir. 1974). 
First, the Court must determine to what extent a judgment rendered in the person's 
absence might be prejudicial to him or those already parties to the action. Ms. Mower claims 
Mr. Dolezsar is simply a joint tortfeasor and his absence would not unfairly prejudice any current 
parties. Simpsons properly assert Mr. Dolezsar is more than a mere joint tortfeasor and is one of 
the major actors in this case—potentially one who self-dealt and defrauded others; all the 
allegedly fraudulent statements were made to Ms. Mower by Mr. Dolezsar. The Defendants will 
be unfairly prejudiced by any judgment issued in the absence of Mr. Dolezsar because of, for 
example, their inability to cross claim against him. 
Second, the Court must decide the extent to which the prejudice can be mitigated. Ms. 
Mower made no argument concerning this factor, however Simpsons properly noted the 
prejudice can be avoided by dismissing the claims for fraud. 
Third, the Court must ascertain whether a judgment rendered in a person's absence will 
be adequate. Ms. Mower claims the Court should consider adequacy of judgment from the 
Plaintiffs point-of-view. In Davis v. United States, 343 F.3d 1282,1292-93 (10th Cir. 2003) the 
Tenth Circuit addresses adequacy not from the standpoint of the plaintiff, but by evaluating the 
quality of the resolution of the dispute. Id. In looking at the resolution, judgment rendered 
without Mr. Dolezsar would be inadequate because, among other things mentioned by Simpsons, 
no cross claims can now be brought against his estate. 
Finally, the Court must determine whether a plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the 
action is dismissed for nonjoinder. Dismissal of the fraud claims will not affect Ms. Mower's 
claims for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, conversion and unjust enrichment. The 
Court is well aware these claims may not perfectly protect Ms. Mower's interests were all of the 
facts alleged to be proved. (The Court previously ruled, however, inadequate facts regarding 
fraud were alleged by plaintiffs.) In the absence of Mr. Dolezsar and with the inability to join his 
estate as a party at this juncture, the remaining claims must suffice. 
Based on the above analysis and all other reasons stated by Simpsons, the Court finds 
Simpsons would be substantially prejudiced by proceeding with the fraud claims in the absence 
of Mr. Dolezsar. Mr. Dolezsar played a key role in the communication of the information which 
is claimed to form the basis of the alleged fraud in this action. The Court cannot conclude an 
adequate resolution to the claims for fraud may be reached in the absence of Mr. Dolezsar's 
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estate, and the only way to mitigate the resulting prejudice to Simpsons is to dismiss the claims 
for fraud. Ms. Mower's remaining claims provide an adequate remedy for the injuries of which 
she complains. 
III. Conclusion 
The Simpson defendant's Motion to Dismiss fraud claims in the Second Amended 
Complaint on the basis of Rule 19 is GRANTED. 
6 Of Jy UN-DATED this /fc? of vJt/fcuL. ,2010 
BY THE COURT: 
S f^tifel D. McVey ^ • 
District Court Judge "" 
4 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 090403844 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
MAIL: BART J BAILEY 584 S STATE ST OREM, UT 84058 
MAIL: CRAIG CARLILE 86 NORTH UNIVERSITY STE 430 RAY QUINNEY & 
NEBEKER PROVO UT 84601-4420 
MAIL: MARK D EDDY 23 3 S PLEASANT GROVE BLVD STE 2 02 PLEASANT GROVE 
UT 84062 
MAIL: CHRISTOPHER D GREENWOOD 1840 N STATE ST SUITE 200 PROVO UT 
84604-0117 
MAIL: JONATHAN L JAUSSI PO BOX 460 PAYSON UT 84651 
MAIL: JULIAN D JENSEN 311 S STATE ST STE 3 80 SALT LAKE CITY UT 
84111 
MAIL: LAURA S SCOTT 201 S MAIN ST STE 18 0 0 PO BOX 45898 SALT LAKE 
CITY UT 84145-0898 
MAIL: DENVER C SNUFFER 10 8 85 S STATE ST SANDY UT 8407 0 
MAIL: STEVEN R SUMSION WELLS FARGO BUILDING 86 N UNIVERSITY AVE 
STE 400 PROVO UT 84601 
Date: io\fl\)Q CttiM J f e ^ ~ ' ~ 
Deputy Court Clerk 
Page 1 (last) 
DOC? 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
